Party like it’s New Year’s Eve 1930
I recommend that you finish the year with a look at the News from 1930 blog, which is providing some “year in review” commentary on 1930 now–including these details on the market highs and lows. Obviously some things were much worse in 1930 than today–notably industrial production and the stock market:
Market highs and lows:
Dow industrial average high of 294.07 Apr. 17; low 157.51 Dec. 16. Rail average high of 157.94 Mar. 29; low 91.65 Dec. 16. Utility average high of 108.62 Apr. 12; low 55.14 Dec. 16.
Market value of NYSE-listed stocks high of $76.1B Apr. 1; low $53.3B Nov. 30.
Dow bond average high of 97.70 Oct. 1; low 92.83 Dec. 17.
Production highs and lows:
Daily oil production high of 2.722M barrels Feb. 22; low 2.127M barrels Dec. 27, lowest since July 1926.
Steel production in March was yearly high of 4.300M tons; low 2.234M Nov. 30.
Rail freight loadings high of 989,504 cars Aug. 30; low 702,085 Nov. 29 (vs. 1929 high 1,203,139, low 798,682).
Reflections
One clear factor stands out about 2009: though the vast majority of neoclassical economists (and the politicians they advise) entered the Global Financial Crisis in denial that it could even happen, by late 2008 they were in panic mode about what it could forebode. Ed Lazear, who was head of Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers from 2006-2008, gave a strong sense of just how extreme that panic was when he spoke at the Australian Economists Conference in September of this year–and the Economic Report of the President (which he submitted from 2007 till 2009) provide an interesting history of just how little idea conventional economists had that a crisis was on its way.
At the beginning of 2007, the President’s Council of Economic Advisers were confidently predicting that unemployment would remain constant in 2007, and rise only slightly in subsequent years:
A year later–at the beginning of 2008–they were only slightly less cheerful:
Even as 2009 commenced, they were still unaware of just how bad the crisis would be. The forecast below was made using data up till November 10 2008, and the forecasts are for the end of the nominated year. So the President’s Economic Advisers told Obama–on his arrival at America’s helm in February 2009–that unemployment at the end of 2009 would be … 7.7 percent:
That forecast wrong by 2.3 percent as of October 2009–even after a slight recovery:
By 2009 the biggest government stimulus packages in human history were in full swing. Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd estimated that these amounted to spending 18 percent of GDP over 3 years from September 2007 till September 2010.
As a result of these packages, the economic outcome for 2009 was far less painful than non-neoclassical economists like myself expected. I had surmised that Australian unemployment would top 9 percent by year’s end 2009–instead it is 5.7%. Unemployment in the USA has apparently started to stabilise at 10%, when I expected it to be above 13% by now.
So the government stimulus packages have, in the short term, worked. I’ll consider what might happen next further down, but I want to emphasise something here: this is as much a contradiction of standard neoclassical economic theory as the GFC was in the first place. Not only does neoclassical theory not allow that events like the GFC can occur, it also argues that government policy cannot have a beneficial impact upon the economy–all it can do is increase the rate of inflation.
The actual reasons for this belief are arcane, but this choice quote from leading neoclassicals Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace puts the dominant neoclassical case in a nutshell:
In this system, there is no sense in which the authority has the option to conduct countercyclical policy. To exploit the Phillips Curve [a relationship between unemployment and inflation], it must somehow trick the public. But by virtue of the assumption that expectations are rational, there is no feedback rule that the authority can employ and expect to be able systematically to fool the public. This means that the authority cannot expect to exploit the Phillips Curve even for one period. Thus, combining the natural rate hypothesis with the assumption that expectations are rational transforms the former from a curiosity with perhaps remote policy implications into an hypothesis with immediate and drastic implications about the feasibility of pursuing countercyclical policy.’ (“Rational Expectations And The Theory Of Economic Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 2 (1976) pp. 177-78; emphases added)
Whoops: suddenly in 2008, economists who believed that went straight into “Keynesian” pump-priming mode. They have become “born again Keynesians”–though their knowledge of Keynes is scant to say the least, since prior to 2009, neoclassical economists had driven all consideration of Keynes out of academic curricula.
