It’s Hard Being a Bear (Part Five): Rescued?
I’m happy to admit that I underestimated how strongly governments would respond to this financial crisis. Dramatic reductions in interest rates, huge fiscal stimuli and—in the USA and UK—expansion of government-created money, have all had a positive impact on the economy and asset markets (both shares and houses).
In his recent essay, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd estimated that the rescues were the equivalent of roughly 18 percent of global GDP over a 3 year period, which is an unprecedented level of expenditure by governments.
Eichengreen and O’Rourke’s comparison of today to the Great Depression gives the most balanced assessment of how effective these policies have been at the global level.
They have clearly turned around stock markets. Six months ago, world stock markets were 50% below their peak, a far worse performance than during the Great Depression when, at the same time after the peak, they had only fallen 10%. By the beginning of September, markets had recovered to be only a couple of percent below the comparable 1930 position of a 30% fall.
Industrial output has also turned around. Six months ago this was 13% below the peak level, worse than the 1930s position of an 11% decline. Since then it has risen to be only 10% below, while at the equivalent time in the 1930s, industrial output had fallen 20% from its 1929 high.
So has the government cavalry ridden to the rescue? If the crisis were one simply of liquidity, the answer would be yes. A government stimulus can overwhelm the impact of a credit crunch, and the innate dynamic of a productive economy can re-assert itself after such a crisis, leading to renewed growth.
But this not merely a crisis of liquidity. It is one of excessive private debt, on a scale that is also unprecedented: the USA is carrying US$41.5 trillion in debt on the back of a US$14 trillion economy, proportionately 70 percent more debt than it had at the start of the Great Depression. In December 2007, the private sector swung from ramping up debt levels as it chased speculative gains on asset markets, to retreating from debt as the asset bubbles burst.
In the space of a year, private debt went from adding US$4 trillion to aggregate demand, to subtracting US$165 billion from it. Private debt had ceased being the economy’s turbocharger and had instead become its flooded engine.

While economic outsiders like myself, Michael Hudson, Niall Ferguson and Nassim Taleb argue that the only way to restart the economic engine is to clear it of debt, the government response, has been to attempt to replace the now defunct private debt economic turbocharger with a public one.
In the immediate term, the stupendous size of the stimulus has worked, so that debt in total is still boosting aggregate demand. But what will happen when the government stops turbocharging the economy, and waits anxiously for the private system to once again splutter into life?

I am afraid that all it will do is splutter.
This is especially so since, following the advice of neoclassical economists, Obama has got not a bang but a whimper out of the many bucks he has thrown at the financial system.
In explaining his recovery program in April, President Obama noted that:
“there are a lot of Americans who understandably think that government money would be better spent going directly to families and businesses instead of banks – ‘where’s our bailout?,’ they ask”.
He justified giving the money to the lenders, rather than to the debtors, on the basis of “the multiplier effect” from bank lending:
the truth is that a dollar of capital in a bank can actually result in eight or ten dollars of loans to families and businesses, a multiplier effect that can ultimately lead to a faster pace of economic growth. (page 3 of the speech)
This argument comes straight out of the neoclassical economics textbook. Fortunately, due to the clear manner in which Obama enunciates it, the flaw in this textbook argument is vividly apparent in his speech.
This “multiplier effect” will only work if American families and businesses are willing to take on yet more debt: “a dollar of capital in a bank can actually result in eight or ten dollars of loans”.
So the only way the roughly US$1 trillion of money that the Federal Reserve has injected into the banks will result in additional spending is if American families and businesses take out another US$8-10 trillion in loans.
What are the odds that this will happen, when they already owe more than they have ever owed in the history of America? The next chart inverts the usual portrayal of America’s debt to GDP ratio by inverting it: the top of the graph represents zero debt, the bottom, a debt to GDP ratio of 300 percent—which is just shy of the current ratio of 292 percent.
If the money multiplier was going to “ride to the rescue”, private debt would need to rise from its current level of US$41.5 trillion to about US$50 trillion, and this ratio would rise to about 375%—more than twice the level that ushered in the Great Depression.
