The Fed’s 2% Inflation Target Trap

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Thomas I. Pal­ley

Senior Eco­nom­ic Pol­i­cy Advi­sor, AFL-CIO

The Fed­er­al Reserve has now open­ly adopt­ed a two per­cent infla­tion tar­get, with both Chair­man Bernanke and the Fed­er­al Open Mar­ket Com­mit­tee pub­licly com­mit­ting to hold­ing infla­tion at that lev­el. Though not a prob­lem today, this two per­cent tar­get rep­re­sents a pol­i­cy trap that will under­cut the pos­si­bil­i­ty of future wage increas­es despite on-going pro­duc­tiv­i­ty growth.  That promis­es to aggra­vate exist­ing prob­lems of income inequal­i­ty and demand short­age.

The Fed’s new pol­i­cy is tac­ti­cal­ly and ana­lyt­i­cal­ly flawed. Tac­ti­cal­ly, at this time of glob­al eco­nom­ic weak­ness, the Fed­er­al Reserve should be advo­cat­ing poli­cies that pro­mote ris­ing wages rather than focus­ing on infla­tion tar­gets. Ana­lyt­i­cal­ly, its infla­tion tar­get is too low and will inflict sig­nif­i­cant future eco­nom­ic harm.

There is lit­tle rea­son to believe a two per­cent infla­tion tar­get is best for the econ­o­my. Those econ­o­mists who claim it is are the same econ­o­mists who should have been dis­cred­it­ed by the finan­cial cri­sis of 2008 and the eco­nom­ic stag­na­tion that has fol­lowed. Their claims are based on the so-called “Great Mod­er­a­tion”, the two decade peri­od of mod­est infla­tion and sta­ble growth, which pre­ced­ed the cri­sis. How­ev­er, it is now clear the Great Mod­er­a­tion was the prod­uct of a twen­ty-five year cred­it bub­ble, sup­port­ed by the arti­fact of per­sis­tent­ly low­er inter­est rates that can fall no fur­ther.

If, in the future, the Fed­er­al Reserve feels it must set infla­tion tar­gets, there are strong grounds for believ­ing a slight­ly high­er infla­tion rate of three to five per­cent pro­duces bet­ter out­comes by low­er­ing the unem­ploy­ment rate and cre­at­ing labor mar­ket bar­gain­ing con­di­tions that help con­nect wages to pro­duc­tiv­i­ty growth. Over the last thir­ty years, Amer­i­can work­ers have faced pro­longed wage stag­na­tion despite sig­nif­i­cant pro­duc­tiv­i­ty growth. The one excep­tion was the late 1990s and 2000 when the unem­ploy­ment rate fell to four per­cent, briefly cre­at­ing con­di­tions in which work­ers were able to win wage increas­es. That his­to­ry shows the impor­tance of full employ­ment for shared pros­per­i­ty.

The two per­cent infla­tion tar­get rep­re­sents a cru­el trap. The unem­ploy­ment rate will even­tu­al­ly come down, and when it does the econ­o­my will bump against the Fed­er­al Reserve’s new self-imposed infla­tion ceil­ing. That ceil­ing like­ly coin­cides with an unem­ploy­ment rate of six per­cent or high­er. Under the new pol­i­cy regime, the Fed­er­al Reserve will then have rea­son to pull the trig­ger and raise inter­est rates, there­by trap­ping mil­lions in unem­ploy­ment and ensur­ing con­tin­u­a­tion of the sec­ond round of wage stag­na­tion which began after the stock mar­ket bust of 2001.

The Fed­er­al Reserve’s two per­cent infla­tion tar­get con­sti­tutes a back­door way of forc­ing soci­ety to live with a “new nor­mal” of per­ma­nent wage stag­na­tion and unem­ploy­ment far in excess of full employ­ment. In effect, by adopt­ing this tar­get, the Fed has sur­rep­ti­tious­ly aban­doned its leg­is­lat­ed man­date to also pur­sue “max­i­mum employ­ment”.

The two per­cent infla­tion tar­get would not pass muster if soci­ety were to have an open debate about what con­sti­tutes max­i­mum employ­ment with sta­ble prices, and whether the eco­nom­ic cri­sis has cre­at­ed struc­tur­al change that war­rants aban­don­ing pre­vi­ous­ly attained employ­ment goals. How­ev­er, rather than engag­ing in demo­c­ra­t­ic pol­i­cy delib­er­a­tion befit­ting an open soci­ety, the Fed­er­al Reserve has opt­ed for a qui­et end run that will make restor­ing shared pros­per­i­ty even more dif­fi­cult.

The polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic log­ic of the moment makes it dif­fi­cult to chal­lenge the Fed. First, infla­tion is now low so that the public’s ear is not attuned to the threat of the two per­cent tar­get. Sec­ond, com­pared to most of his cohort of lead­ing econ­o­mists, Chair­man Bernanke has been a force for humane and sen­si­ble eco­nom­ic pol­i­cy, under­stand­ing of the mis­ery inflict­ed by mass unem­ploy­ment and will­ing to do some­thing about it. Crit­i­ciz­ing him can there­fore appear unap­pre­cia­tive.  Third, in a peri­od of wage stag­na­tion, oppo­si­tion to low infla­tion and sup­port for high­er future infla­tion can sound like sup­port for high­er prices. That is a mis­un­der­stand­ing. The oppo­si­tion is to an infla­tion tar­get that will per­ma­nent­ly ele­vate unem­ploy­ment and pre­vent work­ers from bar­gain­ing a fair share of pro­duc­tiv­i­ty growth.

Thir­ty years ago the wages of ordi­nary peo­ple start­ed to stag­nate. A big rea­son for that is work­ing fam­i­lies lost the eco­nom­ic pol­i­cy bat­tle. This must not be allowed to hap­pen again after the eco­nom­ic cri­sis of the last sev­er­al years. Whether intend­ed or not, the Fed­er­al Reserve’s two per­cent infla­tion tar­get will turn out to be a below the radar pol­i­cy cruise mis­sile aimed at the heart of shared pros­per­i­ty. It must be shot down.

This op-ed was post­ed on the FT Econ­o­mists’ Forum on Tues­day July 31, 2012.

 

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About Steve Keen

I am Professor of Economics and Head of Economics, History and Politics at Kingston University London, and a long time critic of conventional economic thought. As well as attacking mainstream thought in Debunking Economics, I am also developing an alternative dynamic approach to economic modelling. The key issue I am tackling here is the prospect for a debt-deflation on the back of the enormous private debts accumulated globally, and our very low rate of inflation.