Steve Keen’s DebtWatch No 23 June 2008
RBA Assistant Governor Guy Debelle and I spoke at a conference on Subprimes in Adelaide last month. One aspect of my analysis that Guy queried was my emphasis upon the Debt to GDP ratio. He noted that this appeared suspect, because it was comparing a stock (the outstanding level of debt) to a flow (annual GDP).
It’s a valid point to make. The engineer-turned-economist Mickal Kalecki once caustically observed that “economics is the science of confusing stocks with flows”, and I’m a stickler myself for not making that mistake. So making a song and dance about a stock to flow comparison like debt to GDP has to be justified by a sound argument.
The most accessible argument is an analogy to global warming. Just as the growing level of C02 in the atmosphere is evidence that the ecosystem is not coping with the (relatively tiny) additional volume of carbon dioxide human activity is adding to the biosphere, the accumulation of debt relative to income is evidence that the economy is not coping with the (relatively large) volume of debt being generated by the financial system to finance speculative purchases of assets.
There are at least five strong similarities between this ecological issue and the economic one of accumulating debt:
- The environment has an established “carbon cycle”, by which the emission of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere by animals, etc., is balanced by its re-absorbtion by plants, etc. This process is augmented by many other factors–such as the explusion of CO2 by volcanoes–and, on a geological time frame, far from stable; but over the period of human existence, the atmospheric concentration was below 300 parts per million (ppm) until industrialisation began.
- The fact that the concentration has risen from under 300 ppm to over 380 ppm in the past century shows that the planet’s natural carbon-processing cycle is not coping with the extra CO2 added by human industrial and agricultural activity. Global Warming is the most apparent manifestation of this increased stock of CO2.
- Even if all human industrial and agricultural activity stopped today, it would take decades for the additional CO2 we have added to the atmosphere to decline to pre-industrial levels. At present, the existing natural carbon cycle is only means to reduce that accumulation, and it could take longer to reduce the build up than it took to accumulate it, since we have damaged many of the natural “carbon sinks” in the ecosystem.
- Persisting with present or higher levels of CO2 will cause the ecosystem to undergo both profound and uncertain change, some aspects of which can be inferred from past geological data.
- There are feedback effects that mean any climate-altering effects of raised CO2 levels may be further amplified. For instance, the rise in temperature has reduced the area of ice in the North Pole, leading to reduced reflection of sunlight (since ice reflects most light while water mostly absorbs it), and further increasing global temperatures.
Similar propositions can be put with respect to debt:
- The economy has a natural capacity to process debt. Borrowing by businesses to finance investment can lead to new products whose sale enables the businesses to make a profit and repay debt over time (Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development gives perhaps the best explanation of this “natural debt cycle”);
- The fact that debt levels are rising with respect to income is a sign that the economic system is not coping with the level of debt being generated today;
- Even if all borrowing stopped today, it would take decades for the additional debt we have accumulated to be reduced to pre-debt bubble levels. The only way that debt levels can be reduced is if income is redirected from either consumption or investment into debt reduction. This is the key reason that the debt to GDP ratio is important: it tells us how much of income would be needed to reduce debt, and how long such a reduction would take. However the process of reducing debt will itself reduce income to some degree, since money that would otherwise have gone into investment will now simply be used to pay down debt levels–and incomes and employment will fall as a result;
- Persisting with the level of debt we have now will mean a profoundly different and uncertain economic environment. The proportion of income needed to service debt will remain at levels that have only ever been experienced in the past during Depressions.
- Finally, there are feedback effects in the economy that can mean debt to GDP ratios fall even when, ultimately, borrowers try to reduce their exposure to debt. The worst such effects are: direct reductions in investment as retained earnings are used to pay down debt rather than invest; indirect falls in investment as falls in consumption reduce cash flow and depress both earnings and expectations; and falling prices if deflation sets in, as it did during the Great Depression when prices fell as much as 10% per year.
There is also an academic economic argument that can be made about the importance of the debt to GDP ratio, deriving from Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”. In this theory, a rising ratio is both a prediction of the model, and a force leading to greater financial instability and possible economic breakdown in a Depression. But I’ll leave a full discussion of this for a future Debtwatch.
Observations on the Data
The most recent data imply that the turnaround in debt to GDP may finally be starting. The debt to GDP ratio fell last month, from 165.25% of GDP to 165.2%. It’s not a lot, and it may still return to its 44-year long upward trend; but it is the first time in fifteen years that the ratio has fallen.
