The US Senate should not reappoint Ben Bernanke. As Obama’s reaction to the loss of Ted Kennedy’s seat showed, real change in policy only occurs after political scalps have been taken. An economic scalp of this scale might finally shake America from the unsustainable path that reckless and feckless Federal Reserve behavior set it on over 20 years ago.
Some may think this would be an unfair outcome for Bernanke. It is not. There are solid economic reasons why Bernanke should pay the ultimate political price.
Haste is necessary, since Senator Reid’s proposal to hold a cloture vote could result in a decision as early as this Wednesday, and with only 51 votes being needed for his reappointment rather than 60 as at present. This document will therefore consider only the most fundamental reason not to reappoint him, and leave additional reasons for a later update.
Misunderstanding the Great Depression
Bernanke is popularly portrayed as an expert on the Great Depression—the person whose intimate knowledge of what went wrong in the 1930s saved us from a similar fate in 2009.
In fact, his ignorance of the factors that really caused the Great Depression is a major reason why the Global Financial Crisis occurred in the first place.
The best contemporary explanation of the Great Depression was given by the US economist Irving Fisher in his 1933 paper “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions”. Fisher had previously been a cheerleader for the Stock Market bubble of the 1930s, and he is unfortunately famous for the prediction, right in the middle of the 1929 Crash, that it was merely a blip that would soon pass:
“ Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau. I do not feel that there will soon, if ever, be a fifty or sixty point break below present levels, such as Mr. Babson has predicted. I expect to see the stock market a good deal higher than it is today within a few months.” (Irving Fisher, New York Times, October 15 1929)
When events proved this prediction to be spectacularly wrong, Fisher to his credit tried to find an explanaton. The analysis he developed completely inverted the economic model on which he had previously relied.
His pre-Great Depression model treated finance as just like any other market, with supply and demand setting an equilibrium price. In building his models, he made two assumptions to handle the fact that, unlike the market for, say, apples, transactions in finance markets involved receiving something now (a loan) in return for payments made in the future. Fisher assumed
“ (A) The market must be cleared—and cleared with respect to every interval of time.
(B) The debts must be paid.” (Fisher 1930, The Theory of Interest, p. 495)[1]
I don’t need to point out how absurd those assumptions are, and how wrong they proved to be when the Great Depression hit—Fisher himself was one of the many whose fortunes were wiped out by margin calls they were unable to meet. After this experience, he realized that his equilibrium assumption blinded him to the forces that led to the Great Depression. The real action in the economy occurs in disequilibrium:
We may tentatively assume that, ordinarily and within wide limits, all, or almost all, economic variables tend, in a general way, toward a stable equilibrium… But the exact equilibrium thus sought is seldom reached and never long maintained. New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium…
It is as absurd to assume that, for any long period of time, the variables in the economic organization, or any part of them, will “stay put,” in perfect equilibrium, as to assume that the Atlantic Ocean can ever be without a wave. (Fisher 1933, p. 339)
A disequilibrium-based analysis was therefore needed, and that is what Fisher provided. He had to identify the key variables whose disequilibrium levels led to a Depression, and here he argued that the two key factors were “over-indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after”. He ruled out other factors—such as mere overconfidence—in a very poignant passage, given what ultimately happened to his own highly leveraged personal financial position:
I fancy that over-confidence seldom does any great harm except when, as, and if, it beguiles its victims into debt. (p. 341)
Fisher then argued that a starting position of over-indebtedness and low inflation in the 1920s led to a chain reaction that caused the Great Depression:
“(1) Debt liquidation leads to distress selling and to
(2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank loans are paid off, and to a slowing down of velocity of circulation. This contraction of deposits and of their velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes
(3) A fall in the level of prices, in other words, a swelling of the dollar. Assuming, as above stated, that this fall of prices is not interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there must be
(4) A still greater fall in the net worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies and
(5) A like fall in profits, which in a “capitalistic,” that is, a private-profit society, leads the concerns which are running at a loss to make
(6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labor. These losses, bankruptcies, and unemployment, lead to
(7) Pessimism and loss of confidence, which in turn lead to
(8) Hoarding and slowing down still more the velocity of circulation. The above eight changes cause
(9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of interest, in particular, a fall in the nominal, or money, rates and a rise in the real, or commodity, rates of interest.” (p. 342)
Fisher confidently and sensibly concluded that “Evidently debt and deflation go far toward explaining a great mass of phenomena in a very simple logical way”.
So what did Ben Bernanke, the alleged modern expert on the Great Depression, make of Fisher’s argument? In a nutshell, he barely even considered it.
Bernanke is a leading member of the “neoclassical” school of economic thought that dominates the academic economics profession, and that school continued Fisher’s pre-Great Depression tradition of analysing the economy as if it is always in equilibrium.
With his neoclassical orientation, Bernanke completely ignored Fisher’s insistence that an equilibrium-oriented analysis was completely useless for analysing the economy. His summary of Fisher’s theory (in his Essays on the Great Depression) is a barely recognisable parody of Fisher’s clear arguments above:
Fisher envisioned a dynamic process in which falling asset and commodity prices created pressure on nominal debtors, forcing them into distress sales of assets, which in turn led to further price declines and financial difficulties. His diagnosis led him to urge President Roosevelt to subordinate exchange-rate considerations to the need for reflation, advice that (ultimately) FDR followed. (Bernanke 2000, Essays on the Great Depression, p. 24)
This “summary” begins with falling prices, not with excessive debt, and though he uses the word “dynamic”, any idea of a disequilibrium process is lost. His very next paragraph explains why. The neoclassical school ignored Fisher’s disequilibrium foundations, and instead considered debt-deflation in an equilibrium framework in which Fisher’s analysis made no sense:
Fisher’ s idea was less influential in academic circles, though, because of the counterargument that debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups, it was suggested, pure redistributions should have no significant macroeconomic effects. ” (p. 24)
If the world were in equilibrium, with debtors carrying the equilibrium level of debt, all markets clearing, and all debts being repaid, this neoclassical conclusion would be true. But in the real world, when debtors have taken on excessive debt, where the market doesn’t clear as it falls and where numerous debtors default, a debt-deflation isn’t merely “a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors)”, but a huge shock to aggregate demand.
