Debt Britannia

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As much as I criticize the US of A for its economic management, I can't fault its statistical agencies on the collection and dissemination of data: data is readily available and almost always in an easily accessible format. That, and the fact that it's the world's biggest economy, is why most of my analysis is of the US. Australia's ABS deserves similar accolades for making data readily accessible and relatively easy to locate.

The UK data source, the Office of National Statistics, is almost impenetrable by comparison—it's the statistical system that Sir Humphrey Appleby would design. It gives the appearance of accessibility, yet either drowns you in so much data in response to any query that you give up, or which, when you get to what you think you want, returns rubbish.

For example, you'd think following the sequence "Economy—UK Sector Accounts—Financial Assets and Liabilities" would actually take you to something resembling the USA's Flow of Funds, wouldn't you?

Guess again. Figure 1 shows what it returns you: no data, no publications, but links to four methodology papers on Investment Trusts. "Well done, Bernard!

Fig­ure 1

Given this state of affairs (or these affairs of state?), I haven’t both­ered try­ing to put together a debt pro­file of the UK as I have for Aus­tralia and the USA—which of course shows the suc­cess of the Appleby method. But as so often hap­pens, the method back­fired when Mor­gan Stan­ley, using rather more research resources than I can bring to bear, pub­lished a chart of national indebt­ed­ness in which the UK was right at the top—with a stag­ger­ing 950% pri­vate debt to GDP ratio, and a finan­cial sec­tor debt ratio alone of over 600%.

Fig­ure 2: Mor­gan Stan­ley global debt ratio cal­cu­la­tions

I expect that Sir Humphrey’s descen­dants are now busy putting out this brush fire with claims of double-counting, but even the UK Treasury’s Bud­get Report admits to a peak pri­vate sec­tor debt to GDP ratio of over 450 per­cent, with the finance sec­tor ratio alone being 250%:

Over the pre-crisis decade, devel­op­ments in the UK econ­omy were dri­ven by unsus­tain­able lev­els of pri­vate sec­tor debt and ris­ing pub­lic sec­tor debt. Indeed, it has been esti­mated that the UK became the most indebted coun­try in the world.

Chart 1.1 high­lights the rise in pri­vate sec­tor debt in the UK. House­holds took on ris­ing lev­els of mort­gage debt to buy increas­ingly expen­sive hous­ing, while by 2008 the debt of non­fi­nan­cial com­pa­nies reached 110 per cent of GDP. Within the finan­cial sec­tor, the accu­mu­la­tion of debt was even greater. By 2007, the UK finan­cial sys­tem had become the most highly lever­aged of any major econ­omy…” (UK Bud­get Report, 2011)

Fig­ure 3: UK Trea­sury pri­vate debt to GDP fig­ures

To put this into per­spec­tive, the USA’s pri­vate debt to GDP ratio peaked at 303% of GDP, and the rapid decline in this debt to its cur­rent level is what has caused its “Great Reces­sion”. I never thought that another devel­oped econ­omy could make the USA’s debt bub­ble look triv­ial, but clearly I was wrong.

Fig­ure 4: And you thought Amer­ica had a debt bub­ble…

As well as aggre­gate UK pri­vate debt exceed­ing America’s, the UK also has a higher debt to GDP ratio for every sec­tor. How­ever as usual, gov­ern­ment debt, about which politi­cians and neo­clas­si­cal econ­o­mists obsess, is the small­est com­po­nent of total debt, and has only started to grow after the cri­sis began. To empha­sise one point on which I emphat­i­cally agree with MMT econ­o­mists, pub­lic debt is not the prob­lem, and attempt­ing to reduce pub­lic debt now is the wrong policy—from my per­spec­tive, because it would add pub­lic sec­tor delever­ag­ing to pri­vate sec­tor delever­ag­ing, thus exac­er­bat­ing the under­ly­ing prob­lem of delever­ag­ing. Rather than obsess­ing about pub­lic debt now, politi­cians and econ­o­mists should have been con­cerned about ris­ing pri­vate debt in the pre­vi­ous two decades.