Forecasts
Now that government action has saved the economy in the short term, the same economists who used to argue that it could do nothing of the sort are expecting the resumption of “business as usual” growth. Ed Lazear himself, in September 2009, was expressing (without much conviction) the view that it was feasible for the US economy to grow at 5% in 2010–on the basis that the data showed that “the bigger the fall, the higher the rebound”. A statistical argument to that effect formed part of his 2009 Report:
So far, the recovery is not going according to plan. What was initially seen as a strong sign that the V-shaped recovery was underway–the 3.5% growth rate in the September quarter–has since been revised down to a mere 2.2% growth. The initially estimated rate was just more than enough to make a dent in unemployment; the revision is still below the 3% level that is seen as being needed to keep unemployment from rising.
I base my forecasts, not on regressions, but what I regard as the underlying causal mechanisms in the economy, which are well captured in Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. The key factor here is the ratio of private debt to GDP, built up on the basis of an inherently cyclical economy, and overlaid by a financial system that has a strong tendency to fund “Ponzi” speculative behaviour rather than real investment.
On that basis, the real game of the GFC–deleveraging by the private sector–has only just begun in the USA (and has been delayed in Australia by government policy, as I discussed in my previous post). We are just at the peak of the biggest debt bubble in human history. It dwarfs the level of debt reached in the 1930s largely because conventional economists like Greenspan and Bernanke allowed a “natural” debt bubble that should have burst in 1987 to keep going for two more decades:
“Business as usual” growth since the end of WWII has been underwritten by a rising level of debt (right from 1945 in the USA’s case, and from the mid-1960s in Australia’s):
This was always going to lead to a crisis when the debt-financing load became too great, and the asset bubbles financed by this Ponzi Lending finally burst. The government rescues of 2009 have clearly re-ignited this bubble in the stock market, giving us the longest running and biggest bear market rally in history:
Whether that rally can continue–and “business as usual” growth resume in the real economy–is the moot point for 2010. The rally, though impressive, has still only taken the market back to 25 percent below its peak in early October 2007.
My expectation is that, some time during 2010, the disconnect between the financial markets’ euphoric expectations and the hard reality of a deleveraging private sector will bring the optimism of both “born again Keynesian” neoclassical economists and the markets to an end. Growth will not resume once the stimulus packages are removed, since deleveraging will then assert itself in the absence of government stimulus. Falling debt will subtract from growth, as it once added to it, and unemployment will start to rise again.
I expect that governments will react to this as they did in 2009–by turning on the stimulus packages once more, while continuing to ignore the private debt levels that caused the crisis in the first place. They will “turn Japanese”, to coin a phrase–since this is the same thing the Japanese government has been doing for two decades since its Bubble Economy burst at the end of 1989.
This process may repeat itself two or three times before serious attention is finally turned to the Ponzi-dominated financial sector’s parasitic impact on the real economy. But for now, the parasites are clearly still in control of the host.
That’s it for the serious stuff! Sydney is a great city in which to welcome in the New Year, and I’ll happily be doing that at a swish restaurant in Darling Harbour tonight. But before I go, here’s a quick personal retrospective on 2009.
Should old acquaintance be forgot…
Many thanks to the many bloggers who’ve joined the site (there are now over 3,000 members), and to the smaller number (about 50 I think) who regularly post comments. I’ve learnt a lot from following the debate, though the sheer volume and my “real job” work commitments get in the way of replying to all requests for feedback.
There are also a remarkable number of readers around the world: the site now has about 50,000 unique readers each month, with a substantial additional number following via RSS feeds. On New Year’s Day I’ll publish the final count for the number of readers, but the current tally (as of 9.39am on New Year’s Eve) is shown in the table below. It seems likely that December will set a new record of over 53,000 unique readers.
