The Death of the Great American Middle Class

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By Salvatore Babones

Salvatore Babones (@sbabones) is a senior lecturer in sociology & social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS).  You can find more of his commentary on the US economy at

The American economy has done well over the past forty years.  America's national income per person has almost exactly doubled since 1970.[1]  The United States has been the richest major country in the world for over 100 years now, and it remains the richest major country in the world today.[2]  The American economy in 2010 generated $47,436 for every man, woman, and child living in the country.[3]  On current projections, this figure will rise by a further $1000 per year for the next several years.[4]

That's a lot of money for a lot of people.  Unfortunately, all of that money doesn't go directly into ordinary Americans' paychecks.  Some of it goes into corporate profits, payroll taxes, and other expenses.  The remaining personal income actually paid out to Americans through their paychecks and profits came to $40,094 per person in 2010.[5]  That's still over $40,000 for every man, woman, and child living in America.

Of course, that doesn't mean that a family of two adults with eight children will make $400,000 a year.  Most children don't work, and when they do work they don't earn very much.  Spreading total US personal income out among just the adult population[6] would give an average of income of $52,952 for every American adult.

In other words, if America's total personal income were evenly distributed, the typical married couple would be making over $100,000 a year.

If the typical single person in America were making $52,952 a year and the typical married couple were making $105,904 a year, the United States really would be a very rich country.  The problem is that most people actually make much less than this.  The typical American adult makes just $26,134.[7]  Half of all Americans make less than this.

How can it be that the typical American adult makes just $26,134 when America is the richest nation on Earth?  The answer is that a few high-income Americans gain the lion's share of America's national income.  As illustrated in the figure below, the top 5% of American households made as much money in 2009 as the entire bottom 50% combined.[8]  That's amazing.  Out of about 120 million households in America today, the richest 6 million make as much money as the poorest 60 million.

Put a slightly different way, the same data show that the richest 20% of households take home more income than the other 80% combined.  There really are two Americas: the top 20%, and everybody else.  By definition, most Americans fall into the category of "everybody else."

It wasn't always like this, and it doesn't have to be like this.  America used to be one of the most equal countries in the free world, a place where anybody could make a decent living, support a family, and retire well.  Such simple dreams are increasingly out of reach for ordinary Americans who fall in the middle of the country's income distribution.



The figure below shows the median male income for American men since the end of the Civil War in 1865.[9]  The median income is the income of the average or typical person.  Men's incomes are used because the proportion of women working outside the home has changed dramatically over the years.  Where data are available for women, they tell a similar story.

It's obvious from this figure that typical male incomes rose continuously from the 1860s through the 1960s.  Between 1865 to 1973 typical male incomes rose by a factor of 10, from $3425 a year to $34,762 a year.  Male incomes rose in every single decade for more than a century.

It's also obvious that this growth ended in the 1970s.  Since the 1970s there has been no increase in male median incomes -- at all.  None.  In fact, since 1973 typical male incomes have fallen by 7.4%, from $34,762 a year to $32,184 a year.  Typical male incomes fell slightly in the 1970s, rose slightly in the 1980s and 1990s, then fell again in the 2000s.

That's remarkable, considering that American national income per person has doubled over the same period.  But it gets worse.  For American men of any given age, incomes have fallen dramatically since 1973.  For American men aged 45-54 years old incomes have fallen by 11.1%; for men 35-44 years old incomes have fallen by 18.7% since 1973, and for men aged 25-34 years old incomes have dropped by an astounding 26.7%.[10]

Yes, the average American young man in 2009 makes one-quarter less than the average American young man did in 1973.  American men today are -- literally -- worse off than their fathers were.  The typical young male Americans made $43,530 in 1973, compared with just $31,914 today.[11]  No wonder young adults can't afford to move out on their own these days.

How it is possible that the US economy has doubled in size without helping the average working man at all?  The answer can be divided into three parts.  First, more and more women work outside the home.  This boosts the overall size of the economy without boosting the wages paid by any particular job.  Second, the population is getting older as baby boomers mature.  Older people are more experienced and thus earn more (on average), even though incomes for people of any particular age haven't changed.

The third part, however, is the biggest.  It's rising inequality.  Pretty much all of the economic gains of the past forty years have gone to the top half of American workers.  Most of those gains have gone to the top 1%.  It has been estimated that 58% of all the income growth in the US economy between 1976 and 2007 went to the top 1% of households in America.[12]  To get into that top 1% a household has to be bringing in over $405,000 a year.[13]

For the 99% of Americans whose household incomes are well under $400,000 a year, there has been very little improvement since the 1970s.  For individual Americans in the middle of the income distribution, there has been no improvement at all.[14]  For Americans at the bottom, things have actually gotten worse since the 1970s.[15]

It sounds like the same old story: the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.  But as shown in the figure above, that's not really true.  For at least a century from 1870 to 1970 it was the people in the middle -- or at least the working men in the middle -- who got richer.