UK house­hold debt grew along sim­i­lar lines to USA house­hold debt, but con­tin­ued grow­ing as US house­hold debt started to taper. It is now falling, but still exceeds even Australia’s house­hold debt ratio—though Aus­tralia holds the dubi­ous record for the fastest rate of growth of house­hold debt since 1990.

Fig­ure 5

While UK house­holds were rel­a­tive lag­gards in the rate of growth of debt, UK busi­nesses showed how it was done by tripling their indebt­ed­ness in just over 2 decades, from the post-1987 Stock Mar­ket Crash level of 38% of GDP to a whop­ping 118% at the end of 2009.

Fig­ure 6

But “Card­board Box? You were lucky!”. The Four York­shire­man award for dig­ging a hole faster than any­body else goes to the UK finance sec­tor. The USA and UK both began the post-1987 Stock Mar­ket era with roughly com­pa­ra­ble lev­els of finance sec­tor debt—roughly 50% for the UK and 40% for the USA. But two decades later, UK finance sec­tor debt peaked at 261% of GDP, more than twice the US level of 123% (I can’t show Australia’s finance sec­tor debt since the RBA doesn’t sep­a­rately record it, but the Mor­gan Stan­ley data in Fig­ure 2 implies that it’s larger than America’s).

Fig­ure 7

The com­bi­na­tion makes the UK the Pri­vate Debt Cap­i­tal of the G20 world.

Fig­ure 8

All this implies that when a debt slow­down hits the UK, it could do so with even more impact than it did in the USA. As I’ve argued exten­sively else­where, aggre­gate demand in a credit-based econ­omy is income plus the change in debt. This per­spec­tive puts the UK’s stag­ger­ing depen­dence upon pri­vate debt into sharp relief; explains why—as yet—it hasn’t suf­fered as sharp a down­turn as has the USA; and also implies that that day of reck­on­ing may be approach­ing. Take a good look at Fig­ure 9 and Fig­ure 10.

Fig­ure 9: British Aggre­gate Demand

Fig­ure 10: Amer­i­can Aggre­gate Demand

Firstly, note that the peak debt con­tri­bu­tion to aggre­gate demand was far higher in the UK than the USA: in 2008, the UK GDP was roughly 1.4 tril­lion pounds while the increase in debt was 800 bil­lion, yield­ing total pri­vate sec­tor spend­ing (on assets as well as goods and ser­vices) of over 2.2 tril­lion; the US num­bers are roughly 14 tril­lion dol­lars for GDP and 4 tril­lion for the increase in debt.

Sec­ondly, the USA went straight from lever­ag­ing to delever­ag­ing, with the change in debt going from adding $4 tril­lion in 2008 to sub­tract­ing 2.5 tril­lion in 2010. In the UK, there have been 4 dips into delever­ag­ing, but 3 of them have sub­se­quently been reversed, and the worst to date (in 2010) reduced aggre­gate demand by only 100 billion—40% of the impact of the peak decline in the USA.

But thirdly, another period of delever­ag­ing has just begun in the UK, whereas the rate of decline of debt has slowed in the USA. Things aren’t look­ing rosy for 2012 in the USA, but they could be far worse in the UK.

Fig­ure 11 com­pares debt-financed demand in the two coun­tries: the UK’s debt binge has been strik­ingly larger, far more volatile, and is now headed down while the USA—though still deleveraging—is headed up.

Fig­ure 11

The role of debt in dri­ving both employ­ment and asset prices is very appar­ent. The boom years of the UK econ­omy from 1993 till 2008 were in fact its bor­row years.

Fig­ure 12

I pre­fer to cor­re­late the Credit Accel­er­a­tor to change in asset prices, but these next two fig­ures are use­ful in show­ing the level of UK asset prices, as well as their cor­re­la­tion with the change in pri­vate debt.

