Movement at the Station”: Canadian Central Bank Governor Carney on the Age of Deleveraging

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There was movement at the station,
for the word had passed around
That the colt from old Regret had got away…
("Banjo" Patterson, "The Man from Snowy River")

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Before I make any critical remarks, I'll start by saying that I'm delighted to see the Governor of a Central Bank even refer to Hyman Minsky, let alone acknowledge that we are in a "Minsky Moment" (p. 4: "The global Minsky moment has arrived"—or should that be Millennium?), to acknowledge that we are now in an Age of Deleveraging (the speech's title was "Growth in the age of deleveraging”), to focus upon the impact of changes in the aggre­gate level of debt rather than merely on its dis­tri­b­u­tion (p. 1: “Accu­mu­lat­ing the moun­tain of debt now weigh­ing on advanced economies has been the work of a gen­er­a­tion”), and to coun­te­nance that debt write­offs may have a role to play in escap­ing from this never-ending cri­sis (Car­ney 2011, p. 6: “Whether we like it or not, debt restruc­tur­ing may hap­pen”).

By way of con­trast, so far as I am aware, the word “Min­sky” has yet to pass from Ben Bernanke’s lips since this cri­sis began, and his dis­cus­sion of Min­sky prior to this cri­sis was, to put it politely, asi­nine. Bernanke devoted pre­cisely 2 sen­tences to Hyman Min­sky in his Essays on the Great Depres­sion (Bernanke 2000):

Hyman Min­sky (1977) and Charles Kindle­berger (1978) have in sev­eral places argued for the inher­ent insta­bil­ity of the finan­cial sys­tem but in doing so have had to depart from the assump­tion of ratio­nal eco­nomic behav­ior.. [A foot­note adds] I do not deny the pos­si­ble impor­tance of irra­tional­ity in eco­nomic life; how­ever it seems that the best research strat­egy is to push the ratio­nal­ity pos­tu­late as far as it will go. (Bernanke 2000, p. 43)

I expect that sheer embar­rass­ment may be one rea­son that Hyman’s name is taboo in Bernanke’s presence.

Fig­ure 1: Result of search for “Min­sky” in Fed­eral Reserve Speeches

Sim­i­larly, the impact of delever­ag­ing on aggre­gate demand doesn’t even fit in Bernanke’s doggedly Neo­clas­si­cal mind­set: from that point of view, only the dis­tri­b­u­tion of debt mat­ters, and not his aggre­gate level. Despite his popularly-believed sta­tus as an expert on the Great Depres­sion, he sim­ply refused to coun­te­nance any expla­na­tion of that event that didn’t fit into the Neo­clas­si­cal basket—as evi­denced by his dis­missal of Irv­ing Fisher’s “Debt Defla­tion The­ory of Great Depres­sions” (Fisher 1933):

Fisher’s idea was less influ­en­tial in aca­d­e­mic cir­cles, though, because of the coun­ter­ar­gu­ment that debt-deflation rep­re­sented no more than a redis­tri­b­u­tion from one group (debtors) to another (cred­i­tors). Absent implau­si­bly large dif­fer­ences in mar­ginal spend­ing propen­si­ties among the groups, it was sug­gested, pure redis­tri­b­u­tions should have no sig­nif­i­cant macro-economic effects… (Bernanke 2000, p. 24; empha­sis added)

The high­lighted sec­tion of the above quote also shows how lit­tle thought Bernanke gave to the actual process of debt-deflation: dur­ing such a cri­sis, many debtors can’t repay their debts and there­fore there is no zero-sum “redis­tri­b­u­tion from debtors to cred­i­tors”, but wide­spread debt defaults. As Car­ney empha­sises, defaults are inevitable and pol­icy mak­ers may make things worse if they sim­ply try to avoid debt write-offs:

Whether we like it or not, debt restruc­tur­ing may hap­pen. If it is to be done, it is best done quickly. Policy-makers need to be care­ful about delay­ing the inevitable and merely fund­ing the pri­vate exit. (p. 6)

So bravo to Gov­er­nor Mark Car­ney for being prob­a­bly the first OECD Cen­tral Bank Gov­er­nor to acknowl­edge Min­sky, delever­ag­ing, and the inevitabil­ity of debt defaults (though not the first Cen­tral Bank Gov­er­nor in the world; that hon­our almost cer­tainly belongs to Mer­cedes Marcó del Pont, Gov­er­nor of the Cen­tral Bank of Argentina).