This is a rescue? It’s a “hair of the dog” cure: having booze for breakfast to overcome the feelings of a hangover from last night’s binge. It is the road to debt alcoholism, not the road to teetotalism and recovery.

Fortunately, it’s a “cure” that is also highly unlikely to work, because the model of money creation that Obama’s economic advisers have sold him was shown to be empirically false over three decades ago.
The first economist to establish this was the American Post Keynesian economist Basil Moore, but similar results were found by two of the staunchest neoclassical economists, Nobel Prize winners Kydland and Prescott in a 1990 paper Real Facts and a Monetary Myth.
Looking at the timing of economic variables, they found that credit money was created about 4 periods before government money. However, the “money multiplier” model argues that government money is created first to bolster bank reserves, and then credit money is created afterwards by the process of banks lending out their increased reserves.
Kydland and Prescott observed at the end of their paper that:
Introducing money and credit into growth theory in a way that accounts for the cyclical behavior of monetary as well as real aggregates is an important open problem in economics.
I couldn’t agree more, but unfortunately they—and neoclassical economists in general—did bugger all about it. On the other hand, the Post Keynesian group, of whom I am one, have continued to try to construct models of the economy in which credit plays an essential role.
I’ve recently developed a genuinely monetary, credit-driven model of the economy, and one of its first insights is that Obama has been sold a pup on the right way to stimulate the economy: he would have got far more bang for his buck by giving the stimulus to the debtors rather than the creditors.
The following figure shows three simulations of this model in which a change in the willingness of lenders to lend and borrowers to borrow causes a “credit crunch” in year 25. In year 26, the government injects $100 billion into the economy—which at that stage has output of about $1,000 billion, so it’s a pretty huge injection, in two different ways: it injects $100 billion into bank reserves, or it puts $100 billion into the bank accounts of firms, who are the debtors in this model.

The model shows that you get far more “bang for your buck” by giving the money to firms, rather than banks. Unemployment falls in both case below the level that would have applied in the absence of the stimulus, but the reduction in unemployment is far greater when the firms get the stimulus, not the banks: unemployment peaks at over 18 percent without the stimulus, just over 13 percent with the stimulus going to the banks, but under 11 percent with the stimulus being given to the firms.
The time path of the recession is also greatly altered. The recession is shorter with the stimulus, but there’s actually a mini-boom in the middle of it with the firm-directed stimulus, versus a simply lower peak to unemployment with the bank-directed stimulus.
Why does this model show that it’s better to give the money to the debtors than the lenders, in contrast to the case that Obama was sold, that it’s better to give it to the bankers?
Because the “money multiplier” model is effectively a mechanical, static, equilibrium model of the economy. Give the banks excess reserves, and they will lend them to the public, which will happily take on the debt. Once the reserves are fully lent out, the economy is back to equilibrium again.
In contrast, my model is a dynamic, non-equilibrium one, where the “circular flow” of money and goods is properly accounted for. In this system, you can think of the different bank accounts in the system as like dams with pipes connecting them of vastly different diameters.
When a credit crunch strikes, the pipes pumping the bank reserves to the firms shrink dramatically, while the pipe going in the opposite direction expands, and all other pipes remain the same size.
If you then fill up the bank reserves reservoir—by the government pumping the extra $100 billion into it—that money will only trickle into the economy slowly. If however you put that money into the firms’ bank accounts, it would flow at an unchanged rate to the rest of the economy—the workers—while flowing more quickly to the banks as well, reducing debt levels.
So giving the stimulus to the debtors is a more potent way of reducing the impact of a credit crunch—the opposite of the advice given to Obama by his neoclassical advisers.
This could also be one reason that the Australian experience has been better than the USA’s: the stimulus in Australia has emphasized funding the public rather than the banks (and the model shows the same impact from giving money to the workers as from giving it to the firms—and for the same reason, that workers have to spend, so that the money injected into the economy circulates more rapidly.