According to a recent survey, 91% of American adults identify themselves as "middle class."[16]  Of these, 53% identify themselves as falling in the middle of the middle class, 18% in the upper middle, and 18% in the lower middle class.  Taking the middle of the middle as a benchmark, over half of all Americans seem to feel like they live pretty typical lives.  They're probably right.

On surveys and in actual incomes there's a bulge of Americans who fall somewhere in the middle of the distribution.  They're more than half the population, but far short of the whole population.  They're the Middle Sixty.  Above them are the Top Twenty -- lawyers, doctors, investment bankers, and business executives.  Below them are the Bottom Twenty -- the poor.  The Middle Sixty, Top Twenty, and Bottom Twenty roughly correspond to normative ideas of well-off, middle-class, and poor.

The "Middle Sixty" are the roughly 60% of Americans who live lives of plenty, but not lives of luxury.  They never go hungry, but they can't afford to hire kitchen help.  They're not homeless, but they have one home, not two or three.  Their kids don't go to private prep schools, but their kids can go to college if they work hard and get the grades.  The Middle Sixty live ordinary, typical American lives.

A good way to think about what it means to be a member of the Middle Sixty is to think about owning a car.  Most Americans own a car.  It might be a Hyundai or it might be a Hummer, but either way it's one car for each adult driver.  Only poor Americans can't afford their own cars.  Only rich Americans can afford to have collections of cars.  For the vast majority of Americans in the middle, one car per driver is enough.

People at the high end of the Middle Sixty might drive expensive new cars while people at the low end of the Middle Sixty drive cheap used cars, but life is pretty similar either way.  They all drive their cars on the same roads and park in the same spaces at the same supermarkets.  They all have kids in carseats and pump their own gas.  When the car needs service, they have to get up early and drop it off before work.  Some of the Middle Sixty have nicer lifestyles than others, but they all have pretty much the same lifestyle.

A good indicator of the strength of the middle class in a country is the proportion of all the income in that country that goes to the Middle Sixty.  For example, one problem in Mexico is the lack of a strong middle class.  In Mexico, the Middle Sixty take home just 46.6% of Mexico's income, even though they make up 60% of Mexico's households.[17]  In Mexico, so much of the nation's income goes to the Top Twenty that there's very little left for the Middle Sixty, or for the poor.

The amazing thing is, by this measure even Mexico has a stronger middle class than the United States.  The Middle Sixty in America take home just 46.3% of America's income.[18]  This is by far the lowest figure of any major developed country.  The figure below shows Middle Sixty income levels for the United States, Mexico, and four other countries.[19]  The United States scores at the rock bottom of the league for the economic strength of its middle class.

It might be even worse than this.  The data used to calculate the official US Census Bureau income statistics don't accurately measure incomes over about $100,000.  As a result, they don't adequately capture the recent rise in the incomes of the super-wealthy.  To address this gap, the Federal Reserve conducts a survey every three years that is specifically designed to measure the incomes of people earning over $100,000 a year.[20]

The latest data available from that Federal Reserve study are for 2007.  The results suggest that the income share of the Middle Sixty is actually just 35.8%.[21]  To put that number in context, a 35.8% income share is literally "off the chart" of the figure above.  Using that same Federal Reserve data, the Middle Sixty income share was 44.6% in 1982, the first year that the survey was conducted.[22]

For those who don't remember 1982, it was a tough year for the middle class.  Since then, though, the income share of the Middle Sixty has dropped to nearly 11 points below Mexican levels.  And that was in 2007, which was a good year for most Americans.  The latest Federal Reserve survey was conducted in 2010, but the data have not yet been released.  Considering the state of the economy in 2010, it's likely to be a bloodbath for the Middle Sixty.

The United States didn't always have the world's weakest middle class.  Back in 1968 the US Middle Sixty took home 52.3% of all the nation's income (based on the official statistics).[23]  That implies that in 1968 the US middle class was stronger than any middle class in the world is today.  The US Middle Sixty might have been even stronger in the 1950s, but unfortunately data are not available to tell.  The data start in 1968, and it's been all downhill from there.



Total US national income per person rose by 99.3% over the 30 years from 1969 to 2009.[24]  Why then have incomes for most Americans been stagnant or falling?  Why do American families now need two incomes to have the standard of living they used to have with just one?  Why aren't today's young adults making twice as much as their parents did were when they first entered the labor market thirty years before?

The answer is that all of the growth in the American economy over the past forty years has gone to the top half of Americans.  Most of it has gone to the Top Twenty.  If the US income distribution today had remained unchanged from 1969, by 2009 the average American household would have had an income of $86,479 instead of $49,777.[25]  If the US income distribution had become more equal in the four decades after 1969 -- as it did in the four decades before 1969 -- the average American household would be doing even better.