That said, there are sev­eral points on which I’ll quib­ble with Carney’s analysis.

Pri­vate debt is different

Car­ney lumps pri­vate sec­tor and pub­lic sec­tor debt together, and excludes finan­cial sec­tor debt from his statistics—clearly in the belief that finance sec­tor debt doesn’t mat­ter, pre­sum­ably (since he doesn’t pro­vide his rea­son­ing for doing so) in the belief that finance sec­tor debt to the finance sec­tor is a “zero sum game”.

Fig­ure 2: Carney’s key debt to GDP ratio chart

From the per­spec­tives of Minsky’s the­ory, the empir­i­cal record, and the process of pri­vate money and debt cre­ation, both these decisions—lumping gov­ern­ment and pri­vate sec­tor debt together, and ignor­ing finance sec­tor debt—are in error.

Minsky’s “Finan­cial Insta­bil­ity Hypoth­e­sis” focused upon the dynam­ics of pri­vate debt, with the core con­cept being that lever­aged spec­u­la­tion would rise dur­ing a period of tran­quil growth in a cap­i­tal­ist econ­omy because tran­quil­lity was the excep­tion rather than the rule:

Stability—or tranquillity—in a world with a cycli­cal past and cap­i­tal­ist finan­cial insti­tu­tions is desta­bi­liz­ing. (Min­sky 1982, p. 101)

Min­sky saw properly-managed pub­lic spending—and hence pub­lic debt—as a poten­tial “home­o­sta­tic sta­bi­lizer” to this dynamic of pri­vate debt. Ris­ing tax­a­tion and declin­ing social secu­rity pay­ments dur­ing a boom made a pub­lic sec­tor sur­plus likely, which would take money out of cir­cu­la­tion and reduce the scale of pri­vate spec­u­la­tion, while declin­ing tax­a­tion and ris­ing social secu­rity pay­ments dur­ing a slump would give pri­vate busi­nesses a cash flow they wouldn’t oth­er­wise have, mak­ing it eas­ier to repay debts. I mod­elled this aspect of his hypoth­e­sis in my first papers on Min­sky (Keen 1995; Keen 1996; Keen 2000), and got the out­come that Min­sky pre­dicted: a pri­vate sys­tem that was prone to a debt-deflation could be sta­bi­lized by counter-cyclical gov­ern­ment spending.

Fig­ure 3: A Min­sky model with­out gov­ern­ment spend­ing

Fig­ure 4: A Min­sky model with gov­ern­ment spend­ing

In my model, the gov­ern­ment sec­tor was “resolute”—increasing spend­ing if unem­ploy­ment exceeded 5% and reduc­ing it below that level. In the real world, gov­ern­ments have accepted ris­ing unem­ploy­ment, and accu­mu­lated debt in pur­suit of fol­lies (like the war in Iraq) as well as in pur­suit of eco­nomic sta­bil­ity. But even so, the counter-cyclical role of gov­ern­ment debt can be seen when one com­pares pri­vate sec­tor debt—including finan­cial sec­tor debt—to gov­ern­ment (see Fig­ure 5).

Fig­ure 5: Sep­a­rat­ing out pri­vate sec­tor and pub­lic sec­tor debt in the USA

This is more appar­ent when we look just at the change in debt: pri­vate and pub­lic debt move in oppo­site directions.

Fig­ure 6: Pri­vate and pub­lic debt move in oppo­site direc­tions

Finance sec­tor debt matters

Ignor­ing finance sec­tor debt is a mis­take. Firstly, it’s huge: by far the largest com­po­nent of debt, pri­vate or pub­lic, in the USA (see Fig­ure 7).

Fig­ure 7

Sec­ondly, finance sec­tor debt is not a “zero sum game”. Though lend­ing by a non-bank finan­cial com­pany to another entity doesn’t cre­ate money, it does cre­ate debt; and the ini­tial lend­ing by a bank to a non-bank cre­ates both credit money and debt. Since the finance sec­tor was the source of most of the spec­u­la­tive debt that fuelled the bub­ble, and it is by far the major force in delever­ag­ing now, leav­ing it out of the analy­sis exempts a major causal fac­tor in both the pre-2008 boom and the post-2008 debacle.