This model can explain some aspects of the current US data that are inexplicable from the conventional, neoclassical point of view—the key paradox being that while base money (“M0”) has been increased dramatically, there has been almost no movement in broader measures of money (“M1” and “M2”). If the money multiplier argument were correct, the increases in M1 and M2 would have been multiples of the increase in M0, as Obama was led to expect.

In fact, the expansion in M0 has been met by a fall in the credit-generated component of the money supply: since M2 includes all of M1 and M1 includes all of M0, this is clearer when we substract the double-counting out. M1 has actually contracted almost as much as M0 has expanded, while the expansion in M2 has been less than a third the size of the growth in M0.

The “money multiplier” has also collapsed—a mystery from a neoclassical point of view, but entirely predictable from the “endogenous money” perspective.

Obama has been sold a pup by neoclassical economics: not only did neoclassical theory help cause the crisis, by championing the growth of private debt and the asset bubbles it financed; it also is undermining efforts to reduce the severity of the crisis.
This is unfortunately the good news: the bad news is that this model only considers an economy undergoing a “credit crunch”, and not also one suffering from a serious debt overhang that only a direct reduction in debt can tackle. That is our actual problem, and while a stimulus will work for a while, the drag from debt-deleveraging is still present. The economy will therefore lapse back into recession soon after the stimulus is removed.


Scott,
Thanks for the continuing engagement! I begin from a sceptic’s position, hence my handle. Like I said, I’m mostly convinced, but I can’t have anyone thinking I’m easy, if you know what I mean.
I’m glad you made the point the the deficit is limited by private saving desire. I had not managed to easily discern that point, or limiting condition, in the posts on bill’s blog, although I did get that impression from chartalist literature generally.
Regarding the safety of ‘deposits’ within the public economy, I guess a bank run in this analogy is equated with a run on the currency. Extending (and possibly belabouring) this analogy, the currency exchange rate represents the ‘share price’ of the national economy bank.
These analogies may seem trite to you, but I can assure you they will go very long way to promoting general understanding of the chartalist economic picture in the general layman econoblogosphere.
yes mahaish – lololol!
Mahaish … I’m bringing the marshmallows.
Scepticus … no problems at all with analogies. Warren Mosler’s the best I’ve ever seen at them, and as you note, their power is really unmatched.
Best,
Scott Fullwiler
Do I get a prize for being commenter number 400?
Hey, now that’s cheating! -:).
Actually, the record for the largest number of comments on a post is still held by “Rudd’s Essay is on the money“, which had 407 comments. So I suppose the next milestone will be 500 comments on a blog post…
Steve, we should have some prizes (including booby-prizes), democractically voted for, (or autocratically awarded) every so often.
Any ideas for catagories?
I might leave that up for democratic nomination scepticus!
I would have liked to have an Xmas party for the blog this year, at least in Sydney: with 2300+ members now, there should be at least enough in my home town for a good dinner out together–but I’m off to Europe in mid-November for an as yet undetermined time. So maybe a New Year’s dinner might go down better–and some prizes there would be a hoot.
By the way, I’m about to post the entry on Chartalism including Bill Mitchell’s precis. I am then off to Adelaide for the Economists’ Conference, where I’m presenting a paper on my Minsky and Circuit models and the GFC. That will leave me little if any time for the blog for the next few days, but I’m sure you will all keep up the chat in my absence.
Bill has also said that he might sign on to the blog to take part in the discussion, and we also have Scott here too to handle any debate that arises. I’ll do what I can to join in, though probably more after Tuesday than before.
Scott Fullwiler,
I think some of the commenters have misinterpreted my “why does it matter?” question, whereas you’ve been clearer on it.
With reference to your September 26th 4:35 pm comment, I agree entirely with your seven point operational list. The veracity of that list is merely a matter of understanding the mechanics of the monetary system and in particular the banking system. I think it matters very much whether economists understand this or not, and I think you would agree with this wholeheartedly. As you say, agreement with the list does not necessarily make one a Chartalist. Agreement with the list is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to be a Chartalist.
I also think that whatever policy prescriptions flow from such operational understanding is a very important matter. There is much to chew on there, and much debate is possible, I think.