The fact that the average American household today has an income of $50,000 instead of $100,000 can be attributed entirely to rising instead of declining inequality over the past four decades.  America has far greater income than ever before in its history, but that income is concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.  Rising inequality is killing middle America.

Sociologists and economists have been conducting detailed quantitative analyses of rising inequality for more than a quarter century now.  It's no mystery why inequality has been rising in America.  As a recent 11-country comparative study concluded, the main factors that determine whether a country is equal or unequal in its income distribution are "union density, the strictness of employment protection law, unemployment benefit duration, unemployment benefit generosity, and the size of the minimum wage."[26]

By far the most important of these is union density: the percentage of workers who are covered by a union contract or collective bargaining agreement.[27]  Around the world, wherever workers have unions, they get better pay.[28]  The most recent estimates suggest that unionization increases an individual worker's pay by about 17%,[29] but some argue that the effect on total pay (including benefits) could be as high as 43%.[30]  Though researchers argue over the exact figure, research consistently shows that unions increase workers' wages.

In the end the key issue is bargaining power.  Obviously, workers who bargain as part of a union are in a better bargaining position than workers who don't have a union.  But it's not just a matter of unions.  Where unemployment benefits are generous, workers can bargain harder, since it's not catastrophic if they lose their jobs.  And having a good minimum wage means that when unemployed workers run out of insurance payments they can be sure of earning at least a living wage when they do go back to work.

So how does America compare on union coverage?  As the figure below makes clear, the United States has just about the lowest level of union coverage in the world.[31]  This figure compares the proportion of workers who are covered by union-type collective bargaining contracts across the United States and 11 western European countries.  Union coverage in the United States is now lower (by far) than anywhere in western Europe.  Even at its height in 1953, US union coverage was low by European standards.  Today it is absolutely in the basement.

At the union peak in 1953 well over 40% of American workers were covered by collective bargaining agreements.  Considering that union workers were never very poor and never very rich, that 40% accounts for the majority of the Middle Sixty.  In other words, it used to be normal for Americans to be in a union.  Ralph Kramden, Archie Bunker, and Fred Flintstone were all union members.  Ronald Reagan was a six-term union president before he became a politician.  In 1960 he even called his union out on strike!

Of course, the decline of unions isn't the only reason why inequality is rising in America.  There is some evidence that America is pulling apart along regional lines, with New York and Los Angeles pulling away from the rest of the country.[32]  There's also some evidence that technological change is creating situations in which the top-ranked people in any industry (like sports and movie stars) end up taking home more and more of the available pay.[33]  After-tax inequality is also affected by changes in the tax system.

To some degree the decline in union membership is also just a symptom of a much broader trend: the decline of society and the rise of individualism.  This trend is associated with increased consumerism and free market economics.  People place their own interests above the common good.  In particular, American businesspeople increasingly ask not what's good for their employees, their customers, or their coworkers, but what's good for themselves.  Nowhere is this better illustrated than when looking at executive pay.

The chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the top employee, the commander-in-chief, of any public company.  In the United States, CEOs run their companies with very few constraints.  Technically they are supervised by boards of directors, but most American CEOs serve as chairmen of their own boards of directors -- and even select their own board members.  Shareholders are the legal owners of a public company, but if shareholders are unhappy it's much easier for them to sell their shares than to fire their CEOs.

It's been widely reported that CEOs now receive enormous salaries, hundreds of times as much as their own workers.  The average annual pay of a Fortune 500 CEO was over $8,000,000 in 2009.[34]  That's about 200 times the earnings of the average American adult who works full-time.[35]

Much less widely reported has been the growing gap between how much companies pay their CEOs and how much they pay the small number of top executives who work directly under the CEO.  Between 1993 and 2006 CEOs at America's top 1500 public companies received average annual raises of 8.8% per year.[36]  Corporate seconds-in-command received annual raises averaging 5.4%, thirds-in-command 5.2%, fourths-in-command 5.0%, and fifths-in-command 4.6%.[37]

In other words, inequality is rising even within the boardroom.  It is rising everywhere we look.  The rising pay gap between corporate fourths- and fifths-in-command has nothing to do with union coverage, unemployment insurance, technological change, or the premiumization of life in New York and Los Angeles.  It can only be traced to changing norms of what's considered acceptable behavior in setting pay.  Forty years ago, executives might have felt some pressure to take care of their employees before taking care of themselves.  They certainly don't anymore.



Ronald Reagan, the conquering hero of American conservative mythology, was born in 1911.  He came of age during the Great Depression.  People of his generation had it tough.  They worked hard to make ends meet, but their hard work was rewarded with ever-increasing standards of living.  For Americans of their generation, things started out hard but got better and better as time went on.  They were perpetual optimists, because living in America they could always be sure of one thing: life would be better for their children than it was for them.