Crucially, even though Bernanke notes at the beginning of his book that “the premise of this essay is that declines in aggregate demand were the dominant factor in the onset of the Depression” (p. ix), his equilibrium perspective made it impossible for him to see the obvious cause of the decline: the change from rising debt boosting aggregate demand to falling debt reducing it.
In equilibrium, aggregate demand equals aggregate supply (GDP), and deflation simply transfers some demand from debtors to creditors (since the real rate of interest is higher when prices are falling). But in disequilibrium, aggregate demand is the sum of GDP plus the change in debt. Rising debt thus augments demand during a boom; but falling debt substracts from it during a slump
In the 1920s, private debt reached unprecedented levels, and this rising debt was a large part of the apparent prosperity of the Roaring Twenties: debt was the fuel that made the Stock Market soar. But when the Stock Market Crash hit, debt reduction took the place of debt expansion, and reduction in debt was the source of the fall in aggregate demand that caused the Great Depression.
Figure 1 shows the scale of debt during the 1920s and 1930s, versus the level of nominal GDP.
Figure 1: Debt and GDP 1920-1940
Figure 2 shows the annual change in private debt and GDP, and aggregate demand (which is the sum of the two). Note how much higher aggregate demand was than GDP during the late 1920s, and how aggregate demand fell well below GDP during the worst years of the Great Depression.
Figure 2: Change in Debt and Aggregate Demand 1920-1940
Figure 3 shows how much the change in debt contributed to aggregate demand—which I define as GDP plus the change in debt (the formula behind this graph is “The Change in Debt, divided by the Sum of GDP plus the Change in Debt”).
Figure 3: Debt contribution to Aggregate Demand 1920-1940
So during the 1920s boom, the change in debt was responsible for up to 10 percent of aggregate demand in the 1920s. But when deleveraging began, the change in debt reduced aggregate demand by up to 25 percent. That was the real cause of the Great Depression.
That is not a chart that you will find anywhere in Bernanke’s Essays on the Great Depression. The real cause of the Great Depression lay outside his view, because with his neoclassical eyes, he couldn’t even see the role that debt plays in the real world.
Bernanke’s failure
If this were just about the interpretation of history, then it would be no big deal. But because they ignored the obvious role of debt in causing the Great Depression, neoclassical economists have stood by while debt has risen to far higher levels than even during the Roaring Twenties.
Worse still, Bernanke and his predecessor Alan Greenspan operated as virtual cheerleaders for rising debt levels, justifying every new debt instrument that the finance sector invented, and every new target for lending that it identified, as improving the functioning of markets and democratizing access to credit.
The next three charts show what that dereliction of regulatory duty has led to. Firstly, the level of debt has once again risen to levels far above that of GDP (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Debt and GDP 1990-2010
Secondly the annual change in debt contributed far more to demand during the 1990s and early 2000s than it ever had during the Roaring Twenties. Demand was running well above GDP ever since the early 1990s (Figure 5). The annual increase in debt accounted for 20 percent or more of aggregate demand on various occasions in the last 15 years, twice as much as it had ever contributed during the Roaring Twenties.
Figure 5: Change in Debt and Aggregate Demand 1990-2010
Thirdly, now that the debt party is over, the attempt by the private sector to reduce its gearing has taken a huge slice out of aggregate demand. The reduction in aggregate demand to date hasn’t reached the levels we experienced in the Great Depression—a mere 10% reduction, versus the over 20 percent reduction during the dark days of 1931-33. But since debt today is so much larger (relative to GDP) than it was at the start of the Great Depression, the dangers are either that the fall in demand could be steeper, or that the decline could be much more drawn out than in the 1930s.
Figure 6: Debt contribution to Aggregate Demand 1990-2010
Conclusion
Bernanke, as the neoclassical economist most responsible for burying Fisher’s accurate explanation of why the Great Depression occurred, is therefore an eminently suitable target for the political sacrifice that America today desperately needs. His extreme actions once the crisis hit have helped reduce the immediate impact of the crisis, but without the ignorance he helped spread about the real cause of the Great Depression, there would not have been a crisis in the first place. As I will also document in an update in early February, some of his advice has made America’s recovery less effective than it could have been.
Obama came to office promising change you can believe in. If the Senate votes against Bernanke’s reappointment, that change might finally start to arrive.
Addendum
This is an advance version of my monthly Debtwatch Report for February 2010. Click here for the PDF version. Please feel free to distribute this to anyone you think may be interested–especially people who may be in a position to influence the Senate’s vote.
Professor Steve Keen
www.debtdeflation.com/blogs
[1] This book was an untimely relaunch of his 1907 PhD thesis.






January 25th, 2010 at 12:54 am
Steve the title of figure 5 has the incorrect date range. Thanks otherwise for a sobering summary of what awaits us, Bernanke or not. Greetings from London. Paul Amery
January 25th, 2010 at 1:31 am
If you want more reasons why Mr Bernanke should not be re-apointed go to Brad De Long’s website today. He has a Fed insider rationalising the Fed’s stance on bubbles and other issues. Incroyable!