The focus of my “why does it matter?” question is really fairly concentrated on something else. It has to do with what I understood to be the central and unique tenet of Chartalism. Perhaps I’m wrong on this. I thought this has to do with the role of taxation in the natural demand for state money. In is in this sense that I wonder why one’s view on the essentialness of taxation as the driver for the demand for fiat money is particularly necessary for a correct understanding the operational essentials contained in your list, or even for debating the policy issues that confront us today that are more correctly analysed when understanding the operational essentials of the list. I think it’s an interesting historical perspective. And it’s an interesting idea to consider in the context of today’s monetary architecture. But as far as an idea to be proven in any way as applicable to today’s architecture, it seems to me to be neither necessary nor provable. Moreover, an attempted proof would probably require the construction of some wild counterfactual that has very little to do with today’s architecture. Hence, “why does it matter?”
So I thought the tax perspective was the core theme of Chartalism, which in my view is not essential to understanding the modern monetary system or its natural policy implications. But maybe I have that wrong, and need to see a clearer definition of exactly what Chartalism is, and what it isn’t. Perhaps Steve’s next post will clear this up for me.
Damn!
Misspelled your last name.
Scott Fullwiler.
Sorry, Scott.
JKH . . . you got the name right, actually. You’re already better at than a number of my in-laws.
Anyway, yes, taxes create a demand for the currency is the central tenet of chartalism. I would agree also (obviously since I wrote it before) that being a chartalist is not a necessary precondition for understanding the operational side of monetary/fiscal operations.
My own 2 cents is that I do think that understanding chartalism adds value to understanding current policy and tactics (though pushing the operational side is more important to most of us at the moment). Witness, for instance, recommendations posted to the KC blog and Warren’s site regarding California’s IOUs (and the implications potentially for national governments trapped in the neoliberal paradigm), or Warren’s statement on his site that “the money to pay taxes and buy govt bonds comes from government spending” (though I suppose one could come to at least an operational understanding of the latter w/o chartalism).
Finally, I think the historical literature from chartalists helps dispell a lot of common misconceptions about the history of money and governments, which is very important given all the bad monetary history pushed by neoliberals regarding our “bartering forefathers” who supposedly invented money to overcome the double coincidence of wants. One hears a lot more of this bad history in times like these as policymakers push the boundaries of what people consider to be normal macro policy responses.
Best,
Scott Fullwiler
I have the following problem with what has been stated as the Chartalist position (My question may go along the lines mentioned by Scepticus already) – certain crucial elements are missing from the bigger picture. We don’t live in isolated states where currencies are used for paying taxes and buying locally produced goods only. We live in a globalised world where international financial system revolves around US dollar.
“My interpretation of your analogy would be that if by depositors we mean “savers,” then the deficit SHOULD be limited to offsetting their desire to save. If they desire not to, then they are spending, and the deficit SHOULD be smaller. To run a bigger deficit raises aggregate demand beyond capacity.”
First of all I think that we have to admit that a significant volume of “saving” occurs when creditor countries (China, Russia, Saudi) buy bonds sold by debtor countries (US and very unfortunately also Australia). Speculators also play a significant role there. So the desire to save is not limited by local demand for savings.
The second observation is that the aggregate demand is determined by the amount of currency in circulation so if the “desire to save” turns negative and investors lose confidence in bonds the market will be instantly flooded with money (as the governments will try to adjust bond yields effectively forcing them to buy back bonds before the maturity date). There is no such thing as long-term average desire to save.
The third observation is that if the amount of public debt grows into three-digit numbers (like 200-300% of the GDP) even a small disturbance may lead to an instability and getting rid of bonds denominated in a particular currency. It is like snowy overhang waiting to make an avalanche.
My point is that if the Chinese or Russians start getting rid of US Treasury bonds US dollar will collapse what will trigger genuine inflation caused by rising commodity prices in the US despite having at the same time massive deleveraging of the private debt. The Chinese may not want right now this because they would lose. But one day the instability may become too significant.