Thirdly, by lump­ing together pri­vate and gov­ern­ment debt and ignor­ing finance sec­tor debt, Carney’s aggre­ga­tion obscures the com­par­i­son of today with the Great Depres­sion, under­states the growth of debt since the end of WWII, mis-identifies the start of the Age of Delever­ag­ing, and under­states the degree of delever­ag­ing to date.

With Carney’s aggre­ga­tion, “Peak Debt” dur­ing the Great Depres­sion was 285% of GDP ver­sus 254% today, the buildup in debt only began in 1980, “Peak Debt” occurred in August 2009, and delever­ag­ing has been rel­a­tively mild since then.

How­ever, con­sid­er­ing just pri­vate sec­tor debt and includ­ing the finance sec­tor, Peak Debt in the Great Depres­sion was 238% ver­sus 303% today, the build-up in debt began right from 1945, “Peak Debt” occurred in Feb­ru­ary 2009, and delever­ag­ing since then has been stark.

Con­sid­er­ing all pri­vate and pub­lic debt together, the sit­u­a­tion today is worse than the Great Depres­sion (307% then ver­sus 373% today), the debt build-up dates to 1950, “Peak Debt” was in March 2009, and deleveraging—despite a huge increase in gov­ern­ment debt—has been marked.

Fig­ure 8: Com­par­ing debt ratios

Which aggre­ga­tion is bet­ter? This is best answered by look­ing at why aggre­gate debt mat­ters, which is the role of chang­ing debt lev­els in aggre­gate demand.

Aggre­gate Demand is Income + Change in Debt

I’m begin­ning to feel a bit like Cato the Elder here, who ended every speech with “Fur­ther­more, it is my opin­ion that Carthage must be destroyed”: in the credit-based econ­omy in which we live, aggre­gate demand is the sum of incomes plus the change in debt. This mon­e­tary demand is then expended on both goods and ser­vices and claims on finan­cial assets.

This is a case that is made well by both Schum­peter and Min­sky, but has been ignored by neo­clas­si­cal eco­nom­ics (and for­got­ten even by some mod­ern non-neoclassical economists):

From this it fol­lows, there­fore, that in real life total credit must be greater than it could be if there were only fully cov­ered credit. The credit struc­ture projects not only beyond the exist­ing gold basis, but also beyond the exist­ing com­mod­ity basis. (Schum­peter 1934, p. 101)

If income is to grow, the finan­cial mar­kets, where the var­i­ous plans to save and invest are rec­on­ciled, must gen­er­ate an aggre­gate demand that, aside from brief inter­vals, is ever ris­ing. For real aggre­gate demand to be increas­ing, … it is nec­es­sary that cur­rent spend­ing plans, summed over all sec­tors, be greater than cur­rent received income and that some mar­ket tech­nique exist by which aggre­gate spend­ing in excess of aggre­gate antic­i­pated income can be financed. It fol­lows that over a period dur­ing which eco­nomic growth takes place, at least some sec­tors finance a part of their spend­ing by emit­ting debt or sell­ing assets. (Min­sky 1982, p. 6; empha­sis added)

We can use this to show that Carney’s aggre­ga­tion is mis­lead­ing, because using his aggre­ga­tion, there has been no delever­ag­ing. The change in debt, on his mea­sure, remained pos­i­tive right through the crisis.

Fig­ure 9: Change in debt in US$ mil­lion

But when the finan­cial sec­tor is included and gov­ern­ment sec­tor excluded, there has been a huge turn­around from ris­ing debt adding almost 30% to aggre­gate demand at the peak of the bub­ble, and then sub­tract­ing 20% from aggre­gate demand at its trough.

Fig­ure 10: Change in debt as per­cent of GDP

The final clincher is the cor­re­la­tion of these mea­sures to unem­ploy­ment. There is a strong neg­a­tive cor­re­la­tion between change in debt and the level of unem­ploy­ment, since increas­ing debt increases aggre­gate demand and reduces unem­ploy­ment. Carney’s mixed private-public-minus-finance mea­sure has a rea­son­able cor­re­la­tion to unem­ploy­ment of –0.45, but the private-only-including-finance has a cor­re­la­tion of –0.94.

Fig­ure 11: Far stronger cor­re­la­tion of change in Pri­vate debt to Unem­ploy­ment

What’s “old Regret” got to do with it?