January 25th, 2010 at 4:56 am
Thanks for writing this up. One thing I don’t quite understand. You say that Bernanke could have been more effective at dealing with the crisis. He has tried to prevent debt-deflation. But is that in your view a long term solution? Will we eventually deflate/depress business even more at a later date? If not, why?
thanks again Prof Keen.
January 25th, 2010 at 8:03 am
Hi
As Pamery states, wrong title on figure 5 or wrong figure 5.
Otherwise a very good post, the only thing I miss is what we should do instead.
Greatings from Sweden
Robert Johansson
January 25th, 2010 at 8:31 am
Everytime I come here I breathe a sigh of relief at the down to earth common sense and no-nonsense rationality of this site. Thank goodness for Steve Keen and(/or?) the Australian approach to things.
January 25th, 2010 at 9:29 am
Steve, I agree but surely the American people should address the real problem; in 1913 they lost control of the issuance of their currency to a cabal of world bankers. Wilson later admitted he had made a grave mistake while Lincoln would have rolled in his grave. Abolish the Fed.
January 25th, 2010 at 9:53 am
Thanks for that pamery, it’s now fixed on the blog and I’ll post an updated version of the PDF in a few minutes.
Please distribute it as widely as possible everyone; there’s a real chance to derail Bernanke’s reappointment this week, and my extra argument as to why that would be a good thing could help sway a vote or two in the Senate if it gets into the right hands.
January 25th, 2010 at 10:06 am
Hi johngn888,
The main issue there is giving the money to the banks rather than to the public as in Australia’s stimulus package. When I run the update next week I’ll include a simulation that shows giving funds to the public is much more effective in a credit crunch than giving it to the banks.
I believe deflation is the likely medium term outcome, as with Japan. Ultimately the system has to be righted by a massive rebalancing of fiat to credit money, however that happens; my expectation is that it will be via deflation rather than inflation.
January 25th, 2010 at 10:46 am
I don’t see anything in the analysis which gives any reasons why deleveraging will result in true deflation (ie generalised price decreases) rather than asset-specific price deflation.
After all, the leveraging period (specifically over the last 10-15 years), has not seen generalised price increases, but rather asset price increases. So isn’t it possible we will see the reverse during the deleveraging period?
I think true deflation is an unlikely scenario.
January 25th, 2010 at 10:46 am
Below is what Bernanke wrote on 2009/07/21 in the context of worries about inflation. He clearly believes in the money multiplier theory. He thinks that it should work but the impact has been very limited.
“Since the onset of the financial crisis nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the interest-rate target for overnight lending between banks (the federal-funds rate) nearly to zero. We have also greatly expanded the size of the Fed’s balance sheet through purchases of longer-term securities and through targeted lending programs aimed at restarting the flow of credit.
These actions have softened the economic impact of the financial crisis. They have also improved the functioning of key credit markets, including the markets for interbank lending, commercial paper, consumer and small-business credit, and residential mortgages.”
…
“When the Fed makes loans or acquires securities, the funds enter the banking system and ultimately appear in the reserve accounts held at the Fed by banks and other depository institutions. These reserve balances now total about $800 billion, much more than normal. And given the current economic conditions, banks have generally held their reserves as balances at the Fed.
But as the economy recovers, banks should find more opportunities to lend out their reserves. That would produce faster growth in broad money (for example, M1 or M2) and easier credit conditions, which could ultimately result in inflationary pressures—unless we adopt countervailing policy measures. When the time comes to tighten monetary policy, we must either eliminate these large reserve balances or, if they remain, neutralize any potential undesired effects on the economy.”
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203946904574300050657897992.html
January 25th, 2010 at 10:56 am
Hi David,
I’m in favour of abolishing the Fed’s ability to be anything other than a clearing house between banks, but I don’t believe that the public can ever be in charge of currency issuance in a world with private banking. As I note in my reform proposals, I’d rather try to make taking on debt for leveraged speculation unattractive than try to reform the nature of banking.
January 25th, 2010 at 11:46 am
Steve,
I’d like to suggest an additional graph to add to your presentations to clarify the impact of debt on GDP growth. Here’s an example , using the well-known Shadowstats analysis of CPI calculation “lies”. ( Note : I’m only using this as an example of data presentation , not to suggest that the CPI data as corrected by Shadowstats is the “right” data.)
Here’s a graph from Shadowstats , showing the year-by-year differential in GDP between the official stats and his own data , corrected for the phoney CPI calcs :
http://www.shadowstats.com/alternate_data/gross-domestic-product-charts
There’s nothing wrong with this graph , but I don’t think it has nearly the impact of this one from itulip , which uses the same data , presented in a ‘classical’ GDP-growth-over-time format :
http://www.nowandfutures.com/images/real_gdp_williams.png
Just eyeballing your Fig. 5 above , it looks like if you netted out added private debt from the official GDP , you’d end up with a peak GDP of $10-11 trillion , rather than $14 trillion. Even if you ( more conservatively ) netted out 60-70% of the added debt , the reduction would still be substantial and , of course , the further back in time you go , the more it adds up.
The end result of this calculation might provide a reasonable stimate of what real GDP in the U.S. will look like in coming years , assuming total — public plus private — debt/GDP levels stabilize.
Of course growth of public debt/GDP levels over the last few decades makes our current situation look even worse. I know you intend to include public debt in your models going forward , but it’s worth noting that the private debt levels probably understates the recent “debt-dependence” of U.S. economic growth.
January 25th, 2010 at 11:55 am
I forgot to mention that I intend to forward your pdf to my Senators. I just emailed them on Friday to suggest voting “No” on Bernanke , but this will make a nice followup.
January 25th, 2010 at 12:03 pm
Mr. Keen,
There was – at least – someone who saw already in 2005 what was coming. One Alan Greenspan !!!