Fig­ure 13


 

Fig­ure 14

The UK Credit Accelerator

As explained else­where (“A much more neb­u­lous con­cep­tion”), since the change in pri­vate debt is an impor­tant com­po­nent of aggre­gate demand, and aggre­gate demand is expended on both com­modi­ties and assets, the accel­er­a­tion of pri­vate debt will be cor­re­lated to the change in unem­ploy­ment and the change in asset prices. This is very appar­ent in the UK data, and all 3 measures—unemployment, the FTSE and real house prices—are now under the influ­ence of neg­a­tive credit accelerators.

Fig­ure 15

Fig­ure 16

Fig­ure 17

Add to this pri­vate sec­tor delever­ag­ing a gov­ern­ment com­mit­ted to a deluded pro­gram of “expan­sion­ary fis­cal con­sol­i­da­tion”, and the indi­ca­tions are that the UK will be a leader in the global reces­sion stakes in 2012.

About Steve Keen

I am a professional economist and a long time critic of conventional economic thought. As well as attacking mainstream thought in Debunking Economics, I am also developing an alternative dynamic approach to economic modelling. The key issue I am tackling here is the prospect for a debt-deflation on the back of the enormous debts accumulated in Australia, and our very low rate of inflation.
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91 Responses to Debt Britannia

  1. Farnorth5 says:

    RE: Debt Britannia:

    Steve –Another home run for you .

    Being in Canada and watch­ing your blog and read­ing both books and look­ing at your var­i­ous inter­views etc.its easy to see if you had the same access to stats in the above for Canada
    based on my own his­tory of expe­ri­ence in both Municipal/State
    finance as well as pri­vate sec­tor here,you would end up with a Canada set of sta­tis­tics very sim­i­lar to what you have for Australia.

    We rely on US con­sump­tion of raw mate­ri­als the way you rely on China to keep
    unem­ploy­ment down and the econ­omy gen­er­ally hum­ming along,

    Although over­all we did not com­mit credit sui­cide the way the Amer­i­cans did on real estate,we still have credit issues to address and at this time,notwithstanding the good obser­va­tions of our Bank of Canada head about Min­sky,
    our fool­ish fed­eral polit­i­cans still think we should be “Bal­anc­ing the Fed­eral Books ” , before the Debt Man­age­ment Reces­sion is over .(The lack of pri­vate sec­tor debt man­age­ment between 1998 and 2008 being the real issue)

    Peo­ple have tried to tell the Feds, you exer­cise finan­cial dis­ci­pline and adopt bal­anced fed­eral bud­gets when the coun­try is NOT in recession.allowing space to run the fed­eral debt to gdp from 30% to 60% dur­ing a reces­sion to pro­vide extra UIC / Wel­fare /Retirement boosts but to no avail.

    The other half of Keynes obser­va­tions and what our then Finance Min­is­ter Paul Mar­tin did in 1994 to 2006 (Low­ered the National Debt from 556B to 456B and most impor­tant low­ered the Fed­eral Debt to GDP Ratio from 72.5% to 23 % in 12 years ‚when the coun­try was not in recession.)

    As you may have guessed, this cur­rent state of affairs really burns my butt ‚as it is/was all tech­ni­cally unnecessary .

    I expect Canada to go into fur­ther reces­sion over the next two years and
    stay there until the Amer­i­can hous­ing debt is even­tu­ally sorted out .
    (Ten to 15 years at the cur­rent rate of deleveraging)

    Unfor­tu­nately Bernanky and Gei­th­ner are doing their best to slow the delever­ag­ing as much as possible.

    We all look on with dis­gust as we see them copy­ing the Japan­ese 25 year kick the can down the road exer­cise, instead of deal­ing with the
    defec­tive debt on the Finance Com­pa­nies books.

    BTW A Happy New Year from Canada to your­self and other con­trib­u­tors to the dia­logue over this past year,it’s made inter­est­ing reading.

