It’s Hard Being a Bear (Part Six)?Good Alternative Theory?
on September 27th, 2009 at 9:44 amIf the economy does in fact recover from the Global Financial Crisis—without private debt levels once again rising relative to GDP—then my approach to economics will be proven wrong.
But this won’t prove conventional neoclassical economic theory right, because, for very different reasons to those that I put forward, modern neoclassical economics argues that the government policy to improve the economy is ineffective. The success of a government rescue would thus contradict neoclassical economics just as much—or maybe even more—than it would contradict my analysis.
The actual reasons for this belief are arcane, but this choice quote from leading neoclassicals Thomas Sargent and Neil Wallace puts the dominant neoclassical case in a nutshell:
In this system, there is no sense in which the authority has the option to conduct countercyclical policy. To exploit the Phillips Curve [a relationship between unemployment and inflation], it must somehow trick the public. But by virtue of the assumption that expectations are rational, there is no feedback rule that the authority can employ and expect to be able systematically to fool the public. This means that the authority cannot expect to exploit the Phillips Curve even for one period. Thus, combining the natural rate hypothesis with the assumption that expectations are rational transforms the former from a curiosity with perhaps remote policy implications into an hypothesis with immediate and drastic implications about the feasibility of pursuing countercyclical policy.’ (“Rational Expectations And The Theory Of Economic Policy”, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 2 (1976) pp. 177-78; emphases added)
The neoclassical confidence that the government can’t beneficially affect the economy is thus based on the insane assumption of “rational agents” who live in a world that is permanently in equilibrium, and whose expectations about the future are accurate—something that Ross Gittins’s recent column did a good job of critiquing. The real world is inhabited by real, fallible human beings, who are prone to bouts of irrational exuberance, susceptible to Ponzi Schemes disguised as investment, and who live in a world in permanent disequilibrium and with an uncertain future, in which their expectations are almost always wrong. They are therefore incapable of predicting and therefore neutralizing the impact of government policy, as neoclassical theory assumes that “rational agents” do.
There are other strands in neoclassical theory that argue there is some role for the government in controlling the economy—notably the so-called Taylor Rule which argues that the Central Bank can control the economy by fine tuning the interest rate. Taylor himself is arguing that deviation from his rule—when the Federal Reserve under Greenspan held interest rates at near zero after the burst of the DotCom bubble in 2000 – is what caused the crisis. I disagree, but that’s a topic for a later day.
The general proposition remains that in its overall bias, neoclassical theory argues that the government can’t beneficially influence the economy—and therefore that if there is a genuine, sustainable recovery as a consequence of the government stimulus packages, that contradicts neoclassical economics even more than it would contradict my approach.
That means that if there is a “winning” economic theory out there, then it must be one that argues that government action alone can help an economy recover from a crisis, and indeed maintain output growth at a level that will maintain full employment.
There is one “neoclassical” theory that argues this, which most economists—reflecting their non-existent training in the history of their own discipline—actually think is Keynesian. This is the so-called “IS-LM” model, which argues that the government can manipulate employment via fiscal policy. Neoclassicals are likely to retreat to this model—and declare themselves “Born Again Keynesians” in the process—without realizing that the originator of this model, John Hicks, rejected it on very sound grounds almost 30 years ago.
Hicks realized that his model attempts to represent the economy using just two markets—goods and money—when there is of course another important market: that for labour. He omitted the labour market from his model on the basis of what neoclassical economists call “Walras’ Law”. This is the proposition that, if all but one market in an economy are in equilibrium, then that final market must also be in equilibrium.[1]
Writing in 1979 in the non-orthodox Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Hicks realized this flaw (and several others) in this logic: it can apply only when the economy is in equilibrium—when both the goods market AND the money market are in balance. That, in terms of the model, is where the two curves cross. But the model is used to simulate what is supposed to happen when one or both markets are not in equilibrium, or when one curve—normally the IS curve—is shifted by deliberate government policy, such as running a deficit during an economic crisis. Therefore it is used to try to describe what happens in disequilibrium.