That's simply not true anymore.

Today, American confidence in the future has reached an all-time low.  Americans are optimists by nature, and optimists still outnumber pessimists by 54% to 42%, but the gap is narrower than ever before.[38]  By a small margin of 38% to 37%, more Americans actually think life was better in the 1960s than it is today.[39]  Among those who are old enough to actually remember adult life in the 1960s, the ratio is 49% to 30% in favor of the sixties.[40]

That's not just nostalgia.  Life really was better in the late 1960s for many Americans, and certainly for most white Americans.  Perhaps more importantly, the United States of forty years ago had much more of an ethic that they were all in it together.  In the 1960s and 1970s, American CEOs paid themselves roughly 40 times as much as an ordinary worker.[41]  That's not exactly slumming it, but it seems positively frugal by today's standards.

What's incredible is not that so many people are no better off than their parents were forty years ago.  What's incredible is that so many people are no better off than their parents were forty years ago despite the fact that American economic output per person has doubled in that period.  The problem isn't that the economy is stagnant.  It's not stagnant.  It's growing.  The problem is that the rewards of that growth are all going to a very small number of people -- ironically, to the people who need them least.

There's both good news and bad news to be read in this benchmarking of the great American middle.  The good news is that there are plenty of resources in America for everyone to live a very good life.  There's so much income generated every year in America that if we distributed it evenly the average household could be living on $100,000 a year.  Even allowing for the kinds of inequality found in America in the 1960s and 1970s -- CEOs making 40 times their workers' salaries instead of 200 times -- the average household could be bringing in $80,000 a year.  That's not too bad.

The bad news is that there's no sign that Americans are prepared to take it into their own hands to reduce inequality.  Fewer than half of Americans have a favorable view of unions; even after a major recession, slightly more Americans have a positive view of businesses than of unions.[42]  Americans are not going to the polls to demand that their political leaders implement policies that are known to reduce inequality.  Perhaps most importantly, Americans are not moving away form the divisive beggar-thy-neighbor individualism that caused inequality to rise in the first place.  Instead, they seem to be embracing it.



[1] Based on figures from the 2010 National Income and Product Accounts from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 7-1.

[2] Based on real national income per capita estimates from Angus Maddison (2010), Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD, Table 3.

[3] Based on 2010 US GDP estimates from US Bureau of Economic Analysis release BEA 11-02, Table 3, divided by 2010 US population estimates from US Census Bureau release NST-PEST2010-01, Table 1.

[4] Based on 2011 and 2012 US growth projections from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Update, January 2011.

[5] Based on 2010 US personal income estimates from US Bureau of Economic Analysis release BEA 11-02, Table 10, divided by 2010 US population estimates from US Census Bureau release NST-PEST2010, Table 1.

[6] Based on the age structure of the US population in 2009 from US Census Bureau release NC-EST2009, Table 2.

[7] Based on 2009 figures from US Census Bureau release PINC-01, Part 1.

[8] Based on an analysis of 2009 figures from US Census Bureau Income Inequality Historical Table H-2.

[9] Data for 1865-1946 based on E.H. Phelps Brown and Margaret H. Phelps Brown (1968), A Century of Pay: The Course of Pay and Production in France, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, 1860-1960, Appendix 3.  Data for 1947-2009 are based on figures from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table P-8.  The three separate inflation-adjusted Phelps Brown and Phelps Brown indices have been spliced together at their overlap points, then spliced to the Census Bureau 2009 dollar series using the average conversion rate between the two sources for the years 1947-1960 ($72.87 in 2009 dollars per Phelps Brown and Phelps Brown index point).  Linear interpolations have been used to fill the gaps in the series due to World War I (1914-1919) and World War II (1942-1944).

[10] Based on figures from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table P-8.

[11] Based on figures from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table P-8.

[12] Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez.  2009.  "Top Incomes in the Long Run of History," NBER Working Paper 15408; the authors include single-person households as "families," making their definition of a family near-identical to the US Census Bureau definition of a household.

[13] Based on Atkinson et al's figures for the top 1% extrapolated using top 5% income growth rates since 2007 from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table H-1.

[14] Based on figures from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table P-8.

[15] Based on the application of income ratios from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table IE-2 to data from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table P-8.

[16] Pew Research Center (2008), Inside the Middle Class: Bad Times Hit the Good Life.

[17] Based on 2002 figures (the most recent available) from Matthew Hammill (2005), Income Inequality in Central America, Dominican Republic and Mexico: Assessing the Importance of Individual and Household Characteristics, Table 3.

[18] Based on 2009 figures from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table H-2.