    May you have good luck and good man­age­ment in get­ting your basic mes­sage across in the New Year ‚that pri­vate debt man­age­ment not only mat­ters,
    but with a ten to one ratio to pub­lic debt, is the cor­ner stone of the worlds finan­cial sys­tem we all take for granted and is the crit­i­cal com­po­nent in the system.….

  2. mahaish says:

    and they wont find out until some­one doesnt get paid”

    This will never hap­pen for eco­nomic rea­sons if the Uk retains their cen­tral bank

    repo 105 , and lehman broth­ers, rj,

    and when the fed found out , it was too late

    it comes down to whether there is ade­quate or infact any mean­ing­full super­vi­sion of the derivates mar­ket by the cen­tral bank,

    his­tory does not pro­vide any encour­age­ment on this matter.

  3. Steve Keen says:

    Bril­liant detec­tive work as always Andrew, thanks! I’ll tweet it more widely.

  4. mahaish says:

    good point but that only refers to the bal­ance sheets of those who trade in for­eign exchange, in bank­ing terms is a domes­tic debit and a for­eign bank account credit – the domes­tic bank­ing bal­ance sheets have reduced. Its the same rea­son no coun­try could ever have a 100% neg­a­tive bal­ance of trade – it would soon drain domes­tic bank accounts”

    hi alain­ton

    yes, ultimate;y it depends on which bank­ing juris­dic­tion the deposit is ulti­mately held,

    there can be net out­flows and inflows.

    On the sec­ond point its the famil­iar issue of whether hor­i­zon­tal money cre­ation is an asset/liability pair – No”

    well i dont know how we come to this conclusion,

    admit­tedly an account­ing entry is a reflec­tion of a par­tic­u­lar time slice.

    are you refer­ing to the fact that the col­la­toralised value of the under­ly­ing assett may not be reflected in dou­ble entry book keep­ing, at any instance that post dates the transaction

  5. RickW says:

    Cen­ter­line
    Jan­u­ary 1, 2012 at 4:27 am | #
    .… I would wager there is a high prob­a­bil­ity the next cri­sis will orig­i­nate from London.”

    That will be no dif­fer­ent to the last one. Joseph Cas­sano ran the AIG FP group from Lon­don. He is regarded as patient zero in the 2008 melt­down:
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Cassano

    He was the dumb sucker that Gold­man Sachs took for a ride but he can still laugh because he is a multi-millionaire and will never need to work again.

  6. RickW says:

    Alain­ton
    Decem­ber 31, 2011 at 9:36 pm | #
    .…..
    richard.barwell@rbs.com
    (now at RBS) &
    oliver.burrows@bankofengland.co.uk
    Here is their very detailed paper from April http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/fs_paper10.pdf

    That link only gave me the front page. I was able to down­load the paper from here:
    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1815000

    Min­sky is listed in the ref­er­ences but no Steve Keen.

  7. RickW says:

    Andrew
    I have emailed the link to Steve’s Youtube lec­ture series to Bar­well and Bur­rows. Won­der if they will have the curios­ity to view the lectures.

  8. Dannyb2b says:

    RJ

    When­ever the UK Govt spends a series of jour­nal entries are processed (by the trea­sury BOE com­mer­cial banks and receiver of the money) which releases new money into the economy.

    The com­mer­cial bank jour­nal entry is
    DEBITS BoE Reserves (BoE debt/bank asset)
    CREDIT Cus­tomer bank account (bank liability/ receivers asset)”

    Yes I under­stand that. My point is that you need to sep­a­rate the exec­u­tive gov­ern­ment from the cen­tral bank. The cur­rent sys­tem needs to be changed.