Toil and Trouble
It’s been a productive year for me in terms of research. Against all expectations, I managed to develop the monetary multisectoral model of production that has been an ambition for over a decade–under the pressure of a research grant from the CSIRO that had a very tight deadline. Early in the New Year I’ll post a pair of videos outlining both my model and the CSIRO’s biophysical model–I simply haven’t had time to do so as yet.
I’ve also published more than ten papers–a ridiculous tally for one year:
- (2009) “The “Credit Tsunami”: Explaining the inexplicable with debt and deleveraging”, in Friedman, G., Moseley, F. & Sturr, C., The Economic Crisis Reader, Dollars and Sense, New York, pp. 44-51.
- (2009), “The Global Financial Crisis, Credit Crunches and Deleveraging“, Journal Of Australian Political Economy, No 64, pp. 18-32.
- (2009), “The Confidence Trick”, The Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, May, 2009.
- (2009), “Household Debt—the final stage in an artificially extended Ponzi Bubble”, Australian Economic Review, Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 347-57.
- (2009). “Bailing out the Titanic with a Thimble”, Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 3-24.
- (2010). “The coming depression and the end of economic delusion”, in Steven Kates (ed.),Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings: Alternative Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, pp. 127-142.
- (2009) “The dynamics of the monetary circuit”, in Jean-François Ponsot and Sergio Rossi (eds.), The Political Economy of Monetary Circuits: Tradition and Change, Palgrave, London, pp. 161-187.
- (2009), “Warum die Standard-Theorie des Unternehmens nicht mehr unterrichtet werden Darf”, in Luderer, B. (ed.), Die Kunst des Modellierens (The Art of Modelling), Vieweg+Teubner Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp. 179-194. (English draft here)
- (2009), “A pluralist approach to microeconomics”, in Reardan, J. (ed.), The Handbook of Pluralist Economics Education, Routledge, London, pp. 120-149.
- (2009), “Mathematics for pluralist economists”, in Reardan, J. (ed.), The Handbook of Pluralist Economics Education, Routledge, London, pp. 149-167.
- (2009), “Keynes’s ‘revolving fund of finance’ and transactions in the circuit”, in Wray, R. and Forstater, M., (eds.), Keynes and Macroeconomics after 70 Years, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 259-278.
The 11th paper is awaiting referees’ reports (“Solving the Paradox of Monetary Profits“), but will be available as an online discussion paper on Monday January 4th in the new and very innovative journal Economics.
The number of conferences I’ve spoken at is even more ridiculous: 44 in all, about 33 of which were public seminars with the remainder being academic conferences.
I also wrote 10 new lectures for a new subject Behavioural Finance. I’ll add three more next year when I take the subject again in August 2010:
Behavioural Finance
- Reconsidering Consumer Behaviour (PDF)
- Reconsidering Producer Behaviour (PDF)
- Reconsidering Behaviour in Finance (PDF)
- How the Data Killed CAPM (PDF)
- The Fractal Markets Hypothesis (PDF)
- The Inefficient Markets Hypothesis (PDF)
- Experiments in Economic & Financial Behaviour (to be posted in 2010)
- The statistics on money and implications for finance and economics (PDF)
- The endogenous money perspective (PDF)
- Modelling Endogenous Money I (PDF)
- Modelling Endogenous Money II (PDF)
- The Global Financial Crisis (to be posted in 2010)
- Alternative nonlinear methods to model financial behaviour (to be posted in 2010)
New Year’s Resolutions
Some of these are necessities:
- Establish a blog for the walk from Parliament House to Kosciousko
Others are vital:
- Begin a discussion forum linked to Debtwatch
- Start solid work on my book Finance and Economic Breakdown for Edward Elgar Publishers
And some are easy to achieve, but hard to do:
- Spend less time on the blog so that I have more time for the book
The last task is hard to do because, of course, I enjoy this blog. But I spend too much time on it already, let alone with the added task of writing a book. But ultimately I have to provide a book-length treatment of Minsky’s theories (and the data of the GFC) if I’m going to help cause a permanent shift in economic theory and policy. So I have to force myself to spend less time on this blog.