[19] All figures are the most recent available.  Canadian figures are for 2008 and come from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 202-0405.  United Kingdom figures are for 2008-2009 and come from UK Office for National Statistics report on Effects of Taxes and Benefits on Household Income Table 2.  French figures are for 2008 and come from INSEE Revenus et Niveaux de Vie Mass des Niveaux de Vie Détenue par les x% les Plus Riches.  Australian figures are for 2007-2008 and come from Australian Bureau of Statistics Document 6523.0 Table S1.

[20] The Survey of Consumer Finances, which contains a supplemental sample targeting high-income individuals.

[21] Based on figures from Edward N. Wolff (2010), Levy Economics Institute Working Paper 589: Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze -- An Update to 2007, Table 2.  In this paper Wolff does not disaggregate figures for the lowest two quintiles.  To construct the Middle Sixty percentages, Wolff's "bottom 40%" figures have been split out using the ratio between the bottom two quintiles observed for the relevant year in US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table H-2 to arrive at a second quintile imputation, which was then added to Wolff's third and fourth quintile figures.

[22] Again based on Wolff's figures with an imputation for the second-to-bottom quintile.

[23] Based on 1968 figures from US Census Bureau Historical Income Statistics Table H-2.

[24] Based figures from the 2010 National Income and Product Accounts from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, Table 7-1.

[25] Arrived at by applying US GDP growth between 1969 and 2009 to the US median household income level in 1969.

[26] Winfried Koeniger, Marco Leonardi, and Luca Nunziata (2007), "Labor Market Institutions and Wage Inequality, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 60, pp. 340-356 (quote from p. 340).

[27] Koeniger et al (2007), Table 2.

[28] Alex Bryson (2007), “The Effect of Trade Unions on Wages,” Reflets et Per­spec­tives de la Vie Économique, Vol. 46, pp. 33–45.

[29] David G. Blanch­flower and Alex Bryson (2004), “What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would Free­man and Med­off Be Sur­prised?” Jour­nal of Labor Research, Vol. 25, pp. 383–414, Table 2.

[30] Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bern­stein, and Sylvia Alle­gretto (2007), The State of Work­ing Amer­ica 2006/2007, Table 3.32.

[31] Based on fig­ures from Barry Hirsch and David Macpher­son, U.S. His­tor­i­cal Tables, accessed through the web­site.  The 1953 US fig­ure is imputed from the 1953 pri­vate sec­tor work­ers’ mem­ber­ship fig­ure from Barry Hirsch (2008), “Slug­gish Insti­tu­tions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions and Indus­trial Com­pe­ti­tion Coex­ist?” Jour­nal of Eco­nomic Per­spec­tives, Vol. 22, pp. 153–176, adjusted upward by the his­tor­i­cal aver­age of 25% to account for gov­ern­ment work­ers and work­ers who were cov­ered by union con­tracts but who were not union mem­bers.  Fig­ures for Euro­pean coun­tries are drawn from L. Ful­ton (2009), Worker Rep­re­sen­ta­tion in Europe, Labour Research Depart­ment (Lon­don) and Euro­pean Trade Union Insti­tute, accessed through the website.

[32] Robert J. Gor­don and Ian Dew-Becker (2008), Con­tro­ver­sies about the Rise of Amer­i­can Inequal­ity: A Sur­vey, NBER Work­ing Paper 13982.

[33] Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook (1995), The Winner-Take-All Society.

[34] Scott DeCarlo (2010), “What the Boss Makes,” For­tune Mag­a­zine online April 28, 2010.

[35] Based on data from US Cen­sus Bureau His­tor­i­cal Income Sta­tis­tics Table P-38.

[36] Based on data from Chang­min Lee and Woonam Seok (2009), “The Struc­ture and Pay Dis­tri­b­u­tion in the Exec­u­tive Team,” work­ing paper, Sam­sung Research Insti­tute of Finance, Table 6.

[37] Again based on Lee and Seok (2009), Table 6.

[38] Based on data from the Pew Research Cen­ter for the Peo­ple and the Press (2011), “Econ­omy Dom­i­nates Public’s Agenda, Dims Hopes for the Future,” p. 2.

[39] Again based on Pew (2011), p.13.

[40] Again based on Pew (2011), p.14.

[41] Based on fig­ures from G. William Domhoff (2011), “Power in Amer­ica: Wealth, Income, and Power,” Who Rules Amer­ica? web­site, Uni­ver­sity of Cal­i­for­nia at Santa Cruz, Fig­ure 8.

[42] Based on data from the Pew Research Cen­ter for the Peo­ple and the Press (2011), ” Labor Unions Seen as Good for Work­ers, Not U.S. Com­pet­i­tive­ness,” p. 2.