    The sys­tem needs the gov­ern­ment to be con­strained in terms rais­ing funds from tax­a­tion, bor­row­ing or sell­ing assets. This way it can be run trans­par­ently and in an account­able man­ner. Instead of just push­ing poli­cies on the econ­omy which for what­ever rea­son arent in the national inter­est. Finan­cial lim­i­ta­tions along with other mea­sures force the gov­ern­ment to become effi­cient. No entity should have a blank check not even the government.

    The cen­tral bank should not deal with the exec­u­tive for mon­e­tary pol­icy. Mon­e­tary pol­icy doesnt need to use gov­ern­ment debt to affect the money supply.

  9. alainton says:

    Mahaish/RJ

    The dou­ble entry book­keep­ing sys­tem requires two entries to be made to bal­ance — even in those cases where as by the flick­ing of a switch money is cre­ated instan­teously and not through a flow — in the case of hor­i­zon­tal money not cre­ated through secu­ri­ties how­ever the lia­bil­ity entry is decep­tive as it is not debt based money — there is no future flow — War­ren Mostlers brother sis­ter anal­ogy is a good one — it is using the anal­ogy of good­will to say — you owe me noth­ing, as of course their is no con­tract or promise to pay — it is an impor­tant point as we need to be able to rec­on­cile the credit the­ory of money with hor­i­zon­tal money.

  10. RJ says:

    Alianton

    Mon­e­tary sov­er­eign Govts can cre­ate money as req

  11. RJ says:

    Alain­ton

    Mon­e­tary sov­er­eign Govts can cre­ate money as required and with­out restriction.

    The point War­ren Mosler was mak­ing here (I think) is :

    US Govt debt is largely mean­ing­less (it is not only because the bond asset is very impor­tant to the asset holder) because it can be cre­ated when required as required by a series of jour­nal entries.

    There are how­ever issues from mon­e­tary sov­er­eign Govt debt. But not being able to pay is not one of them.

    –Mon­e­tary infla­tion caused by too much Govt debt. I do not think this will ever be an issue if Govt bonds are issued at the required inter­est rate when required. (Oth­ers includ­ing MMT sup­port­ers do not agree).

    - Cur­rency value. If Govt spend reck­lessly the cur­rency value may depreciate.

    –Resource allo­ca­tion may be inef­fi­cient etc

    In my opin­ion the solu­tion to the cur­rent prob­lem is sim­ple. More Govt debt (a lot more) by tax cuts (higher deficits and then higher debt) NOT more Govt spend­ing (Govts spend too much already) EXCEPT for increased pen­sions and unem­ploy­ment benefits.

    But unbe­liev­ably igno­rance of money and bank­ing (espe­cially econ­o­mists) espe­cially the dif­fer­ence between Govt debt and non Govt debt stops this occurring.

    Peo­ple seem to want to believe money is spe­cial. Not just the result of a series of jour­nal entries. That Govts with a cen­tral bank can cre­ate as required when required.

  12. RJ says:

    The sys­tem needs the gov­ern­ment to be con­strained in terms rais­ing funds from tax­a­tion, bor­row­ing or sell­ing assets. This way it can be run trans­par­ently and in an account­able man­ner. Instead of just push­ing poli­cies on the econ­omy which for what­ever rea­son arent in the national inter­est. Finan­cial lim­i­ta­tions along with other mea­sures force the gov­ern­ment to become effi­cient. No entity should have a blank check not even the government.”

    Democ­racy and sov­er­eignty means the peo­ple and Govt have this power with­out the agreed frame­work for Gov­ern­ment. Not an unelected rul­ing elite.

    Lets see how the Euro coun­tries go. They are now con­strained and have in effect lost their sov­er­eignty to bankers, EU bureau­crats, an unelected rul­ing elite and / or for­eign rulers.

    I believe the Euro and EU route will be a com­plete and utter dis­as­ter for the peo­ple of these coun­tries. They have in effect done what you want. Lets see how it works out.