Happy New Year everyone. 2010 looks like being just as exciting as was 2009.








JKH and Scepticus
Yes, there’s no theoretical problem with modeling a pure credit economy with a central bank providing overdrafts for payment clearing. Marc Lavoie calls this overdraft central banking. My understanding, however, was that Steve was trying to do a model without a central bank, so that’s what we were discussing . . . but certainly he could model a pure credit economy much easier by just doing as both of you suggest.
From the MMT perspective, Warren will always ask why the private sector accepts central bank liabilities in payment in the first place, which hasn’t been answered. I think to just do the model, you don’t necessarily have to answer that question, but for it to actually happen in the real world (that is, a pure credit economy as described by both of you), you do. And Warren at least would argue that the central bank’s liabilities would have no value without some compelling reason (namely, that they settle tax liabilities with the state) to use the cb’s liabilities versus private liabilities. For more on Warren’s views here, see “A General Framework for the Analysis of Currencies and Commodities . . . . (can’t recall the exact title, sorry, but it’s something like that)” in the mandatory readings section of http://www.moslereconomics.com.
Best,
Scott Fullwiler
JKH and Scepticus
To follow up, the framework you both are describing is essentially what I was suggesting in comment 392 above.
Best,
Scott Fullwiler
Scott,
I don’t understand two things from Marc Lavoie – one is overdraft economy and the other is “government deposits”. Somewhere in his writings he says most economies are overdraft! Which means the real world economies and not hypotheticals. Bit puzzled. Can you please explain ?
Hi Ramanan,
Yes, Lavoie means that most real-world central banks manage the payments system and set the target rate via lending operations (overdrafts, repos, standing facilities), rather than doing so via “asset-based” operations (outright open market operations where the cb buys/sells financial assets). He’s right (note that while the Fed does engage in outright operations for offsetting a drain in reserves as currency is purchased by banks to meet customer withdrawals, its day-to-day operations for managing the payments system and setting its target rate fit Lavoie’s description).
Best,
Scott Fullwiler
Guys thanks for the detailed replies.
I don’t see why the government can’t simply reply that taxes are remitted by credit deposits at the central bank.
All such taxes can be immediately exhaled back into the private sector as new credit extended to private banks against which the government can draw later when it needs to spend those taxes.
People therefore value the means of exchange for the same reason they did before with fiat money but there is no actual ‘money’ in the sense of net financial assets of the private sector.
That also means aggregate withdrawl of funds from the banking sector is impossible, which makes deflation impossible and negative interest rates possible. I would say that in this case the revolving fund would never fail although I guess it might all fall apart if negative saving rates turn out to be the stuff of bloody revolutions, mark of the beast etc etc.
Not sure what the dynamics of long term government debt would be though in this scenario.
As an aside Steve, I used speculative capital from the game updown of which I won a 40 dollar paypal credit which I then used to both donate to your research and buy your book debunking economics. So I don’t believe speculation is necessarily evil if it properly pumped into the real economy. It’s crowd behavior of the masses when buying in pack (like a heard of sheep) when evaluations or premise is flimsy. For instance gold is just another form of paper. Yet the masses think it is an adequate inflation hedge.
I would like to point out your work on disproving the marshallian model in favor of the Keenzian (as a pun on Keynesian) is ground breaking. But I would be really interested exploring this concept further. With some real world demand curve behaviors. For instance, I don’t believe a company can incrementally approach their optimal output in in lieu a change in strategy of company XYZ in either direction sometimes due to the costs associated with that change. But what is discussed is change in output, not change in strategy though I will need to read though it more closely. Also the cost barrier to change output incrementally may be prohibitive thus company XYZ may have the advantage and ZYX goes ka-put. Also one discusses marginal cost with marginal revenue, it would be interesting to also include debt explicitly which would appear in the term for marginally cost (I assume I have no finance or economics degree).