Whether the world will be better or worse off is another issue – personally I would concentrate on rebalancing trade deficits and redesigning the western economies so they are less driven by individual demand. I would lower the exchange rate of AUD by quietly paying back foreign-denominated debt and by starting massive public infrastructure investment programs financed by money creation. This would whack private (over)consumption but would also stimulate export.
How long can we keep living beyond our means by importing goods and selling off our assets? I would simply like to bring forward something (the “day of reckoning” for our economy) what is inevitable anyway.
Then we can start fixing the sustainability and environmental issues rather than waste time and money on “stimulating” car dealers and the real estate industry.
Does it make sense or have I misunderstood the principles of Chartalism or drifted too much in the social-democratic direction?
AK . . . I think you’ve drifted almost completely in the neo-liberal direction.
First, if int’l investors sell their Treasuries, the $ falls in value and US exports improve, US jobs are created, etc, whereas the opposite happens in those countries that sold the bonds. Doesn’t seem to be in their interest–they’ve been export driven for a reason. They may do it, though.
Second, let’s look at this operationally. If China sells its Treasuries, what happens? The Fed simply renames the Chinese govt’s account at the Fed from a savings account holding time deposits to an overnight account holding reserves. So what? Yes, the $ falls, but as above, not necessarily a problem. Could be a bit inflationary in the short term, but doesn’t prevent a currency issuer from creating full employment.
Third, the size of the national debt is irrelevant. It’s the size of the debt service that matters. As I demonstrated in “interest rates and fiscal sustainability” at the CFEPS site, interest on the national debt is essentially a monetary policy variable for a currency issuer under flexible exchange rates. Just look at the two extreme cases of the US and Japan–in the US, a large % of the national debt is held internationally; in Japan, an overwhelming % is held domestically. Those are the ONLY 2 POSSIBLE scenarios. And what’s happened to interest on the national debt in both countries as they’ve run very large deficits? They’ve both followed current and anticipated monetary policy very closely. If int’l investors sell Tsy’s then the current account balance for the US improves (by definition) and bonds are then held domestically, as in Japan (by accounting identity, if you keep the fed deficit the same and improve the current account balance, then private domestic net saving rises). So what?
This is all beside the fact that the US Treasury doesn’t need to issue lt bonds, or any bonds at all, operationally (even neo-liberal graduate texts understand this), and it wouldn’t be more inflationary if it didn’t (actually, issuing bonds is MORE inflationary since it comes with an added interest payment).
Overall, the argument that the US needs to worry about int’l investors is inapplicable to a flexible exchange rate regime. It’s only under fixed exchange rates that actions in currency markets can require the central bank to alter interest rates to maintain an exchange rate peg. We hear this argument every few years or so, and it still hasn’t come true for reasons we repeatedly explain.
Best,
Scott
AK . . . Bill dealt with these same issues in his latest blog, BTW (also note the points raised by JKH and scepticus): http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=5173&cpage=1#comment-1571
Scott,
“Yes, the $ falls, but as above, not necessarily a problem. Could be a bit inflationary in the short term, but doesn’t prevent a currency issuer from creating full employment.”
I agree with this. But the problem I have is if oil costs USD300/barrel the economy in the US will we seriously affected in the short term and the politicians may start doing silly things. People will think that this is the end. They will not afford to drive 4WD cars to their shopping malls … etc.
Investors may feel threatened if they may lose something much more valuable than human life – the value of their financial assets. This is how capitalism works – property rights are above anything else. And you have to treat investors with respect especially in the US. It is not an issue of dealing with undereducated masses – these people know what they want and I believe there is a genuine conflict of interests between the investors and working / unemployed masses.
It is the transitional dynamic process not the long term asymptotic pseudo-equilibrium what concerns me.
My point is that USD freed by selling bonds will not be used to purchase anything in the US. Since USD is the international currency they will most likely be used to purchase more commodities on future markets or assets like mining companies for example in Africa.
Simply – the amount of USD in circulation on the global market will increase and the real price of USD on international exchange markets will go down. I agree that in long term this may be good for the US.