The contributor was an “unexpected” fall in the rate of growth of business borrowing (these things always seem to be “unexpected”). Though it still increased, it grew at a slower pace than GDP–as did personal borrowing. The grwoth in mortgage debt, on the other hand, continued to outstrip GDP (see Tables 1 and 2 below for details).
While in one sense this slowing down in debt growth is a good thing–in that an unsustainable trend may finally be coming to an end–it also may presage very tough economic times ahead. One aspect of my focus on the debt to GDP ratio is the contribution that change in debt then makes to aggregate spending. Aggregate demand in the economy, for everything from commodities to net asset transfers, is the sum of both income (GDP) plus the change in debt.
In a well functioning economy, that shouldn’t be much relative to GDP itself–and it wasn’t in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, the annual change in debt contributed no more than 4% of total demand.
But as the debt level rises, the change in debt can become an extremely large and volatile component of aggregate spending. That clearly is what happened from 1970 onwards: the annual change in debt began to contribute substantially more than 4% of total demand.
And it was highly volatile: notice the slump in its contribution from over 10% to just 4% in 1973-75 that coincided with the collapse of the Whitlam Government, and the fall from a peak of almost 14% of aggregate demand to minus 1.5% during “the recession we had to have”.
Today, the annual change in debt is the source of over 19% of aggregate demand. Should that turn around–as it must even to stabilise the debt to ratio at its current historically unprecedented level–then demand in the economy could “unexpectedly” evaporate.
The full Debtwatch Report, with all the graphics, is available in PDF format here.






June 2nd, 2008 at 4:01 pm
Another thought-provoking article, indeed. I was under the impression that the only likely way out was to default or via inflation. A soft landing would be nice, but the prospect of 44 years of belt tightening doesn’t sound that great!
Can I ask how to interpret the data tables you publish, which are quite unlike any others I’ve seen, and where you get your source data?
June 2nd, 2008 at 7:36 pm
As a physicist I find your use of the Debt to GDP ratio quite valid.
Doing what is known as a standard dimensional analysis on this ratio you will find it to have the dimensions of time:
Debt/GDP = $/($/time) = time
Specifically the way you have defined your ratio it has units of YEARS.
So the ratio that you have defined and expressed in a form such as “Debt is 165% of GDP” could be expressed alternatively as “Debt/GDP=1.65 years”. Strictly speaking the vertical axes on your graphs should carry the annotation “YEARS” otherwise it might give the impression to an RBA Assistant Governor that you think your ratio is dimensionless.
There is nothing invalid about what you have done and so long as you are aware of what your ratio means and you use it correctly (by being careful not to make the mistake of equating, adding or subtracting apples from oranges) then such a ratio can be very useful indeed. I have not seen you fall into this trap in anything of yours that I have read.
Many people in the financial game, however, are naive in that they do violate these dimensional rules and consequently end up with nonsense. Because it occurs quite often I am always on the lookout for it. I am sure that this is what Mickal Kalecki was referring to.
On a personal level your ratio is directly analogous to the ratio of the size of house mortgage to family income. I would doubt that even an RBA Assistant Governor would claim that such a ratio had no value.
June 2nd, 2008 at 11:00 pm
That’s a fabulously helpful interpretation Bernie, thanks very much for it. I have that related observation bolded in the PDF version of this blog:
“The only way that debt levels can be reduced is if income is redirected from either consumption or investment into debt
reduction. This is the key reason that the debt to GDP ratio is important: it tells us how much of income would be needed to reduce debt, and how long such a reduction would take.”
You’ve now given a precise meaning to that, which I will take advantage of in future.
June 3rd, 2008 at 1:14 pm
First, to avoid any confusion my surname is NOT Debelle.
If Mr Debelle insists on comparing flows, would it be possible to look at the movement of Debt servicing costs as a proportion of GDP over time?
The credit bubble has been caused in part, it seems, by interest rates being too low over a number of years. This will have served to help keep down the ratio of debt servicing costs to GDP. The recent interest rate increases will have increased the ratio significantly.
June 3rd, 2008 at 3:19 pm
Hi Steve,
I want to ask an economic ignoramus question: why does inflation matter? Money is just, as Douglas Adams put it, “small green pieces of paper”; why is driving up unemployment seen as a worthwhile thing to do to reduce the number of small green pieces of paper in circulation? Whose interests does inflation hurt that matter than higher unemployment, stagnant demand, etc? (For that matter, wouldn’t inflation drive down the value of the Aussie dollar, make it easier to pay our domestic debts and make our exports more competitive?)