I am becoming more interested in pursuing an advanced degree in economics, but in the real world sense of nonlinear dynamical systems. The stuff your doing. Please ping me a message at johnnyfix@gmail.com.
Hi Scepticus,
You got a bit confused there, it seems. My reply in CAPS below.
Best,
Scott
I don’t see why the government can’t simply reply that taxes are remitted by credit deposits at the central bank.
THAT’S WHAT THEY DO, ACTUALLY.
All such taxes can be immediately exhaled back into the private sector as new credit extended to private banks against which the government can draw later when it needs to spend those taxes.
THE GOVERNMENT ALREADY SPENDS BY CREDITING BANK DEPOSITS, BUT ITS ABILITY TO SPEND ISN’T LIMITED BY HOW MUCH CREDIT HAS BEEN EXTENDED OR HOW MUCH IT COLLECTS. ALSO, THE TAX AND LOAN SYSTEM IN THE US ALREADY DOES BASICALLY AS YOU’VE SUGGESTED. IN FACT, IF THE CB’S TARGET RATE IS SET DIFFERENT FROM THE CB’S REMUNERATION RATE AND ITS LENDING RATE, THEN NET FLOWS TO/FROM THE TREASURY’S ACCOUNT ‘MUST’ BE ‘STERILIZED’ AS YOU’VE EXPLAINED OR ELSE THE CB CAN’T HIT ITS TARGET RATE. CANADA DOES IT, TOO. FINALLY, WHAT USE IS IT TO THE PRIVATE BANKS TO HAVE A BUNCH OF EXTRA RESERVE BALANCES? THE BALANCES DON’T HELP BANKS LEND . . . BANKS CAN CREATE LOANS AND DEPOSITS WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL BALANCES FROM THE CB.
People therefore value the means of exchange for the same reason they did before with fiat money but there is no actual ‘money’ in the sense of net financial assets of the private sector.
NOT TRUE. NET FINANCIAL ASSETS OF THE NON-GOVERNMENT SECTOR ARE CHANGED IF THERE IS A GOVERNMENT SECTOR THAT HAS A CHANGE TO ITS OWN BALANCE SHEET. YOU HAVEN’T DONE AWAY WITH THE GOVT IN YOUR PROPOSAL, SO YOU STILL HAVE CHANGES TO NFA THAT ARE THE NET FLOWS TO/FROM IT.
That also means aggregate withdrawl of funds from the banking sector is impossible, which makes deflation impossible and negative interest rates possible. I would say that in this case the revolving fund would never fail although I guess it might all fall apart if negative saving rates turn out to be the stuff of bloody revolutions, mark of the beast etc etc.
THIS MAKES NO SENSE. PAYING BACK A LOAN WILL DESTROY BANK LIABILITIES, JUST AS IT DOES NOW. ALSO, JUST PUTTING A BUNCH OF EXCESS BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF PRIVATE BANKS DOESN’T CREATE INFLATION BY ITSELF AND DOESN’T NECESSARILY STOP DEFLATION . . . BOTH OF WHICH WE ARE SEEING NOW IN THE US AND IN JAPAN. FINALLY, NEGATIVE INTEREST RATES ARE ALWAYS ‘POSSIBLE.’ THE CB JUST HAS TO SET THE TARGET THERE.
Scott,
Seeking minor clarification on the Lavoie thing (although I haven’t read Lavoie):
I don’t understand the significance. Normal central bank operations apart from QE crises involve a very narrow band for operational excess reserve management which is handled naturally through overdraft and discount window facilities. Normal strategic operations involve fundamental asset expansion in order to create incremental reserves that are the source of settlement for both gradual ‘required reserve’ increases and currency growth as per demand. The two modes are neatly segmented in this way. It’s only during the crisis that they became conflated, when CB’s needed to become strategic about asset expansion and related excess reserve expansion.
OK?