The three lines at the begin­ning of this post are from the famous poem/bush balled “The Man from Snowy River”. For two rea­sons, I couldn’t resist link­ing it to this story because it reminded me of the cliché “shut­ting the fence after the horse has bolted”.

Firstly, Carney’s mea­sure makes it very hard to iden­tify when the cri­sis began: the change in debt in his mea­sure remains pos­i­tive, and all that can be iden­ti­fied is a slight slow­down in the rate of growth of debt (from 14% of GDP p.a. to 7%, after which it “recov­ers” back to about 10%). Peak Debt occurs in August 2009—two years after the cri­sis began.

The private-including-finance mea­sure how­ever clearly iden­ti­fies the end of 2007 as the begin­ning of the crisis—when the change in debt plunged from almost 30% of GDP p.a. down to minus 20% at its nadir in early 2010. So “the colt from old Regret” got away two years before the first Cen­tral Banker noticed.

Sec­ondly, while I’m again very thank­ful that Gov­er­nor Car­ney has put Min­sky into the vocab­u­lary of West­ern cen­tral bankers, we would have been far bet­ter off had Minsky’s wis­dom been heeded decades ago, rather than after the event.

This was pos­si­ble because knowl­edge of Min­sky wasn’t lim­ited to a few obscure non-orthodox econ­o­mists like myself: the head of the BIS’s research depart­ment from 1995 till 2008 was another Cana­dian, Bill White, and he was an out and out Min­sky fan whose warn­ings of a poten­tial cri­sis were ignored.

That said, it’s good to see that sen­si­ble eco­nom­ics, rather than the fan­tasy that is neo­clas­si­cal eco­nom­ics, is finally being con­sid­ered in the realms of Cen­tral Banks.


I was dou­bly bemused to see the title of Gov­er­nor Carney’s paper because I was work­ing on a paper with almost exactly the same title:

Aca­d­e­mic prece­dence being what it is, I’m happy to cede inven­tion of the term “The Age of Delever­ag­ing” to Gov­er­nor Car­ney, and I’ll cite him when­ever I refer to this term in future.

Bernanke, B. S. (2000). Essays on the Great Depres­sion. Prince­ton, Prince­ton Uni­ver­sity Press.

Car­ney, M. (2011). Growth in the age of delever­ag­ing. Empire Club of Canada/Canadian Club of Toronto. Toronto, Bank of Inter­na­tional Settlements.

Fisher, I. (1933). “The Debt-Deflation The­ory of Great Depres­sions.” Econo­met­rica
1(4): 337–357.

Keen, S. (1995). “Finance and Eco­nomic Break­down: Mod­el­ing Minsky’s ‘Finan­cial Insta­bil­ity Hypoth­e­sis.’.” Jour­nal of Post Key­ne­sian Eco­nom­ics
17(4): 607–635.

Keen, S. (1996). “The Chaos of Finance: The Chaotic and Marx­ian Foun­da­tions of Minsky’s ‘Finan­cial Insta­bil­ity Hypoth­e­sis.’.” Economies et Soci­etes
30(2–3): 55–82.

Keen, S. (2000). The Non­lin­ear Eco­nom­ics of Debt Defla­tion. Com­merce, com­plex­ity, and evo­lu­tion: Top­ics in eco­nom­ics, finance, mar­ket­ing, and man­age­ment: Pro­ceed­ings of the Twelfth Inter­na­tional Sym­po­sium in Eco­nomic The­ory and Econo­met­rics. W. A. Bar­nett, C. Chiarella, S. Keen, R. Marks and H. Schn­abl. New York, Cam­bridge Uni­ver­sity Press: 83–110.

Min­sky, H. P. (1982). Can “it” hap­pen again? : essays on insta­bil­ity and finance. Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe.

Schum­peter, J. A. (1934). The the­ory of eco­nomic devel­op­ment : an inquiry into prof­its, cap­i­tal, credit, inter­est and the busi­ness cycle. Cam­bridge, Mass­a­chu­setts, Har­vard Uni­ver­sity Press.