So my reasoning is if too many bonds are accumulated in foreign hands may lead to a sharper adjustment when the system goes from the current pseudo-equilibrium to the real one (based on more balanced international trade). These 2 cases (bonds held predominantly in foreign hands or held predominantly in domestic hands) have been outlined already.
“It’s only under fixed exchange rates that actions in currency markets can require the central bank to alter interest rates to maintain an exchange rate peg.”
Yes I agree with this but the central banks actually try to maintain certain exchange rates. The reason is that the American government is much more interested in making petrol affordable until the last drop of oil is extracted than in maintaining full employment.
I think that they are wrong – but again I am trying to describe what these guys are doing and to anticipate what they’ll do in the nearest future unless you manage to enlighten the decision makers. I doubt this will happen soon. I don’t think the American decision makers are ignorant – the policies make perfect sense to certain groups of people.
If I understand it correctly your position would be to ditch the current constraints on financing the budget deficit, ignore yields of bondholders and ignore exchange rates determining commodity prices. Just simply power ahead with the full employment policies. I would prefer to see that these policies can be implemented but I seriously doubt that this is ever possible in the US or even in Australia.
Again, sorry if I misunderstood something again and repeated my naive arguments but I am a software engineer not an economist.
Best Regards,
Adam
AK,
Agree with you on oil. Far better to eliminate such dependency ASAP.
Regarding the exchange rate, though, the inflataionary impact would be temporary, and as we saw a few years ago, it would accelerate a movement away from oil dependency (perhaps the best thing to happen to the oil exporters’ long-term interests was the popping of the commodities bubble).
Finally, while there would certainly be downward pressure on the US$ in those cases, if a full employment economy is maintained, it’s at least questionable how much the exchange rate would fall . . . foreign investors are looking for returns, after all, and fully employed economies are the most able at providing them.
Best,
Scott Fullwiler
As someone who wants to borrow money to build a productive asset it is pretty clear what the problem is. The reason for borrowing money is so that you can turn it into more money than you borrow. However, if I want to borrow money from a bank for a new productive asset I can’t. There are NO loans available from banks that I can access. I HAVE to get a loan that is backed by existing assets or I have to get money from other people’s savings.
Because of this even in these days of massive debt and hence presumably money sloshing around everywhere I cannot get money except at usury rates. When I say usury I mean usury. A government funded VC recently offered me money at 300% compound over 3 years and if I did not meet my target within the first year he wanted the whole company. The only reason he can do this is because there are few sources of funds to build new assets. Plenty of places to go to get money backed by my house – which of course is the route I will take but the FACT is that you cannot get equity at a sensible price – not because of the risk – but because there is a shortage of supply.
To fix the problem we need to allow banks to be able to create loans against the value of future assets as well as loans created against existing assets.
Of course future assets are riskier but we solve that problem by requiring repayments on loans for future assets to be greater than 100% of the amount borrowed and we allow the loans to be repaid from the profits of the future assets and we remove interest payments.
As a loan against an existing asset is really the borrower renting their own asset it makes sense for loans against existing assets to pay interest but a loan against a future asset should repay the loan from future earnings and not pay interest.
Debt is good if it results in the creation of new productive assets. Debt is bad if it only inflates the value of existing assets. Our current loans regime is an engine for asset inflation and a dampener on asset creation. Fix this and we fix the problem. I think it is that simple but it would be great if someone could model it:)
http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/10/a-second-great-depression-is-still-possible/
Financial Times Someone else has been reading the mail!
http://www.debtdeflation.com/blogs/2009/09/19/it%e2%80%99s-hard-being-a-bear-part-five-rescued/
September 20th, 2009 at 9:23 am
Steve,
Gold will trade at US$1224 on or before November 5 2009.
Remember this and when it happens alot of people on this blog will be owing me and apology.
You can use this information for trading purposes i do not mind if people profit from my calls, even if they agree or dislike me.
Elliottwave.
Anyone else counting down to this? Gold has to put on $200 in a week. Should be an interesting week.