  13. RJ says:

    in bank­ing terms is a domes­tic debit and a for­eign bank account credit – the domes­tic bank­ing bal­ance sheets have reduced. Its the same rea­son no coun­try could ever have a 100% neg­a­tive bal­ance of trade – it would soon drain domes­tic bank accounts”

    I believe all it means is for­eign­ers will own a greater per­cent­age of the finan­cial assets in a country.

    The net finan­cial assets (bonds or bank deposits) will NOT change from trade sur­pluses or deficits. So this is not cor­rect if it refers to finan­cial assets:-

    there can be net out­flows and inflows. ”

  14. Dannyb2b says:

    RJ

    Democ­racy and sov­er­eignty means the peo­ple and Govt have this power with­out the agreed frame­work for Gov­ern­ment. Not an unelected rul­ing elite.”

    Im an advo­cate of mon­e­tary reform I think the mon­e­tary sys­tem as it is cur­rently is inef­fec­tive. The head of the cen­tral bank should be elected by the pub­lic not appointed by the pres­i­dent or what­ever. The cur­rent demo­c­ra­tic sys­tem doesnt have enough checks and bal­ances, it is very impor­tant to impose a mon­e­tary con­straint on the gov­ern­ment not just give it a blank check.

    Yes I agree the Euro coun­tries are now con­trained after being able to rack up mas­sive debts in the first place. There should of already been bind­ing restraints in place to stop the gov debts from going out of hand instead of some loose agree­ment that did noth­ing. The prob­lem with Europe is that they can­not off­set the pri­vate and gov­ern­ment delever­ag­ing because of the mon­e­tary pol­icy trans­mis­sion mech­a­nism which depends on com­mer­cial banks. This needs to be cir­cum­vented like I said before so the cen­tral bank deals directly with the pub­lic to expand money directly to the economy.

  15. RJ says:

    Yes I agree the Euro coun­tries are now con­trained after being able to rack up mas­sive debts in the first place

    What mas­sive debt?

    Govt debt is the only way peo­ple can save non Govt net finan­cial assets for their retire­ment. We need a lot more Govt debt not less.

    There should of already been bind­ing restraints in place to stop the gov debts”

    And who are you to decide this. I sup­port democ­racy and the right of peo­ple to decide for themselves.

    But you view­point is based on igno­rance about money and bank­ing any­way. Govt debt = non Govt assets. Govt inter­est expense = non Govt inter­est revenue.

    And there are con­straints in place. Elec­tions, infla­tion and the cur­rency value for example.

  16. RJ says:

    This needs to be cir­cum­vented like I said before so the cen­tral bank deals directly with the pub­lic to expand money directly to the economy.”

    And this is non­sense. Can I sug­gest you read this book as a start­ing point.

    http://moslereconomics.com/2009/12/10/7-deadly-innocent-frauds/

  17. Dannyb2b says:

    RJ

    What mas­sive debt?
    Govt debt is the only way peo­ple can save non Govt net finan­cial assets for their retire­ment. We need a lot more Govt debt not less.”

    The debt of coun­tries like Greece and Italy is mas­sive IMO.

    Govt debt is the only way peo­ple can save non Govt net finan­cial assets for their retire­ment. We need a lot more Govt debt not less.”

    Govt debt is the only way peo­ple can save non govt net finan­cial assets in the cur­rent arrange­ment and this needs to change because it is ass back­wards. The money sup­ply can be expanded directly to the pub­lic in a non debt based sys­tem with­out the need for any gov­ern­ment assets.

    “There should of already been bind­ing restraints in place to stop the gov debts”

    I sup­port democ­racy and the right of peo­ple to decide for themselves.”

    I think if enough peo­ple were aware of the ben­e­fits of this lim­i­ta­tion of gov­ern­ment excess they would be in favour of it.

    But you view­point is based on igno­rance about money and bank­ing any­way. Govt debt = non Govt assets. Govt inter­est expense = non Govt inter­est rev­enue.
    And there are con­straints in place. Elec­tions, infla­tion and the cur­rency value for example.”