About Steve Keen

I am a professional economist and a long time critic of conventional economic thought. As well as attacking mainstream thought in Debunking Economics, I am also developing an alternative dynamic approach to economic modelling. The key issue I am tackling here is the prospect for a debt-deflation on the back of the enormous debts accumulated in Australia, and our very low rate of inflation.
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25 Responses to Movement at the Station”: Canadian Central Bank Governor Carney on the Age of Deleveraging

  1. LCTesla says:

    Gary Shilling beat both of you to claim­ing the inven­tion of that term, Steve:
    That might solve a mys­tery regard­ing what sub­con­scious well­spring you had both been draw­ing from when com­ing up with it like this in par­al­lel. :P

    It seems to me that neo-classical econ­o­mists ignore the boost to demand from debt growth on account of how the expect a kind of Ricar­dian Equiv­a­lence to hold in the pri­vate sec­tor like they pre­sume it does in the pub­lic sec­tor. Any increases in demand given rise to by debt growth is, by their logic, off­set by decreases in demand from expec­ta­tions to delever at a later stage. Mon­e­tary pol­icy com­pli­cates this some­what, though, because the lever­ag­ing hap­pens at a higher inter­est rate than the delever­ag­ing. I would expect some­one to make the argu­ment that the ratio­nal­ity prin­ci­ple is not in ques­tion and the exces­sive lever­ag­ing is sim­ply given rise to by mon­e­tary pol­icy that rewards lever­ag­ing on a system-wide level for this rea­son. The only ques­tion this would leave unan­swered is how the pri­vate sec­tor as a whole coor­di­nates it’s actions so as to give rise to this “sys­tem wide leveraging”…

  2. cliffy says:

    If I lend myself $20,000, clearly their is lit­tle likely dif­fer­ence in the eco­nomic expres­sion of the before and after state of that transaction.

    How­ever, If a guy in Syd­ney lends a guy in Thai­land $20,000, clearly some­thing in the eco­nomic nature of things has changed.

    This for me this is the rea­son why though on paper a loan from one entity to another has an ele­ment of squar­ing off, it is the expres­sion of that trans­ac­tion in the real world that makes ris­ing debt have effect out­side of any increase in money sup­ply asso­ci­ated with finan­cial sec­tor activity.

    An inter­est­ing study would be the cor­re­la­tion between the char­ac­ter­is­tic dis­tinc­tions between Cred­i­tor and Debtor and the extent of pres­ence of Min­sky markets.

    For exam­ple, if the Debtors and Cred­i­tors are in the same city as opposed to the Debtors being in one city and the Cred­i­tors in another is there a mate­r­ial change in the like­li­hood that mar­kets go Minsky?

  3. mahaish says:

    what beg­gars belief,

    is that as a cen­tral banker,

    he hasnt come out and attacked the sin­gle cur­rency union idea itself

    cen­tral bankers are obsessed with the com­po­si­tion of the mon­e­tary base,

    and i would have thought one of the many impor­tant rea­sons why you have a float­ing exchange rate as oppossed to a cur­rency union or peg, is that cur­rency imbal­ances can be com­pen­sated for through exchange rate move­ments, which helps to min­imise the impact on the mon­e­tary base

    per­haps he thought men­tion­ing min­sky was con­tro­ver­tial enough with­out adding fuel to the fire and con­dem­ing the very idea of a euro

  4. alainton says:

    Steve you are right to keep pub­lic and pri­vate sec­tor debt separate

    1. An expan­sion in gov­ern­ment debt through Tbills or bonds is a sec­toral trans­fer pay­ment in the short term and a com­mit­ment to mon­e­tary expan­sion over term — hence it has much less impact on AD in the short term com­pared to bank cre­ated credit which has an imme­di­ate expan­sion­ary effect.

    2. Changes to gov­ern­ment debt are steady and pre­dictable and sig­nalled through the ‘risk free’ rate (cough cough) — changes to pri­vate sec­tor debt can be much more rapid — espe­cially where bal­ance sheets go into negative

    3. The veloc­ity mul­ti­plier of gov­ern­ment debt is likely to be much lower than pri­vate sec­tor debt — indeed if funded by poorly designed taxes and fund­ing non invest­ment spend­ing it can be negative.

    4. The key effect of pub­lic sec­tor debt reduc­tion is on the liq­uid­ity of banks — tbills at 2.5% are a straight no-brain liq­uid­ity equiv­a­lent to cash, the com­bi­na­tion of less gov­ern­ment debt and enhanced cap­i­tal ade­quacy require­ments is a pri­vate sec­tor delever­ag­ing. A post-keynsian ‘crowd­ing out’ effect.