About David Lawson

-Worked as a real estate agent in 2009, have since left the industry because I now see that it is all fuelled by euphoric expections and debt -Started to become concerned about the global debt bubble after reading 'The Credit Crunch' by Graham Turner about a year ago and have since followed Steve Keens debtwatch blog -Competed a Bachelor of economics in 2004 specalising in iternational trade and finance -Lived in the USA for 5 years of my life, have witnessed first hand there frivolous spending patterns and watched our country become the same over the course of last 10 years
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24 Responses to The Death of the Great American Middle Class

  1. kalman says:

    Life always gets harder. The eco­nomic and social phe­nom­ena cur­rently unfold­ing is that a high stan­dard of health liv­ing is slip­ping away faster than ever. The solu­tion is rather sim­ple.
    1. Recog­nise that you must be smarter and work harder than the rest.
    2. Put aside for a rainy day & prac­tise delayed grat­i­fi­ca­tion.
    3. Make the biggest pur­chase of your life at the worst eco­nomic time. For exam­ple, a house.

  2. Aleshores says:

    Is this a ren­tier econ­omy: no phys­i­cal pro­duc­tion, no work­ers, no mid­dle class, only income from rents (inter­ests, cap­i­tal gains, patents, pro­porty rights?

  3. clive says:

    A lit­tle off topic. This arti­cle from Busi­ness Week appears to val­i­date that Steve’s debt for­give­ness ideas work. Ice­land seems to be on the up and up.–02-24/icelandic-anger-brings-debt-forgiveness-in-best-recovery-story.html

  4. boldpromise says:

    inter­est­ing piece steve espe­cially on the cor­re­la­tion between work­ers and
    unions,unemployment ben­e­fits and min­i­mum wage.

    So is all this talk of amer­i­can cor­po­rates sell­ing out to china an exaggeration?

    Also ive long won­dered about the role technology(machines doing tasks that 6
    peo­ple used to do)has had on the world­wide job-market.Ive spo­ken to blokes
    in their 60s now who all tell the same story-they could of left their jobs and
    found 2 new ones the same day!

    Ive heard you talk of the de-industrialisation of australia.I think an arti­cle on
    this from your­self would make inter­est­ing reading.

  5. Paul says:

    Hello Steve, really enjoy­ing your book Debunk­ing Economics.

    Sal­va­tore Babones appears to have done some selec­tive read­ings. I take issue when Sal­va­tore says that times were much bet­ter in the U.S in the past.

    On the isse about wealth dis­tri­b­u­tion. United States has always had mas­sive wealth inequal­ity and been unde­mo­c­ra­tic which is why it is so dif­fi­cult for peo­ple in the U.S to get heard. United States has bru­tally oppressed it’s own peo­ple to ensure the sta­tus quo. Just look at the polit­i­cal assas­i­na­tions of the six­ties and then demo­niza­tion of these peo­ple by the U.S government.

    I also have a chuckle when U.S points a fin­ger at coun­tries such as IRAN, Syria, Iraq attack­ing these coun­tries as being unde­mo­c­ra­tic. It is bit like the pot cal­lk­ing the ket­tle black.


  6. RickW says:

    In Aus­tralia the cor­re­la­tion between union mem­ber­ship and wages is inverse. That is to say as union mem­ber­ship has declined wages have increased.

    Over the last 15 years real wages for adult males has increased 34%. Over the same period the per­cent­age of unionised male work­force has decreased from 38% to 18%.

    So draw­ing any con­clu­sions about unions and wage growth is non­sense. Unions sti­fle pro­duc­tiv­ity growth. Time is wasted work­ing on how to cut the cake rather than make more cakes for less effort.

    Inequal­ity is more about sense of priv­i­lege and cor­rup­tion. These ele­ments are creep­ing into Aus­tralia but not so bad as some other coun­tries. Does QANTAS deserve to sur­vive when they pay Alan Joyce $5Mpa?

    The prime rea­son Australia’s min­ing indus­try is highly prof­itable has been its abil­ity to dis­man­tle the union shack­les it bore up to the 1990s. Bro­ken Hill min­ers won the 35 hour week in 1917. On the other hand all mine employ­ees in Bro­ken Hill received the same bonus based on equal profit shar­ing. For the Gen­eral Man­ager the bonus pro­vided some nice bot­tles of wine for evening meals while for the admin­is­tra­tion assis­tant of the 1970s the bonus tripled her take home pay each month. This is a good exam­ple of how a bonus within pub­lic com­pa­nies should be shared.

    The UK/US sys­tem is roy­ally screwed given exam­ples like Joseph Cas­sano — paid USD285M in salary and bonuses over a decade or so to send one of the largest com­pa­nies in the world into insol­vency — still liv­ing in lux­ury. Australia’s cor­po­rate scoundrels Bond, Skase, Elliot, Con­nell et al have been brought to account by some degree.