But in disequilibrium—anywhere on the diagram apart from where the two curves cross—Walras’ Law can’t be used to ignore what’s happening in the labour market. So even working from Hicks’s model, neoclassical economists would need to consider disequilibrium dynamics of 3 or more markets. Hicks damningly concluded that:
the only way in which IS-LM analysis usefully survives – as anything more than a classroom gadget, to be superseded, later on, by something better – is in application to a particular kind of causal analysis, where the use of equilibrium methods, even a drastic use of equilibrium methods, is not inappropriate. (Hicks, J. 1981, ‘IS-LM: An Explanation’, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 152; my emphasis)
Yet as Gittins pointed out, and as Paul Krugman himself recently confirmed, neoclassical economists are so obsessed with equilibrium methods that they will shy away from thinking in disequilibrium terms. As Krugman put it, right after critiquing neoclassical economics for being braindead, “I, for one, am not going to banish maximization-and-equilibrium from my toolbox”.
I’m sorry Paul, but stick with those tools and you’ll never come to grips with Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, let alone the actual disequilibrium dynamics of the real economy.
So there is no coherent neoclassical theory that can take solace from the success of the government stimulus packages, should they avert a deep recession and cause a sustained recovery without a rise in the private debt to GDP ratio.[2] If there is to be a winner in this debate, it has to be a non-neoclassical school of thought.
There is such a school of thought which has developed in Post Keynesian literature recently. Known as Chartalism, it argues that the government can and should maintain deficits to ensure full employment.
Chartalism rejects neoclassical economics, as I do. However it takes a very different approach to analyzing the monetary system, putting the emphasis upon government money creation whereas I focus upon private credit creation. It is therefore in one sense a rival approach to the “Circuitist” School which I see myself as part of. But it could also be that both groups are right, as in the parable of the blind men and the elephant: we’ve got hold of the same animal, but since one of us has a leg and the other a trunk, we think we’re holding on to vastly different creatures.
That said, I do have numerous issues with the Chartalist approach, but I haven’t studied its literature closely enough yet to write a critique. [3] I also could have distorted their arguments if I had attempted a summary of their views. So what I decided instead to do is to ask a leading Chartalist, Professor Bill Mitchell from the University of Newcastle, to write a précis of the Chartalist argument (Bill also has a blog on this approach to economics).
This précis follows. I emphasise in closing my own comments that, if there is a genuine recovery not involving rising private debt to GDP levels, then Chartalism is the only theory left standing. Neoclassical economics is dead.
The fundamental principles of modern monetary economics, By Bill Mitchell, Professor of Economics, University of Newcastle
The following discussion outlines the macroeconomic principles underpinning modern monetary theory (sometimes referred to as Chartalism).
The modern monetary system is characterised by a floating exchange rate (so monetary policy is freed from the need to defend foreign exchange reserves) and the monopoly provision of fiat currency. The monopolist is the national government. Most countries now operate monetary systems that have these characteristics.
Under a fiat currency system, the monetary unit defined by the government has no intrinsic worth. It cannot be legally converted by government, for example, into gold as it was under the gold standard. The viability of the fiat currency is ensured by the fact that it is the only unit which is acceptable for payment of taxes and other financial demands of the government.
The analogy that mainstream macroeconomics draws between private household budgets and the national government budget is thus false. Households, the users of the currency, must finance their spending prior to the fact. However, government, as the issuer of the currency, must spend first (credit private bank accounts) before it can subsequently tax (debit private accounts). Government spending is therefore the source of the funds the private sector requires to pay its taxes and to net save, and it is not inherently revenue constrained.
So statements such as “the federal government is spending taxpayers’ funds” are totally inapplicable to operational reality of our monetary system. Taxation acts to withdraw spending power from the private sector but does not provide any extra financial capacity for public spending.
As a matter of national accounting, the federal government deficit (surplus) equals the non-government surplus (deficit). In aggregate, there can be no net savings of financial assets of the non-government sector without cumulative government deficit spending. The federal government via net spending (deficits) is the only entity that can provide the non-government sector with net financial assets (net savings) and thereby simultaneously accommodate any net desire to save and hence eliminate unemployment. Additionally, and contrary to mainstream economic rhetoric, the systematic pursuit of government budget surpluses is necessarily manifested as systematic declines in private sector savings.