“”We’ve lost control over the budget”"
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/american-fury-over-greenspan-leak-508439.html
And you think Greenspan never ever discussed this with Bernanke ?
And that’s the take of mr. Michael Hudson (www.michael-hudson.com) as well. See the frontpage of his website. But there was a clear reason to keep printing money like there’s no tomorrow: the socalled PETRODOLLAR, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Didn’t you read the book “”Superimperialism”" by mr. Michael Hudson ? It’s available on his website. (it requires some digging)
There was a clear reason Greenspan lowered agressively rates from 6% to 1%. Lending broke down in the US in early 2001. This was a severe “”Credit Crunch”". And that was only two or three months after october 2000 when everyone who wanted to buy iraqi oil had to pay for that oil in Euro’s instead of USDs. (Coincidence ??? No way !!) That was simply the last straw on the breaking back of the camel. And Greenspan started to raise interestrates in 2004 when he saw that lending started to pick up again. I still have a graph of that.
But I think there’s one MAJOR flaw in this entire USD Ponzi-scheme. The assumption that foreigners always will use their USDs to buy US Treasuries or Agency paper. Foreigners can also choose to sit on their pile of USD cash. That’s what happened in the late 1970s when Europe called America’s bluff. And it seems the chinese are about to do the same thing. (i.e. stop or reduce buying US Treasuries). See the latest TIC data !
It seems that:
1. Summers and Geithner are “”on the way out”"
2. Volcker and Donaldson are “”already in control”".
http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-is-it-just-us-or-did-tim-geithner-get-fired-yesterday-2010-1
January 25th, 2010 at 12:11 pm
Feasible Goldi, but I’ll have to see if I have time as I write the update for next week. I have a trip to Bangkok to meet with the UNEP and CSIRO to focus on in the meantime.
January 25th, 2010 at 12:12 pm
Excellent–the more Senators who start to question whether Bernanke is actually an expert on the Great Depression, the better!
January 25th, 2010 at 12:46 pm
A good piece in the FT today , apropos to Steve’s post , comparing the U.S.housing busts of the GD vs. the GFC , and noting the failures of the Fed :
“Housing, depressions and credit collapses”
http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2010/01/housing-depressions-and-credit-collapses/
excerpt:
“The lesson is not just that the Fed failed to anticipate the collapse in the bubble: it also didn’t foresee its devastating consequences. This is reflected in the candid comment last year by Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn (Cato Journal): “I and other observers underestimated the potential for house prices to decline substantially, the degree to which such a decline would create difficulties for homeowners, and, most important, the vulnerability of the broader financial system to these events.”
January 25th, 2010 at 1:01 pm
Great blogpost, Steve!
January 25th, 2010 at 1:07 pm
Steve,
Thanks once again for a clear, simple and logical explanation of events that got us to this GFC.
Can I humbly point to another danger which I hope and trust you will be keeping your eyes on?;
“But since debt today is so much larger (relative to GDP) than it was at the start of the Great Depression, the dangers are either that the fall in demand could be steeper, or that the decline could be much more drawn out than in the 1930s.”
In their egotistical desires to become re-elected, Govts will attempt to oppose all efforts to delever. They have no choice really. To allow deleveraging to occur, Govts are in essence admitting that it was the debt (and its attendant loose policies which they actively encouraged) that has brought about the GFC and so much public hardship. So, Govts will be sorely tempted to dramatically and continuously increase their own levels of debt fuelled spending as an offset to the withdrawal of the private sector. It could be that the real Crisis is ahead of us with Sovereign debt defaults being the big hammer to drop.
January 25th, 2010 at 1:20 pm
GSM,
Couldn’t agree more. With this insane system we’re in, like a shark, debt levels need to constantly increase or the system dies (due to Fisher’s debt deflation thesis, or Mises’ “crack up boom” – both talk about exactly the same consequence of unsustainable debt).
Iceland, Dubai, Ireland, Greece, Portugal, heck, even the UK all have massive govt debt loads now. When govt bonds yields spike or there’s a currency crisis, these countries will be on fire.
I support a free market in money (ie a return to a precious metals based monetary system) and nationalisation, then a break up of all TBTF banks, then the elimination of the lender of last resort function from central banks to remove the moral hazard issue that infests the system at present.
I guarantee these are the only viable long term solutions (regardless of the short term pain of adjusting to a deflationary monetary system). The longer the current insane system drags on like a zombie the more govt and public debt, the more malinvestments, the more unemployment when even govt employees have to be laid off and public services are wiped out (like in Iceland today).
Financing “consumption” through debt is a recipe for disaster and govts are now financing health care, and basic services (not capital investment!) with debt. This is yet another disaster in the making. I don’t they’ll be able to blame “the free market” this time around.
January 25th, 2010 at 1:20 pm
“I doubt”
January 25th, 2010 at 1:26 pm
Bill Mitchell examines Bernanke’s record on his post yesterday -
The Great Moderation myth
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=7554
January 25th, 2010 at 1:26 pm
al49er,
From the prior thread;
“How do you create all these jobs ‘and have them productive’, if you have at least a generation whose principal skills are
“shuffling paper’?”
My sense is that productivity will be of secondary concern. The headline Joblessness will be all that matters to Obama’s administration come end 2010 and beyond. We can expect to see massive public renewal and construction programs combined, I suspect, with a much higher level of protectionism.All of it funded by monetization of new debt. If we have concerns about the status of Sovereign debt now, it will be nothing compared to what it will be in a couple of years.
January 25th, 2010 at 1:52 pm
Longtime listener, firsttime caller.
Another erudite contribution thank you.
It was your much simpler comments on the progressive tightening of Westpac’s LVR reported in the mainstream media today that will finally give you the credit you deserve. I think that the Great Unwashed are finally waking up to the fact that debts must be repaid, and that the orgy of cheap debt is over.