  7. Derek R says:


    Sal­va­tore didn’t say that times were bet­ter in the US in the past. He said that times con­tin­u­ally improved for the ordi­nary per­son in the US in the past. What is wor­ry­ing is that since 1970 times have got worse. They may still be bet­ter than they were at any time before 1970 but the trend is head­ing the wrong way. Inequal­ity in the US may have been bad but it wasn’t get­ting worse for most of the 20th cen­tury. Now it is.

  8. koonyeow says:

    Title: Mod­el­ling Income Distribution

    I won­der if the pro­gram Min­sky will be able to sim­u­late income dis­tri­b­u­tion with the said fac­tors as input.

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  10. Steve Hummel says:

    What’s really incred­i­ble is that the myth still per­sists that cap­i­tal­ism is in any way a sys­tem which actu­ally will ever, in fact CAN ever dis­trib­ute income in a rel­a­tively equi­table fash­ion. This is not to toot some horn for social­ism, they are both inher­ently cen­tral­iz­ing of wealth and power. The Amer­i­can mid­dle class is/was an anom­aly brought about by the fact that Amer­ica was the only major mod­ern west­ern nation with its pro­duc­tive capac­ity still intact, plus the fact that the other nations’ capac­i­ties WERE in tat­ters. Other than the 1950-the early 1970’s period.….a mid­dle class any­where under cap­i­tal­ism vir­tu­ally does not exist, at least in any wide­spread way.

    If you want to have a mid­dle class you’re going to have to base the eco­nomic, finan­cial and mon­e­tary sys­tems on ideas and poli­cies that will actu­ally pro­duce rel­a­tive equi­tabil­ity. A mod­ern tech­no­log­i­cal Dis­trib­utist econ­omy will fit that dis­crip­tion, cap­i­tal­ism or social­ism won’t. Its as sim­ple and straigh­for­ward as that.

  11. Greg Wood says:

    Regard­ing trends in national equity con­sider that growth requires energy and that the avail­able (oil) energy sup­ply was rapidly expand­ing across the first 7 decades of the 20th cen­tury. The need (desire) by resource own­ers to con­vert this rapidly expand­ing energy into pro­duc­tion gave labor — as pro­vided by both the ‘work­ing’ and ‘mid­dle’ classes — a lot of lever­age in the market-place.

    From the early sev­en­ties on there has been both a steady dimin­ish­ment in the energy sup­ply (global energy/capita) and an expo­nen­tial increase in tech­nolo­gies that dis­place, or at least dis­ori­en­tate, labor within the pro­duc­tion process.

    Within each of these cat­e­gor­i­cal sce­nar­ios the own­ers of cap­i­tal have sim­ply and ruth­lessly done as and what­ever they can to max­imise their returns.

    In the first instance they realised a ben­e­fit from pro­mot­ing, and to some extent deliv­er­ing upon, a social ideal of com­mon pro­duc­tive endeav­our. In the lat­ter, the social nar­ra­tive of indi­vid­ual aspi­ra­tion serves to iso­late work­ers and ves­ti­gial social enti­ties, and to even turn them upon each other. This enables ‘the most of us’ to be more eas­ily dis-enfranschised from the eco­nomic process, as tech­nol­ogy allows and as resource deple­tion dic­tates, such that the own­ers of cap­i­tal can con­tinue to best max­imise their largely point­less accu­mu­la­tion of appar­ent wealth.

    This trend can be expected to con­tinue to deepen, and to do so with­out regard to tra­di­tional 1st/3rd world bound­aries. The arch-capitalists, and the civil­i­sa­tion they spon­sor, have no care for equity or for social qual­ity out­side of their own rar­i­fied com­mu­ni­ties of interest.

    Sub­mis­sion for change to them, or their highly paid polit­i­cal man­agers, would seem futile. GFC ‘restruc­tur­ing’ to date has made that quite clear. Com­mon agi­ta­tion about the debt struc­ture and, where rea­son­ably pos­si­ble, the com­mon seizure of local resource assets appears to offer the most acces­si­ble exit from inex­orable decline into gross uni­ver­sal inequity.

  12. Greg Wood says:

    Quot­ing Rick W:
    “Over the last 15 years real wages for adult males has increased 34%. Over the same period the per­cent­age of unionised male work­force has decreased from 38% to 18%.”

    Is the for­mer fig­ure cal­cu­lated only upon wages earned by lower to mid­dle order work­force par­tic­i­pants, or is it a prod­uct drawn from total work­force income?

    Accord­ingly, what is the trend fig­ure for the wages of the ‘unionised male work­force’ and their non-unionised equivalent?

  13. cyrusp says:

    US oil pro­duc­tion peaked in 1971.


  14. barrythompson says:

    There is a strik­ing cor­re­la­tion between the pri­vate debt:GDP ratio for the US and the Gini index for the US.