We often read that the appropriate fiscal stance is to balance the federal budget over the business cycle. Some economists claim the goals should be to run a surplus on average over the cycle allowing for deficits in extreme downturns. Both goals would be fiscally irresponsible in Australia’s situation where our current account is typically in deficit. If the government balanced the budget on average and the current account deficit was in deficit over the business cycle then the private domestic sector would on average be in deficit (dis-saving) over that cycle. The decreasing levels of net private savings financing the government surplus increasingly leverage the private sector. The deteriorating debt to income ratios which result will eventually see the system succumb to ongoing demand-draining fiscal drag through a slow-down in real activity.
In other words, adopting a growth strategy that relies on increasingly leveraging the private sector is unsustainable. The only way the private domestic sector can save if there is a current account deficit is for the government sector to run deficits up to the desired private saving. Government deficits “finance” private saving by ensuring that aggregate spending is sufficient to generate the level of output and income that will bring forth the private desired saving levels.
Unemployment occurs when net government spending is too low. As a matter of accounting, for aggregate output to be sold, total spending must equal total income (whether actual income generated in production is fully spent or not each period). Involuntary unemployment is idle labour unable to find a buyer at the current money wage. In the absence of government spending, unemployment arises when the private sector, in aggregate, desires to spend less of the monetary unit of account than it earns. Nominal (or real) wage cuts per se do not clear the labour market, unless they somehow eliminate the private sector desire to net save and increase spending. Thus, unemployment occurs when net government spending is too low to accommodate the need to pay taxes and the desire to net save.
How large should the deficit be? To achieve full employment net government spending has to be equal to the non-government desire to net save to ensure there is no aggregate demand gap. Unlike the mainstream rhetoric, insolvency is never an issue with deficits. The only danger with fiscal policy is inflation which would arise if the government pushed nominal spending growth above the real capacity of the economy to absorb it.
If governments are not revenue constrained why do they borrow? We have to differentiate voluntary constraints governments impose on themselves (which reflect ideological dispositions) from the underlying mechanics of the banking system in a fiat monetary system.
In terms of the latter, while the federal government is not financially constrained it still might issue debt to control its liquidity impacts on the private sector. Government spending and purchases of government bonds by the central bank add liquidity, while taxation and sales of government securities drain private liquidity. These transactions influence the cash position of the system on a daily basis and on any one day they can result in a system surplus (deficit) due to the outflow of funds from the official sector being above (below) the funds inflow to the official sector. The system cash position has crucial implications for the central bank, which targets the level of short-term interest rates as its monetary policy position. Budget deficits result in system-wide surpluses (excess bank reserves).
Competition between the commercial banks to create better earning opportunities on the surplus reserves then puts downward pressure on the cash rate (as they try to off-load the excess reserves in the overnight interbank market). So budget deficits actually put downward pressure on short-term interest rates which is contrary to all the claims made by mainstream economics.
If the central bank desires to maintain the current positive target cash rate then it must drain this surplus liquidity by selling government debt. In other words, government debt functions as interest rate support via the maintenance of desired reserve levels in the commercial banking system and not as a source of funds to finance government spending.
However, the central bank could equally just pay the commercial banks the target rate of interest on all overnight reserves which would achieve the same end without the need to issue debt. So there is no intrinsic reason for a sovereign government to borrow to “finance” its net spending.
The reality is, however, that the neo-liberal era has forced the governments to adopt voluntary constraints on its fiscal activity which are tantamount to those that operated during the gold standard period.
So the federal government now issues debt to the private markets via an auction system $-for-$ with net government spending (deficits). This allegedly imposes “fiscal discipline” on the government (it is totally unnecessary from a financial perspective) because the rising debt becomes a political issue. In conclusion, much of the deficit-debt hysteria that defines the current macroeconomic debate is based on false premises about the way the monetary system operates and the financial constraints on government spending.
Modern monetary theory provides a sound basis for understanding the intrinsic opportunities available to governments in a fiat monetary system and exposes most of the constraints that are imposed on the conduct of fiscal policy as being of an ideological origin.
[1] I reject this argument, but again that’s a story for another day.