JKH . . . yes, agree completely. Lavoie wrote about this long before the crisis (decades, in fact), and he’s talking about the first of your two types of operations. His intended audience is the vast majority of economists that believes the sort of operations you describe as “normal strategic operations” are used for what yoiu describe as “normal cb operations.” Does that make sense? The significance lies in the fact that most economists don’t know it as well as you, in other words.
Scott,
Makes sense, thanks.
The crisis has certainly complicated the task of explaining central bank operations to those who weren’t correctly familiar with them before the crisis!
Hey scott:
THAT’S WHAT THEY DO, ACTUALLY.
Yes, my point was just that the actual existence of money as net financial assets of the private sector just so that they can be taxed is not necessary to get people to use the credit money provided by a pure credit economy.
I would say the chartalist position re taxes applies to any medium of exchange whether credit, fiat or even gold.
THE GOVERNMENT ALREADY SPENDS BY CREDITING BANK DEPOSITS, BUT ITS ABILITY TO SPEND ISN’T LIMITED BY HOW MUCH CREDIT HAS BEEN EXTENDED OR HOW MUCH IT COLLECTS.
That same statement can be applied to any commercial bank, apart from the existence of capital and reserve requirements – in fact you point this out below. In practice governments face curbs too even in a proper MMT regime since considerations of inflation remain.
ALSO, THE TAX AND LOAN SYSTEM IN THE US ALREADY DOES BASICALLY AS YOU’VE SUGGESTED.
Agreed but the presence of base money as a currency essentially for clearing interbank transactions is not required to make the system work.
In fact one could imagine a system in which there is no tax at all and private sector individuals are extended credit by the government to consume public services like roads, healthcare etc. At the same time the private sector extends credit to the public sector in the form of bonds and so on.
In this system, tax is not required as long as people have a desire to consume the public services, and people pay interest to the government on their drawdown of public services.
Of course this is a kind of tax – where consumption of public services are not optional then the interest on public credit is basically a tax. Or the above could be be mixed with direct traditional taxation.
This may seem all rather irrelevant but I’m trying to get to the nub of how a pure credit economy would operate and whether in fact it is any different in principle to what we already have.
IN FACT, IF THE CB’S TARGET RATE IS SET DIFFERENT FROM THE CB’S REMUNERATION RATE AND ITS LENDING RATE, THEN NET FLOWS TO/FROM THE TREASURY’S ACCOUNT ‘MUST’ BE ‘STERILIZED’ AS YOU’VE EXPLAINED OR ELSE THE CB CAN’T HIT ITS TARGET RATE. CANADA DOES IT, TOO. FINALLY, WHAT USE IS IT TO THE PRIVATE BANKS TO HAVE A BUNCH OF EXTRA RESERVE BALANCES? THE BALANCES DON’T HELP BANKS LEND . . . BANKS CAN CREATE LOANS AND DEPOSITS WITHOUT ANY ADDITIONAL BALANCES FROM THE CB.
Quite – so one wonders what the point and relevance of base money is. What is the point of them if they are not really needed for clearing and their volume doesn’t really affect lending (at least as a first order effect)?
A monetary system in which a key plank is effectively redundant seems to be a monetary system that is trying to be something it is not.
I suggest the only reason for base money is to facilitate anonymous cash withdrawls from the banking system.
NOT TRUE. NET FINANCIAL ASSETS OF THE NON-GOVERNMENT SECTOR ARE CHANGED IF THERE IS A GOVERNMENT SECTOR THAT HAS A CHANGE TO ITS OWN BALANCE SHEET. YOU HAVEN’T DONE AWAY WITH THE GOVT IN YOUR PROPOSAL, SO YOU STILL HAVE CHANGES TO NFA THAT ARE THE NET FLOWS TO/FROM IT.
Assuming the public sector invests in private sector assets and vice versa it is possible in theory to have a net private sector position either positive or negative is it not? And the private sector could operate even in the case its liabilities to government exceed its assets (i.e. net lending to the govt sector) – this would merely imply that the private sector has brough forward consumption of public sector services that will need to be paid for in the future.