    I already said I under­stand your expla­na­tion of the cur­rent sys­tem and I agree that is how it oper­ates at present. I think the sys­tem needs to change though. The cur­rent con­straints are only part of the equa­tion. There needs to be fur­ther checks and bal­ances to cre­ate a more bal­anced, sta­ble sys­tem to bet­ter sup­port growth.

  18. RJ says:

    The debt of coun­tries like Greece and Italy is mas­sive IMO.”

    Govt debt??. It less than Japan believe.

    But I’m refer­ring to mon­e­tary sov­er­eign coun­tries. Italy and Greece have given away their most valu­able asset and are now like a com­pany or individual

    US Govt debt is far too low. For exam­ple US100,000 sav­ing per head on aver­age = 30 tril­lion. 200,000 = 60 trillion

    It is not even close to this. The US could eas­ily increase their deficit by $1 tril­lion a year.

  19. Dannyb2b says:

    RJ

    Why tin­ker with the exist­ing mediocre mon­e­tary arrange­ment instead of improv­ing it? I dont think we should rely on a semi com­pe­tent sys­tem of gov­ern­ment to get us out of the mess it cre­ated. The sys­tem has to change so that the pub­lic have a more direct effect on the econ­omy instead of wait­ing so much for the gov­ern­ment. Gov­ern­ment has proved time and time again that it is not really up to it in terms of man­ag­ing the econ­omy lets try reign in their eco­nomic prowess.

  20. jason webb says:

    Please tell me straight away if this com­ment is miss­ing the point, I’m no finan­cial pro­fes­sional, but is there any chance here that some of this debt fig­ure includes the net expo­sure to deriv­a­tive con­tracts, as opposed to their net value? It’s quite pos­si­ble to take out, say, a con­tract for dif­fer­ence, with a rel­a­tively small amount of col­lat­eral, which allows a net expo­sure many mul­ti­ples greater. But this net expo­sure is very unlikely to ever become a real lia­bil­ity because investors would gen­er­ally receive mar­gin calls once any losses came near to the amount of collateral.(in the absence of some enor­mous gap move, of course) Any­way, just won­der­ing, because if this type of con­tract is included in the books of the finan­cial insti­tu­tions, then maybe this par­tic­u­lar uk debt data is not quite what it seems. And the UK is obvi­ously a cen­tre for this type of activ­ity, of course.

  21. Steve Keen says:

    Hi Jason,

    Since I’m using data that is also used by the Trea­sury to cal­cu­late bank debt, I think deriv­a­tive expo­sures are not included. That is cer­tainly the case in Aus­tralian and US data. These fig­ures would be for sec­toral loans from banks.

  22. Steve Keen says:

    But you view­point is based on igno­rance about money and bank­ing anyway”

    RJ, your lan­guage is clas­sic “flam­ing”. Things you can say face to face with­out annoy­ing peo­ple can get tem­pers flar­ing here.

  23. mugs says:

    Can’t seem to get the post as pdf? The link takes me to the login page each time, but I’m already logged in. Has always worked before, am I miss­ing something?

  24. Steve Keen says:

    I insti­tuted a “Clayton’s” mem­ber­ship scheme about four months ago Mugs: any­one can read a post here or doc­u­ments I posted before­hand, but new PDFs are acces­si­ble only to Sub­scribers ($2 a year) or above.

    I’ve recently ported the blog to a new ISP, and some­thing has gone wrong with the “Old mem­bers upgrade” link. But you could sign on as a new mem­ber using “New Mem­ber Reg­is­tra­tion” on the Home Page.

  25. mugs says:

    Thanks Steve, yep I am a sub­scriber, and it shows me as logged in. But click­ing on the pdf links still just takes me to the reg­is­ter page. And if I do try to use the new mem­ber link I still just end up back on the reg­is­tra­tion page each time I try to access the pdf? I’ve had no prob­lem open­ing the pdfs for pre­vi­ous blog posts.

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