[2] There is one Neoclassical School that Krugman believes is validated by the success of the stimulus packages, so called New Keynesianism. Yet again I think that’s wrong, and yet again it’s a topic for another day.
[3] This critique by a Spanish academic indicates that Chartalism is disputed within the broad Post Keynesian school of thought; however I should note that some Chartalists regard this critique as a caricature of their views.
PS if you’d like this essay in PDF format, click here.



Bill et al,
I have a feeling that you may have derived the solution for a problem that is about to go away. As western economies age we’ll find the labout market gets increasingly tight as a result of having fewer working age individuals to support larger numbers of non working elderly. Obviously in this case the JG buffer would be pushing on a string and offer no control of the economy.
However under these circumstances I would expect the private sector to exhibit a dis-saving trend, quite likely combined with stagnant or declining real output.
Under these circumstances according to what I have read so far liquidity should be withdrawn via reduction of national debt. However in this case the private sector will already be dis-inclined to invest (at least according to the current paradigm of capital formation), if they see that future output decline is likely. Withdrawing financial assets would make that worse.
What can be said by modern monetary theory (I really don’t know whey you guys don’t abbreviate it MMT…) about the outcome for the natural rate of interest and the best course regarding addition to, maintainance of or reduction of private sector net financial assets in such a tight-labout, declining output scenario?
Goldilocks …
“To say “no worries” here means you accept the idea that infinite debt/GDP is possible.”
I’m not saying “no worries”; nor that infinite debt/GDP is possible, or wise.
Just trying to understand the risk in the debt/GDP level.
Similarly, a lot of Cassandras predicted collapse from the US current account deficit. Where have they gone lately? Maybe they misunderstood the risk.
But you got the point that I deliberately limited the extent of the argument, which is the important one.
JKH
“Similarly, a lot of Cassandras predicted collapse from the US current account deficit. Where have they gone lately? Maybe they misunderstood the risk.”
I think this might be analogous to telling a friend , Joe , that smoking 4 packs of cigarettes a day will surely shorten his life , and Joe says: ” Rubbish ! “. Then , one day , Joe gets flattened by a bus.
At least Joe was right about the cigarettes.
Scepticus,
My comments have been limited very deliberately to just a partial analytical perspective on the debt ratio problem. I listed my earlier suite of comments on this topic in comment 373. RSJ correctly identified the highly restricted limitations of this approach due to the simplification in my examples; but I’m deliberately attempting to isolate the effect of a single variable in an attempt to avoid misinterpretation of that variable alone. That’s not to say there aren’t associations of other problems with that variable, but they are not the same as the variable which is being viewed popularly as a problem on its own.
I have not been attempting to design squid removal architecture; nor have I gone so far as to diagnose a squid removal problem.
But I do think there is a squid problem.
The epicentre of the beast is battalions of financial traders who have a long position in arithmetic and physics envy, and a short position in judgement and adult supervision.
Bill notes in his blog that there is an issue where large numbers of JG peeps are working for the government that governmnet departments will be tempted to swap ‘alpha’ wage public employees for beta wage employess from the JG pool. He notes that this must be prevented by special rules. Could get nasty and political, especially inter-departmentally.
The issue of special rules does seem to be an issue wrt the JG pool. What are to be the rules for dismissal from the JG pool? No threat of sack means no discipline. This could be countered to some extent if there was a way to progress upwards via the JG pool, but that starts turning these people into employees who can compete with alpha wage earners, which is against the grain of what the JG purports to be.
What is the attitude to JG ‘lifers’?
Finally it seems to me that if money is spent paying the JG pool to do work that people can’t ‘buy’ (e.g. landscaping) that will result in inflation in the things that people can buy even thought the economy is operating at full capacity. I don’t have a philosophical problem with this at all, I’m just wondering what the policy implications are.
Goldilocks,
I don’t have a problem with that analogy. On the other hand, it may be something other than the bus that does him in.
Scepticus,
I support use of the MMT designation, and in fact have used it myself – before temporarily succumbing to Chartalist fever.
Scepticus,
Have you worked out the JG arbitrage equation yet? (I think that was you, wasn’t it?)