THIS MAKES NO SENSE. PAYING BACK A LOAN WILL DESTROY BANK LIABILITIES, JUST AS IT DOES NOW.
If that continues to occur the demand for money must have fallen below supply which would result in negative overnight rates, resulting in a transfer from savers to borrowers, and from shrinking balance sheets to expanding balance sheets which would continue to accelerate until positive demand for money is restored . The money stock could fall in this circumstance but velocity would rise to maintain GDP would it not (speculative…)?
ALSO, JUST PUTTING A BUNCH OF EXCESS BALANCES IN THE HANDS OF PRIVATE BANKS DOESN’T CREATE INFLATION BY ITSELF AND DOESN’T NECESSARILY STOP DEFLATION . . .
I am assuming negative overnight rates will be passed onto savers, thereby allowing banks to lend at very low long term rates or perhaps at mildy negative short term rates.
BOTH OF WHICH WE ARE SEEING NOW IN THE US AND IN JAPAN. FINALLY, NEGATIVE INTEREST RATES ARE ALWAYS ‘POSSIBLE.’ THE CB JUST HAS TO SET THE TARGET THERE.
They can’t do that when retail savers can withdraw paper cash because it would result in general bank runs. Soon the stock of paper cash would be exhausted and out of circulation so unless the economy were setup to handle that eventuality (plenty of EPOS terminals etc) it is not do-able.
Also while capital flight is possible such a move might be problematic.
Having said all that I’m not sure how a pure credit economy would interact in terms of forex with a standard fiat money + credit economy.
Thanks omodes! And yes that’s precisely my point: so long as “speculation” is what John Blatt called it, and not what he alternatively called “placement”. The former was financing innovation, the latter taking positions on the prices of current assets.
I’ll drop you an email off-list today.
Economist’s international interactive House Price Bubble comparison across 4 measures: price index; price in real terms; price against average income; % change
http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14438245
Thanks Noah,
That is so useful that I’m going to write a post about it.
Fabulous resource…
@scepticus 426
“The only thing remaining then is to delete the concept of paper cash and we’re done.”
@JHK 429
“You then go the further step of eliminating currency and privatizing the central bank, etc., which sort of galvanizes the zero net condition, but is not really necessary to achieve it.”
When we talk about pure credit economy, are we talking a electronic currency?
I and many other people would like to keep our token money as units of exchange. Particular business in the Netherlands and Germany may use either implanted RFID chips or credit cards as a form of exchange but this is very Orwellian for my liking.
Anyway not all forms of exchange should be taxed, like pocket money for children or my buying something from a garage sale.
Governments can stop the transfer of credit money (electronic money) but can not stop the transfer of token money. Those who control the money can control all people. Something like a ‘Brave New World’ or ’1984′.
JKH #429:
“If you move from that point and then assume that there is also a zero cumulative government deficit, the zero net position becomes comprehensive.”
I was envisaging a situation that oscillates about the net zero position.
Aggregate demand management can equally well be achieved by ensuring that when demand falls due to sectoral imbalances (whether between the gov/no-gov sectors), or between different sections of the private sector, by effecting a market driven transfer (via interest rates) of wealth from the net surplus sector to the net deficit sector.
This is the same thing chartalism/MMT aims to achieve via targetted taxation and unconstrained public spending. Both when done right would have the same general effect of transferring wealth from net surplus sectors to net deficit sectors.
Alan – a government can in theory prevent the creation of token money by:
a) not providing any (a sin of omission)
b) ensuring that the electronic money retains higher liquidity than any token monies. This can be achieved if the government is providing services which people want, or if they enforce taxation. In either case, people aim to collect the specie which the government requires in return for providing critical services or to extinguish tax liabilities. There would be nothin to stop trading in other tokens like gold but I suggest that the government mandated medium of exchange would be more liquid and thus would be generally preferred by the population.
scepticus
#440 “… one wonders what the point and relevance of base money is”
Isn’t in it the govt’s ability to make good on the claims against it and therefore it higher acceptance to other financial claims? [Somewhat like your reply to Alan in #445]
#440 “… I’m trying to get to the nub of how a pure credit economy would operate and whether in fact it is any different in principle to what we already have.”