May you continue to receive the kudos you deserve.
January 25th, 2010 at 1:57 pm
Steve,
One minor quibble I have with your post:
Bernanke said :
“Fisher’ s idea was less influential in academic circles, though, because of the counterargument that debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups, it was suggested, pure redistributions should have no significant macroeconomic effects. ”
To which you countered with:
“If the world were in equilibrium, with debtors carrying the equilibrium level of debt, all markets clearing, and all debts being repaid, this neoclassical conclusion would be true.”
I don’t think Bernanke’s statement is necessarily true even in the idealized world he describes , because in an economy with extreme levels of wealth and income inequality ,such as the one that’s evolved in the U.S. over the last three decades , there are PLAUSIBLY large differences in marginal spending propensities. The after-tax marginal propensity to consume for someone like Bill Gates might be very near zero , while the same measure for many in the bottom 90% of the income/wealth distribution could approach 100%.
Simple , market-clearing distributions from debtors to creditors would likely have significant impacts on aggregate demand , even if there were no defaults , just because of their contribution to inequality. On the other end of the spectrum , the same process contributes to the phenomenon of “hot money” chasing global asset bubbles , as many of these folks choose gambling over consumption.
January 25th, 2010 at 2:22 pm
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Edward Harrison, Tim Backshall, Jill, greychampion, Noel Kelly and others. Noel Kelly said: One scary essay. Why Ben Bernanke is exactly the wrong body to head the Fed. http://bit.ly/6hh0FZ He has a pre 1930's economic world view! [...]
January 25th, 2010 at 2:31 pm
Yes Goldi, I agree; but that was a very fast post to focus on one issue only. I may get a chance to elaborate on that next week, but more likely a thorough demolition job of Bernanke on the Great Depression will have to wait until my book comes out.
January 25th, 2010 at 2:32 pm
Thanks TheAntipodean, and welcome to the community of discussants here.
January 25th, 2010 at 2:41 pm
Just want to throw in my 2 cents worth on the topic of Bernanke’s actions and the difference between US and Australia.
As a result of the GFC the two countries faced very different scenarios. The US at the time was facing financial system collapse, Australia’s economy which is very externally exposed faced a global economic storm. The two reactions by the authorities were also different and they should be labelled appropriately to emphasise this difference.
The US, first and foremost had to save the financial system from collapse. The money that was injected into the banking system is appropriately labelled as ‘rescue package’.
Australia had to weather the global financial storm and avoid it’s own implosion as a result. This was achieved through a ’stimulatory package’.
I’m not arguing the merits of either actions at this stage, only that they were very distinct and served a slightly different purpose caused by the same event.
In the US, if the money was given to the debtors and not financial system not rescued, any economic stimulus would have been insignificant in the light of the economic calamity that would follow. Ironically if the financial system collapsed in the US that would almost guarantee Bernanke head on the chopping board. Even though Bernanke’s ideology is wrong, the actions taken by the Fed were not ideologically driven, even though that was the apparent justification. The Fed’s action were driven by the necessity to rescue the financial system and hence prevent economic meltdown. They would have done whatever is necessary and then justify it according to their ideology.
The private banks essentially belong to the investors. The way it turned out, those investors paid a heavy price through collapse of their stock values and ownership dillution through extensive recapitalisation.
Indeed the outcomes in the two countries were very different. To learn from this difference, one must focus on some of the sources of the issues.
It seems Australian regulation kept Australian banks balance sheets relatively clean. I would study the difference in the regulatory system and culture between the two countries.
Where did all that cheap credit really come from?
No matter what you believe in terms of credit creation theory let’s trace back exactly where that cash comes from. It’s certainly not the Fed, the use of overnight banking facilities and lender of last resort facilities does not prop up the gigantic debt bubble in the US. If you put a tracing agent on the money it comes direct from the Republic of China. Anecdotal evidence suggests that brokers faced with a situation of easy credit, easy money were enticed to look for more and more ways they could capitilise on this situation. When the country ran out of quality home loan borrowers the lending standards began to deteriorate and the self fulfilling cycle of lower lending criteria and asset inflation kicked off in a big way and actually continued for a very long time, probably around 10 years.
But that cheap credit from the capital markets came from China not the Fed. This leads me to a short discussion of very distinct and fundamental differences between China and the western world.
Chinese people on an individual level are very much efficiency focused. As a whole the country of 1 billion+ residents is able to produce much more than they consume. (As an aside, the culture in India is very different in relation to debt. Apparantly Indian people are very ‘debt averse’ culturally, if finance theory was developed in India it would be dramatically different to what pervades the western world textbooks.)
In contrast western cultures seem to consume more than they produce (look at all your household goods and think of the manpower that went into producing them). I think historically this kind of thinking evolved during the age of colonialisation as it is very much inline with the expansiory thinking which dominated at the time. In other words it is perfectly ok to take from other countries for the furthering of your own economic wellbeing. In the post colonial world, in order to continue this ‘culture’ western countries do so by accumulating debt, which in the long run is clearly unsustainable.
There is a cultural and economic imbalance in this world, the GFC is one of many events which will follow which is and will be indicative of the pressure of the system to rebalance itself.
January 25th, 2010 at 3:04 pm
“a thorough demolition job of Bernanke on the Great Depression will have to wait until my book comes out.”
Send Ben a signed copy , at my expense. With any luck , he will have plenty of reading time , what with being unemployed and all …
Thanks for the replies and for this timely post. The web is crawling with “should he stay or should he go” opinion pieces on Bernanke. Should be an interesting week..
January 25th, 2010 at 3:09 pm
Bernanke said :
“Fisher’ s idea was less influential in academic circles, though, because of the counterargument that debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups, it was suggested, pure redistributions should have no significant macroeconomic effects.”