Some places where what are debating has been discussed in the last few days:
http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk/forum/index.php?showtopic=124644&st=60&start=60
http://www.winterspeak.com/2009/09/its-hard-to-be-bear.html
http://worldofdiscourse.wordpress.com/2009/09/29/a-quick-note-on-stock-valuations/
“Have you worked out the JG arbitrage equation yet?”
Ouch. I don’t think such an equation exists – it’s np complete.
On the squid issue – isn’t it the case that government bonds are embedded in most of these horizontal deriviates? If so, is the current private net saving desire significantly overstated?
Scepticus,
re your comment 375:
“My question is, when as a result of private saving desire declining, and the government reduces its deficit accordingly and _withdraws_ reserves, what implications does this have for the natural (overnight) rate of interest?”
Very good question -
I will not presume to answer on behalf of Bill, Scott, or Warren. But here’s my take:
The natural position of the non government sector will be a cumulative net saving position in the form of excess reserves. The government doesn’t issue debt in the ultimate proposal, and simply leaves the non government net saving position in the form of reserves. No interest is paid on those reserves. The natural rate of interest at zero is thus allowed to prevail.
If the government perceives an inflation threat from pressures on real economy resources, it will manage the deficit down. In an extreme case, it may even run a surplus on a temporary basis. Fiscal policy and monetary policy are completed integrated in this way, by managing the trajectory of the deficit and corresponding reserves as appropriate.
But the cyclical reduction in the deficit will not be great enough to turn the cumulative net saving position negative – so there will still be excess reserves in the system, paying zero interest, and anchoring the risk free rate at zero, at all times, regardless of where we are in the cycle.
Thus, policy is not managed through interest rates, but through fiscal adjustment and its effective on aggregate demand.
I think that’s right, but perhaps Bill or Scott will refine/correct it.
“Ah yes, the classic line that underpins the entire libertarian way of thinking. Hardly surprising that such sentiments have arisen during a period unprecedented prosperity, growth, cheap resources, cheap foreign labour etc etc, that has dulled the senses of two generations to the operational reality of our civilisation.”
I started my working life in the early 70′s. It wasnt pretty I assure you. You seem to be referring to more recent episodes of prosperity.Like many post Boomers, maybe you don’t realise that these things actually do move in cycles where the ground work for the more recent prosperity was put in by the hard yards of the 70′s and early-mid eiighties. Don’t be so naive scepticus to believe that meaningful changes in general prosperity can be accomplished with a simple economic theory of unlimited printing of money combined with taxpayer funded JG schemes. It actually takes takes many years of dogged toil, saving and sacrifice for the average person to gain a comfortable financial position, something I see is lost on some X and Yers. And you can be very certain those that have won’t be keeping any Govt who plans to rob them of that. No matter how enticing their economic theories may be.
“The government doesn’t issue debt in the ultimate proposal, and simply leaves the non government net saving position in the form of reserves.”
I suggested earlier in the discussion that M0 represents the sum of private net saving and got quickly shot down by you.
Are you retracting?
“I started my working life in the early 70’s. It wasnt pretty I assure you.”
I’m sure it wasn’t, however the fact remains that since the end of WWII we’ve enjoyed over the long term a period of sustained improvement in most things, mostly IMO as a result of the demographic boom of which you were a part.
My point was that to expect this trajectory to continue in the face of an aging society and huge global imbalances exacerbated by the relatively new interconnectedness of everything now is a bad case of confirmation bias that has not justification.
As you say, things move in cycles and I’m sure you’d agree we are due for another 20 years down. Forgive us younger generations for thinking we might try and have a go at fixing up the horrible mess we find that our politicians and bankers have left us in, pretty much none of whom are anywhere near my generational cohort.
Scepticus,
“Horizontal deriviates” sounds like it has something to do with Afghanistan.
Government bonds can be useful in hedging directional interest rate risk on various types of exposure. But bank and dealer holdings of US Treasury debt are very small in context – several hundred billion or so.
The largest holder of US Treasury debt is the foreign sector at around $ 3.5 trillion – nearly half the outstandings.
“I suggested earlier in the discussion that M0 represents the sum of private net saving and got quickly shot down by you.”