  5. alainton says:

    Oh Steve, reminded by read­ing some Stephen Kin­sella that if you are cor­rect­ing national account­ing to national income as well as change in debt and net expen­di­ture on assets you also need to include net depreciation

    Dont know if you have caught his recent paper on the ‘state of the art’ of mon­e­tary cir­cuit mod­el­ling — a must read

    Im sure you would raise a wry smile at the following

    The role of prices in stock flow mod­els is not well under­stood at the basic
    levels.It takes God­ley and Lavoie nearly 250 pages to allow prices
    to move’

  6. Christopher Dobbie says:

    I’m think­ing the MF Global deba­cle should be a clear indi­ca­tor to investors of how the finan­cial sec­tor plans to deleverage.

  7. Steve Keen says:

    Thanks Andrew, that is a good lit­tle paper.

  8. Lyonwiss says:

    Back when I first started in finan­cial mar­kets, there was a “par­a­digm shift” in
    the per­cep­tion of Australia’s cur­rent account deficit, from the Pitch­ford thesis:

    Pitch­ford J (1989), ‘A Scep­ti­cal View of Australia’s Cur­rent Account and Debt
    prob­lem’, The Aus­tralian Eco­nomic Review, 86, pp 5–14.

    The deficit was largely due to pri­vate sec­tor debt, not gov­ern­ment debt.
    The Pitch­ford view was that pri­vate sec­tor debt is pri­vate sec­tor prob­lem between
    con­sent­ing adults. The under­ly­ing assump­tion is the effi­cient mar­ket hypoth­e­sis,
    ie the lenders knew what they were doing and they could han­dling the con­se­quences of their deci­sions. The gov­ern­ment has no role:

    The GFC has proved this view to be false. All the bailouts (and any debt
    jubilees) effec­tively con­verted pri­vate debt to pub­lic debt, sub­stan­tially
    caus­ing the sov­er­eign debt crises we are see­ing. Unless gov­ern­ments refrain from mon­e­tary inter­fer­ence, which is vir­tu­ally impos­si­ble, the dis­tinc­tion between
    pri­vate money (debt) and pub­lic money (debt) can only be temporary.

    Under Key­ne­sian (or social­ist) eco­nom­ics, with a fiat money sys­tem, the dis­tinc­tion between pri­vate and pub­lic money is even less clear. As the cur­rent cri­sis devel­ops, the risk that pri­vate sav­ings in pen­sion accounts will be “stolen” for pub­lic pur­pose will increase.

  9. glubilee says:

    Maybe there are some cracks in the ortho­doxy, let’s hope. they are start­ing to get there, but are still blind to many of their assumptions.

    I think the Cen­tral Bankers are in shock, they, like well-educated doc­tors of the 1700s, they are still try­ing to bleed the patient to heal them, and the patients keep dying.. Of course, the patients are all ghetto dwelling worth­less human­ity in their minds any­ways, so no big loss if they kill a few economies, as long as the banks are okay. But when their friends and fam­ily bankers are effected, will they keep bleed­ing or wake up to the errors of their ways?


    Inter­est­ing view 3 charts at Of Two Minds blog

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  14. Bhaskara II says:

    Steve, you men­tioned in a pre­vi­ous post your inter­est in get­ting a 3D print­ing machine to make a phys­i­cal rep­re­sen­ta­tion of the results of your model with gov­ern­ment spend­ing, such as in fig­ure 4.

    Bent wire would be an excel­lent way to cre­ate a 3D phys­i­cal rep­re­sen­ta­tion of a para­met­ric plot.

    Bend­ing wire can be done by an artis­tic hand or by com­puter con­trolled indus­trial machine. A wire form­ing machine could form your plots, pos­si­bly from the inside out to keep from get­ting tan­gled. Or, the wire could be formed in a few pieces and then connected.

    There are cus­tom man­u­fac­tur­ing com­pa­nies that bend wire to order based on a com­mand file. Their ser­vice is known as “wire form­ing” or “wire bending”.

    In Aus­tralia,

    There are videos of the machines work­ing on

  15. Steve Keen says:

    Hmmm. It was a partly friv­o­lous idea, but one worth pur­su­ing. Thanks for that link.

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