Maybe I am missing something but this could be true only in a full reserve banking system where funds loaned to the borrower are actually not available to the depositor.
In the fractional reserve banking system the amount loaned to the borrower is created “out of thin air” therefore it is not a matter of redistribution of wealth. The wealth goes to the borrowers’ vendors during the expansion phase and then is extracted from the borrowers during the contraction phase.
January 25th, 2010 at 3:36 pm
If not Bernanke, who?
My guess, Bill Donaldson, or an acolyte of Volcker/Donaldson.
I’ve got no idea how they would fit into the scheme of things from Steve’s point of view.
January 25th, 2010 at 3:52 pm
Obama should put Volcker in immediately as Fed Chair . It can be for an interim of a few years so the banking crisis is handled, the banksters cleaned out and to set in place the necessary remedial regulatory reforms/structure so desperately required. There is no other banker of sufficient or equal stature anywhere the US (world?) could put forward at this time.
Obama needs to stop this tooing and froing political sensitivity BS and grow a set of balls then act decisively to put the US on a road to truly and honestly repairing all this accumulated economic damage.
In all of this there is possibly an even more important matter for Obama to deal with- that of TRUST. He and his current weasel team have seriously damaged the public’s trust. Appointing Volcker sends a powerful message that the real business of Central Banking is back and Volcker has the cajones to see it done right.
January 25th, 2010 at 3:54 pm
vk,
I may be wrong as a non-economist but I think there is a shift of consumption in time as additional demand (for assets but also for consumer goods and services) is created when credit money is created and the demand is reduced when credit money is destroyed. That’s why I think money destruction on debt repayment is so important when we model credit economy.
The interesting thing is that we cannot distinguish between “fiat” money and credit money once it’s created. We can only see “fiat” money when we analyse balances of commercial banks with the reserve bank.
When debt is not repaid things get a bit hairy.
We should add the vertical money flow as well – fiat money created and spent by the government – this is what the Chartalists want to increase.
I think that Bernanke doesn’t understand the intertemporal aspect of the fractional reserve banking system otherwise he would have acted differently trying to stimulate the economy.
Credit money spending is like negative intertemporal substitution:
“Intertemporal substitution is the decision to forego current consumption in order to consume in the future. The most common example is saving for retirement.”
http://www.econmodel.com/classic/terms/intertemporal.htm
January 25th, 2010 at 4:03 pm
Karl Denninger makes also makes a good case against Bernake, using a different tack, which raises some questions about the Fed:
http://market-ticker.org/archives/1895-Financial-Terrorism-You-Decide.html
This could well explain the decline in the Stock Market last week. It will be interesting to see how this week goes.
January 25th, 2010 at 4:16 pm
Very nice Steve.
It’s amazing that such advanced minds can miss such a simple mathematical calculation. That is, that credit inflation adds to aggregate demand and credit deflation subtracts from it.
I remember in Grade 4 our teacher told us that they once did a study. They asked what seemed like a complicated question to a group of professors. The professors spent hours debating over the answer and not one answered correctly (nor was the answer even coherent).
The administrator then took the question to a class of 8 year olds. Almost every single child put up their hand and answered the question immediately.
The reason for the discrepancy is that the professors added complications to the question. They did not simply apply common sense or see the simplicity of what they were asked. The 8 year olds on the other hand did nothing but.
With respect to credit inflation, I was speaking to this in my blog on Canada (www.americacanada.blogspot.com). In the past two years, credit growth has added the equivalent of 13% to disposable incomes. Credit has grown at 7-13% per year for almost a decade.
In Canada, between February 2008-November 2009, personal lines of credit grew 39% or 56 billion. On a disposable income basis, that is the equivalent of the United States growing credit lines by over 600 billion US. Meanwhile income fell and GDP fell by 5%.
Cheers,
Jonathan
January 25th, 2010 at 6:17 pm
Bailing?;
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/google_owners_to_sell_million_shares_Ii5l6aWBJnJ6Dog0J20caK
January 25th, 2010 at 7:00 pm
[...] that backdrop, please consider The economic case against Bernanke The US Senate should not reappoint Ben Bernanke. As Obama’s reaction to the loss of Ted [...]
January 25th, 2010 at 10:20 pm
Re: Post 11
“Steve Keen
January 25th, 2010 at 10:56 am
Hi David,
I’m in favour of abolishing the Fed’s ability to be anything other than a clearing house between banks, but I don’t believe that the public can ever be in charge of currency issuance in a world with private banking. As I note in my reform proposals, I’d rather try to make taking on debt for leveraged speculation unattractive than try to reform the nature of banking.”
Steve,
who would then control the monetary policy? Would you recommend nationalising it?
This is in regards to the fact that the Feds recent performance on this subject has been suspect to say the lest.
January 26th, 2010 at 12:03 am
Steve #11
“I’m in favour of abolishing the Fed’s ability to be anything other than a clearing house between banks”
That’s essentially the MMT position, too!
Best,
Scott
January 26th, 2010 at 12:25 am
Another issue why the credit inflation will be worse, is the savers and the debtors are in separate countries with separate economies. The repayment of credit does not add to domestic demand by increasing the liquidity of savers.
The addition of the credit inflation added 90+% of its value to disposable income, and its repayment is a complete subtraction from aggregate demand.
So for instance, if the addition added 15% to disposable income, then we could assume that the following deflationary period would represent a loss of 15% of disposable income. The adjustment is 30%. That’s a depression in itself.
Of course when an economy corrects like that, we are left with over capacity, deflation and falling profits. The economy enters into a more severe stage of depression than that 30% represents.