We’re speaking of a proposal here, not the current system.
Please point me to where I shot you down on that front and I’ll retract if necessary.
Superpoincare
Thanks for the links to “The natural rate of interest is zero!”
All I can say is HOLYSHIT
Bill Mitchell’s ideas are a tad radical; this is not a criticism. Bill is saying that with enough deficit spending enough excess reserves will result leading to a zero % cash rate. The following quotes from the articles sums it up (I hope that I have not taken them out of context):
“Our preferred position is a natural rate of zero and no bond sales. Then allow fiscal policy to make all the adjustments. It is much cleaner that way.”
“What will happen though is that the rate it lends to banks and its target interest rate will be affected. The central bank has to offer whatever reserves are demanded by the commercial banks if it wants to maintain control over these two rates. Further, by making this offer the interbank market would disappear…”
From post made by blog members and my own reasoning the implications are:
- No need for a bond market
- No need for a discount window
- No need for open market operations
- No reserve requirements
- No collateral needed if regulator doing its job
- No need for open market operations
I love it Professor Mitchell as we are so close to saying ‘No need for a central bank’. In all honesty good luck with it and I’m sure many will be looking out for the follow-up article on how to stop asset bubbles even though lending rate wont be zero.
scep: “Anything not re-lent by the private sector becomes M0, a state liability.”
JKH: “I think it’s accurate to say that statements like this have no place in Chartalism; it’s certainly accurate to say they have no place in financial accounting.”
I think my statement above equates to saying that M0=private saving.
OK, the current system is M0+bonds. But my initial intuition was correct?
What number comment, please?
Aac, it makes perfect sense to me the risk free rate is zero. Why should you make a return on capital without taking risk?
This also implies to me FDIC should be abolished for any account earning > 0%.
Asset bubbles can be prevented by making sure private underwriting standards are upheld. No loans for consumption, unless borrower is AAA and has significant collateral.
Many folks blame low rates for the bubble. It wasn’t low rates, it was 125% loans, liar loans, option-ARM, etc etc etc.
Historically, demand for money has been only weakly linked to interest rates. Interest rates got down as low as 2% as long as two centuries ago or more.
JKH: #61, page [2]
I’m not looking to score points, just make sure I have an understanding of what your reasoning was.
“‘No need for a central bank’.”
Not quite, a clearing function is still needed. But yeah, much diminished. Bill advocates the triumph of fiscal over monetary policy. However I expect the central bank math wonks will simply migrate to the treasury to determine what the JG wage should be.
There would still be a need to estimate future inflation.
Further, while we might dislike central bankers, the idea of a cabal of politicans of uncertain educational background elected on personality and vague promises determining what the level of reserves should be leaves me a little cold.
Trouble is, as soon as one accepts any basic premises of chartalism, then the job is to redesign the entire political economy accordingly.
Scepticus,
That seems to have been a complicated exchange involving you, Scott, myself, and Steve.
Also, I specifically linked your comment to a variation on Steve’s model, and I don’t recall that precise connection at this moment.
In any event, we have to distinguish between Chartalism as applied to the existing monetary architecture, and Chartalism as applied through what I referred to as the “ultimate” proposal, favored I believe by people such as Bill, Scott, and Warren, regarding the zero natural rate. That proposal is very different from the current architecture.
I perceived in my mind that we were speaking of the current architecture in that earlier exchange. The financial instruments that reflect the evidence of net non government saving in that context are bank reserves, currency, and government debt.
The “ultimate” proposal eliminates the issuance of government debt and leaves that portion of net saving in the form of bank reserves as well.
I hope that clarifies it.
Looking at my comment that you cited, it has the appearance of me jumping on your comment unnecessarily. As I can’t recall the exact train of thought I had in mind, let me apologize now if you found that unnecessarily offensive at the time, because there was no need on my part to be so.
I gotta go …
Regards,
JKH
Further to my gov bonds in horizontal derivative debt instruments question, it seems that if large amount of the national debt are tied up as derivatives, that if unwound, this horizontal credit trade would require that all these bonds be bought back by the government, which would inject a huge amount of liquidity into the system.
I wonder, is this what elliotwave was banging on about?