Why China Had To Crash Part 1

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In this post I con­sid­er the econ­o­my in gen­er­al: I’ll cov­er asset mar­kets in par­tic­u­lar in the next col­umn, but you’ll need to under­stand today’s post to com­pre­hend the stock and prop­er­ty mar­ket dynam­ics at play. Hav­ing said that, the Shang­hai Index fell anoth­er 7.5% on Tues­day, after los­ing 8.5% on Mon­day, and is now down over 45% from its peak—so I’ll try to write the stock-mar­ket-spe­cif­ic post by tomor­row. In this post I’ll show, very sim­ply, why a slow­down in the rate of growth of pri­vate debt will cause a cri­sis, if both the lev­el and the rate of change of debt are high at the time of the slow­down.

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About Steve Keen

I am Professor of Economics and Head of Economics, History and Politics at Kingston University London, and a long time critic of conventional economic thought. As well as attacking mainstream thought in Debunking Economics, I am also developing an alternative dynamic approach to economic modelling. The key issue I am tackling here is the prospect for a debt-deflation on the back of the enormous private debts accumulated globally, and our very low rate of inflation.