January 26th, 2010 at 1:56 am
Dear Steve,
I agree with most of the concepts you’ve proposed. However, I’m trying to understand them further by looking at them from a different prospective.
1. I’m not sure if I agree with your comment about making debt for leveraged speculation unattractive. In a free market one should be able to take as much risk as one wants. However, what we should make sure whoever takes that risk is accountable for paying it back.
2. I think amount of debt taken and interest rates are coupled. Higher debt provides liquidity which increases asset prices which further lowers interest rates and so on. As you’ve mentioned several times this is Minsky’s Theory. It seems speculation by some investors (debt for leveraged assets) lowers interest rates for others who can be responsible enough to borrow for sensible investments (debt for productive assets). So why kill this cycle?
Considering the above issues I think some actions taken by Bernanke may be appropriate. However, my problem is that why these actions benefit only the few i.e., bankers?
BTW: I’ve a theoretical question — Is it possible capital markets jump from “equilibrium state” to “non-equilibrium state” and vice-versa? Also, are there different types of “non-equilibrium states”? Do you recommend a tutorial/paper freely available describing complex dynamical systems.
I would like to thank you for providing a great platform to discuss these issues with smart people as yourself.
regards,
AK
January 26th, 2010 at 2:38 am
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January 26th, 2010 at 3:35 am
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January 26th, 2010 at 4:02 am
steve, JKH, stf et al:
I have been thinking more on the pure credit economy and have come to some conclusions I’d welcome your feedback on.
My tentative assertion is that steve is justified in modelling the economy as a pure credit economy for the following reasons:
1. Given that interest is paid on reserves (in nearly all countries and now in the US too), most of the base money supply is operationally credit, and not ‘money’. The presence of cash is a fly in the ointment but I’m not sure how relevant it really is except in times of bank panics.
2. Given 1, there is little difference, in practice and in liquidity effects, between a unit of base money and a 3 month treasury note and notes of longer duration. Government bonds of various maturities are (have been) heavily traded in the shadow banking sector, adding liquidity to the private sector which would not have been possible without the existence of these securities.
3. The government can be viewed very much like a commercial bank in that it has deposits, assets and equity. Bonds represent a voluntary deposit in the public sector and base money represents an involuntary one. Assets are the current and future tax base and income earning public infrastructure (very roughly represented as some constant X GDP). Equity is the difference between these assets and liabilities, and public sector leverage is reasonably represented by the debt-gdp ratio.
4. the fact the government is not revenue constrained is not really relevant as neither are commercial banks who can make loans (i.e. spend) prior to having secured the required deposits. What does matter both for banks and governments is the leverage of their equity. Infact the only difference is that banks are subject to capital ratios and governments are not.
Given all the above I’m unclear as to what special case can be made that fiat ‘money’ really exists. It’s all credit extended either by the public sector to the private sector (via discount window, and also in practice by deferred taxation) or vice versa (via bank reserves and bonds). I think it makes sense to view the public debt as deferred taxation, effectively extended by the public sector to the private sector, currently on 0% interest terms). If this works as an operating definition, then the net financial asset position of the economy as a whole is zero, and unfunded government spending simply increases public leverage. Note that the fact the national debt will never be fully repaid is no different to noting that a commercial bank will never (can never) redeem all its depositors at the same time.
The fact the clearing asset is given value by it being demanded in tax is not relevant here I think since steve’s circuit model just assumes a default pure credit clearing process which is what I arguing we have now anyway.
So in summary, how is the current economy understood in MMT terms not in actual fact, as a whole, a pure credit economy? What difference if anything would you expect steve’s addition of the gov sector to his model to make to the understanding of economy and credit dynamics it conveys?
January 26th, 2010 at 5:20 am
[...] his reappointment, as there should be far more that I can agree with there. Let’s start with Steve Keen. Bernanke is popularly portrayed as an expert on the Great Depression—the person whose intimate [...]
January 26th, 2010 at 6:28 am
scepticus,
Your post aligns well with my — admittedly purely intuitive — sense of the way things work.
Looking at Steve’s “Debt contribution to aggregate demand” graphs I suspect that , over the long haul , the area under the curve during the debt inflation phases must eventually be balanced by the area above the curve during the debt deflation phases , so that overall leverage remains reasonable. What’s reasonable ? Looking at the U.S. data from the GD onward , I’d say (total)debt/gdp of 150-160% looked sustainable. I think public and private debts must be considered together and equivalently , not as separate special cases. I do think there is some potential for double-counting some types of debts due to the complexities of our financial system , but this should be a solvable problem.
The argument is often made that debt levels don’t matter as long as asset prices are rising enough , but I think this argument fails eventually. Asset values for things like stocks or real estate , relative to GDP/incomes , seem to revert to a mean ratio that’s relatively constant over the long haul. Nevertheless , with every bubble , we’re bombarded with justifications for why ” It’s different this time “.
GDP growth , like a person’s income growth , can be sustainable as long as debt/income or debt/gdp levels are bounded by an upper limit that allows for recovery from shocks , including the low-probability ones. This requires a level of leverage that’s lower than most are used to today, but was considered normal and acceptable in the past.
January 26th, 2010 at 7:02 am
further to the above, I will suggest that ALL government debt is adding liquidity to the private sector, not just base money. This follows from realising the essential equivalence of all forms of government debt and base money, and by observing how the shadow banking sector has succeeded in turning government bonds of all durations into liquid, tradeable ‘money substitutes’ that are part of the ‘fiat money/credit stock’, yet not part of official bank reserves.
No wonder we have had a shadow banking sector, because all the public debt is shadow-money! This suggests to me there will be no net inflationary impact of monetising all long duration government debt into interest paying bank reserves. There is no difference between the two on the liquidity effects that they have on the private sector, except that the latter are cheaper for taxpayers.