    All that credit/debt going into spec­u­la­tion in asset mar­kets, instead of going into phys­i­cal invest­ment that cre­ates jobs and incomes for ordi­nary work­ers, has raised the incomes of the top — the few peo­ple who earn profit from asset mar­kets (FIRE sector).

  15. barrythompson says:

    @ CyrusP

    The big 1971 inci­dent was more likely the end of the gold stan­dard, which enabled unlim­ited credit cre­ation by banks. This was a good thing. Unfor­tu­nately, much of that new credit didn’t go into real invest­ment, it went into speculation.

  16. Derek R says:

    Peak US Oil and the end of the gold stan­dard were very closely con­nected. Basi­cally the Saudis were paid in dol­lars and expected to be able to con­vert them to gold. Nixon took the dol­lar off the gold stan­dard because if he hadn’t the Saudis would have ended up own­ing all of the US gold in a fairly short time.

  17. Kim says:

    This arti­cle starts out as fact-based analy­sis then delves into a place where the author uses select tid­bits to make a more spe­cific analy­sis (ie blam­ing rugged indi­vid­u­al­ism and lack of unions). I call bull­hon­key and poor attempt at sci­en­tific analy­sis when it comes to his dis­cus­sion of the cause.
    Just as one exam­ple, if you look at dif­fer­ent states within the US, union­ized states are now expe­ri­enc­ing much higher unem­ploy­ment and declin­ing incomes.

    Income inequal­ity itself isn’t a prob­lem, IMO, if every­one is gain­ing. Thus we should focus on the income losses PLUS the INCREASE in income inequal­ity, mean­while accept­ing the fact that the best sys­tems might include a sta­ble income inequal­ity. I think Steve’s work and that of oth­ers who pre­dicted the cri­sis, points largely to the pri­vate debt and its asso­ci­a­tion with the FIRE econ­omy as caus­ing the income inequal­ity and declin­ing middle-class incomes.

    If I were to bully my way through a sim­i­lar arti­cle, as this author did, I would asso­ciate the drop in the mid­dle class with our cen­tral bank­ing sys­tem that encour­aged the excess lend­ing. I would not blame indi­vid­u­al­ism or the entice­ment of per­sonal gain. But in any case, it’s tough to prove any­thing eco­nom­i­cally. Noth­ing can be repro­duced in a con­trolled envi­ron­ment as it can with real science.

    Most of all, what the author fails to men­tion is that when equal­iz­ing income is a goal, the over­all income of the soci­ety typ­i­cally falls.

  18. glubilee says:

    There is some­thing major miss­ing from the death of Amer­i­can Mid­dle Claas, this arti­cle just talks about income.…what about wealth or lack there of. Steve has made a car­rer now of not ignor­ing debt…well lets look at it…if you look at sav­ings and debts and net worth of Am mid­dle class in 60s com­pared to now, it’s bru­tal. Prof Eliz­a­beth War­ren (and now Sen­ate can­di­date) in her 2006 speech on the com­ing col­lapse of the Am mid­dle class (mind you this law pro­fes­sor research­ing bank­ruptcy, made this pre­dic­tion long before any most econ­o­mists, present blog­ger com­pany ignored) noted how the fixed, unavoid­able costs of mid­dle class are so huge com­pared to before, the things that must be paid to be in mid­dle class, and to get your kids in mid­dle class like health care, hous­ing and edu­ca­tion while the dis­cre­tionary things, like gad­gets, stuff, clothes, some food, prices have gone down. She says if you look at mid­dle class peo­ple in early to mid 2000s com­pared 1970, as I’d they we’re busi­nesses, the 2000 mid­dle class are highly lever­aged with debt to cover costs of needed hous­ing, while the 1970 mid­dle class had more sav­ings, and was spend­ing less on big fixed costs like hous­ing and more on dis­cre­tionary things like appli­ances, con­sumer goods etc…so the 2000 mid­dle class is in a much riskier, lever­age busi­ness sit­u­a­tion than the 1970 mid­dle class.

    Mean­while, one of the biggest sources of mid­dle class wealth, hous­ing has been wiped out. So while once, a house could be paid of eas­ily in less than 30 years since at high interst rates incen­tivized early pay off, now many US “mid­dle class” are under­wa­ter on their mort­gage, so rather than a house con­tribut­ing to their wealth, it is wip­ing out their wealth and leav­ing them with fur­ther debts with neg­a­tive equity.

    The hous­ing down­turn has wiped out mas­sive wealth of mid­dle class, so sav­ings are down, wealth down, and incomes down…the com­bined effect is a bru­tal loss of qual­ity of life while, as this author notes, the gen­eral Amer­i­can GDP is doing just fine and still is among the rich­est in the world.

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