Me too. I view base money as credit on the govt and cash as a physical token represention of that same credit so we appear to be already in a credit economy (I’m persuaded by Innes: http://moslereconomics.com/mandatory-readings/what-is-money/).
However the dynamics of the more constrained private credit vs the apparently rather less constrained govt base money has me intrigued. The MMT vertical/horizontal framework says that base money really is different, but I wonder. I’m also concerned whether there are more constraints on govt base money than MMT seems to suggest.
JKH, Scott
MMT seems to me to suggest that you need an overarching govt fiat money to encompass and faciliate the private sector.
Foreign Exchange does not need a world central bank and essentially clears by private particpants using mutually agreed conventions – is that right (I’m really naive on how this works)?
If so, those two above concepts seem at odds in my poor brain, am I confusing apples and oranges and if so why is one apples and the other oranges?
Hi BH
The point is that government gives value to the currency by requiring it for tax settlement. If the US govt declared tomorrow that it would no longer accept $US denominated balances for settlement of taxes, but instead would only accept Euro denominated balances, there’d be a lot of switching to Euro balances almost immediately, and the use of $US in exchange would perhaps go away in short order (can’t account for everyone wanting to use it, but largely this would be true). So it’s not necessarily about “facilitating” the private sector.
Don’t know if you were referring to this or not, but the issue of NFA is not necessarily related to this. The point about NFA is that if the non-govt sector desires to save in the aggregate (that is, for the sector to end up with an increase in its net savings), then the only way this can occur by logic of accounting is for some other sector–namely the govt–to leverage. Again, though, this isn’t the same as the payment settlement issue, so facilitating NFA of the non-govt sector and which currency is used to settle payments aren’t the same issue.
Regarding foreign exchange, they are settling payments using currencies that already are accepted for tax settlement in respective nations. Who would want to be holding $US as the US govt made the announcement it would only accept Euros in my example above? Further, you generally settle (as opposed to clear, which is what you were referring to) the different sides of the trade separately in FX transactions . . . for instance, most trades involving $US have the $US side of the trade settled on CHIPS in the US.
Best,
Scott
Thanks for your reply Scott it clarifies a coulple of things for me and your illuminating example is great.
Another question if I may. I’ve so far understood the NFA concept to be in a domestic scenario but is it necessarily so?
I’m unclear as to whether say investors holdings in overseas balances (Euros?) are included. If they are, does that mean the govt sector in the concept is to be understood as including all soverign currency issuing governments?
“In the case where a large amount of excess reserves are neutralised by paying interest on them so that a floor under the overnight rate emerges regardless of reserve volumes it seems that this is in fact a credit economy in all but name, since rates are NOT set by the scarcity or otherwise of ‘money’ (or in MMT terms, the net financial assets of the private sector”
hi scepticus and all,
it was my impression that the way you neutralise a reserve excess is by offering interest baring securities for sale for those non interest baring reserves. open market ops in other words.
it was also my impression that in a interest rate targeting environment, fed neutralising activity is primarilly defensive in nature. the fed doesnt know the scarcity of money until after the fact. i thought in their infinite wisdom the central bank comes to some cocomamy conlusion of what the price should be and then tries to manipulate quantity after the fact. the central bank cant help but react to scarecity or excess. its unavoidable given ccurrent accounting arrangements and the relatively illiquid nature of bank assetts
mahaish I am referring to the feds plan to pay interest on bank reserves in order to raise rates when an excess of reserves is present (normally in this scenario the overnight rates pushed to 0).
There is no real difference between interest paying reserves and short term government bonds.
My point was that if interest rates can be targetted in this way regardless of the quantity of excess reserves, then those excess reserves have no real meaning as money (as opposed to credit, broad money), which is the role people normally is filled by base money.