However, the idea that the government can go on adding to debt ad-infinitum is dubious, because all the bank reserves thus created are claims on the future income of taxpayers. It is only the chartalist assertion that the natural rate of interest is zero, that hides this fact.
But in a pure credit economy, the natural rate of interest is not zero, it is defined by the supply and demand of credit and risk premiums. Loans may create deposits but deposits earn interest. The only way such an economy can work is when the market for credit is cleared naturally, and that can’t happen when someone announces unilaterally a ‘natural rate of interest’.
January 26th, 2010 at 8:19 am
Re #42: Thanks goidcc.
I think this “free market” first thinking blinds us to the extent to which society–via the government–has a role in setting the legal framework of commerce. The fact that the state allowed shares to be made perpetual was a poor piece of legislative behaviour some 200 years ago, because of the potential it gave for Ponzi behavior. I don’t believe that Madoff’s behavior should be legalised for example, yet the essence of debt-financed bubbles on asset prices is the same as with Madoff’s criminal behavior. I have no problem with people taking risk–leveraged or otherwise–for genuine investment or even consumption. But when it’s used to gamble on asset prices without giving any of that money to the firms on whose futures people are gambling, then it’s a recipe for a regular financial collapse that de-legitimises capitalism rather than promoting it.
Statistically, debt levels (relative to GDP) and interest rates are at best very weakly coupled. The real action is in debt itself.
A tutorial on chaos theory for a non-mathematician is tricky; most simple books on the topic are too simple, most introductory books are introductory for mathematics majors. I try to cover the basics in this lecture and its follow-up.
January 26th, 2010 at 9:10 am
scepticus,
You want to use the credit money terms as a kind of “dual language” to MMT what is fine but let’s examine whether there are no hidden meanings and whether that language can be applied to the reality.
Let’s look at the monetary side of the economy.
I believe that from the modelling point of view we are dealing with a collection of variables (stocks) and functions determining flows between the stocks while the boundary conditions (constraints) imposed by accounting identities are always met. In this context it is relevant which flows are independent and which flows are dependant on other variables. Fiat money can be created semi-independently because the power structure (the democratically elected government and parliament, Chinese politburo, Mr Robert Mugabe, the shadowy power structures of the EU) can force that flow. The same applies to the flow draining the non-government sector in the form of taxation but there is some resistance there – either people may dodge the taxes or vote the government out of office. “Bonds represent a voluntary deposit in the public sector and base money represents an involuntary one.” So this is not a liability if the markets can be overpowered to accept an involuntary deposit. My debt is my liability because I have to pay back at least the interests if not the principal of my loan. This is the key difference. Some parameters of the model are dependant some are semi-random and some are almost fully independent.
Credit money is created by banks semi-independently but what they can do is influenced by the political power. In that regards one can question the extent to which the shadow banking system can create money. The answer is – to that extent the money created there can leak to the real economy causing positive or negative flows. One can imagine OTC contracts being simply invalidated (when the players default) if things spin out of control. But the official banking system is creating “real” credit money which can be spent by the agents in exactly the same way fiat money can. These obligations are almost always legally enforceable. If not – there is a small leak but we don’t care about tiny memory leaks as our application is restarted periodically (oh sorry I am now sitting in my backyard with my cat so I should really stop thinking in that way).
The main claim of MMT is that a sovereign government is not constrained but may face the consequences of its decisions. The illusion pushed by neoliberal forces is that because of the separation of the reserve bank and treasury the government has no control. In this case I agree with MMT. They are in control and the reason why they are pretending they aren’t is to relinquish the social responsibility. “My dog ate my homework”. The governments are constrained by the political factors and the real future consequences of the decisions.
This leads us to another fundamental issue where I do not 100% agree with some MMT scholars. Imagine we have successfully built a model of modern monetary system. But how does it relate to the physical reality? How does money relate to goods and services? In communism the government and politburo wanted to control prices. This worked only to some extent. In normal economy the markets (the agents, and the big-fat mega-agents – corporations) and the state determine the prices of consumer goods, services, assets and labour. Inflation is just an aggregate estimate. The simplified assumption is that at the aggregated level supply and demand forces determine the way prices evolve what is linked to unemployment rate by the Phillips curve, etc. The truth is that asset prices inflation was overlooked by the Fed obsessed with CPI inflation targeting mainly because of the emergence of China and other fast developing players. But in the 1970-ties the previous system also didn’t work well – it produced stagflation. So things aren’t so simple. Even the most sovereign governments are constrained somewhat by the immediate and future consequences in pushing “an involuntary deposit” – fiat money – on the societies.
I still need to learn more to build a model of this subsystem in my mind but I believe that things are more complex when we start looking at the disaggregated numbers and analysing all the relevant factors. For example the factors affecting unemployment of people with IQ150). Disclaimer 1. I know that IQ is to some extent rubbish. Disclaimer 2. I don’t care if this is politically incorrect – I know it is.
What about prices of commodities like oil? The supply-side shock of the 1970-ties changed the rules of the game and allowed for certain policies like full employment to be abandoned. So if we want to link goods, services and labour to money (by determining prices) this is not so easy. I wouldn’t use static supply-demand curves.
Ultimately the prices and saving/spending willingness of the agents are the weakest link. Governments can print money and can to some extent suck the liquidity from the market but may not be able to impose prices and to force agents (the market players) to save or spend. That’s why the socialist system failed and that’s why we are having the GFC. Understanding and simulating this part of the system is the most challenging task. I believe that in some cases we may need to simulate agents to better understand how human behaviour at a micro scale affects the society at the macro scale but at a certain level of abstraction aggregated flows and stocks are an estimation good enough to describe the reality and see the inherent instability of the system.