June 3rd, 2008 at 9:42 pm
One way of looking at debt is in terms of compartmental models, as used in biology and pharmacokinetics. Stocks are important as they generate the flows, and in many cases like debt the flows are rate limited. The GDP basically limits the rate at which debt can disappear.
Maybe someone from the RBA would like to show that stocks don’t have consequences by drinking a 6 pack quickly, always an interesting experiment in pharmacokinetics or for engineers simple process kinetics. Then compare the effects to drinking same one beer per day over a week.
June 6th, 2008 at 9:28 am
Another good analytic perspective from another discipline Ken–that’s implicitly how I perceive it too, but getting through its importance to economists will always be difficult.
But maybe I should try the sixpack of beer as a stage experiment next time I’m on podium with a conventional economist!
June 6th, 2008 at 9:42 am
Dear James,
It’s a good question, not an ignoramus one. Inflation does undoubtedly have distributional effects, but the mileau in which it is experienced determines whether these are seen as bad or not.
In the post-World War II environment, when the world had been precipitated into that conflict by the Great Depression, policymakers were easily persuaded that inflation was a minor problem: if guaranteeing higher employment meant higher inflation as a by-product, so be it.
However we then went through a period of roughly 20 years of relatively low inflation AND low unemployment–and the memories of the Great Depression receded.
When the next outbreak of inflation occurred, it coincided with an increase in unemployment–and economists of conservative persuasion (most notably Milton Friedman) dreamed up theories to “explain” this twin phenomenon. Since both occurred at once, arguing that high inflation prevented high unemployment looked rather limp.
The horror scenario put forward then was of ever-increasing inflation: keep it up and we’ll return to the Wiemar (I hope I got the spelling right there!) Republic days of hyper-inflation–like that which Zimbabwe is in right now–of 100,000% inflation per year.
That, clearly, is a horror; but it was not the path we were on in the 1970s, as inflation peaked at around 17% p.a. (below the maximum recorded in the Korean War Boom).
The theoretical and policy product of that period nonetheless was a resurgence of the neoclassical perspective on the economy–that it was self-equilibrating, and attempts by government to manipulate it would fail to move “real” variables like unemployment, and only cause inflation.
In that guise too, the taming of inflation became the “one trick pony” of the economics profession: we had the Vockler squeeze that drove real interest rates sky high, and inflation was driven out of the system (at the cost of a prolonged recession, especially in the UK where similar policies were followed rigorously by the Thatcher Government).
Then the many post-80s booms began; booms and busts with peaks in unemployment heading higher, but lows in unemployment heading lower. Finally this long boom began in the mid 90s, and economists could bask in the reflected glory of what appeared to be a new benign confluence of low unemployment and low inflation. This showed, of course, that their mantra worked: “keep inflation low” at all costs, and the real economy will take care of itself by converging to equilibrium.
So that’s a long-winded explanation of why inflation is seen as a bad thing–in addition to the actual bad effects of discouraging savings by devaluing cash holdings, etc. (there is a comment on cash and inflation that I have to respond to by a new member), etc.
Of course, from my debt-dynamics perspective, this long boom was the product of a borrowing binge, and the 1970s confluence of high inflation and high unemployment was due to the bursting of a debt bubble back then–which is clearly apparent in my Debt/GDP graph.
June 6th, 2008 at 2:53 pm
I use a very simple ratio of stock to flows every day – the money I pay the bank on my borrowings relative to the size of my loan. I call it the “interest rate”…
June 16th, 2008 at 3:52 pm
Thanks for another thought provoking blog Steve. And to the folks above for helping make sense of it all.
I’m curious, where you wrote “there are feedback effects in the economy that can mean debt to GDP ratios fall even when, ultimately, borrowers try to reduce their exposure to debt”, did you mean that the ratio RISES from the feedback effects (as GDP falls faster as a result of repayment/default/capital allocation even while outstanding debt is reduced)? Or have I misunderstood?
Some readers may be interested in a new site (still in its infancy) at http://bubblepedia.net.au – I’m sure discussions involving the debt bubble will become central to questions raised there.
regards, F.
June 18th, 2008 at 11:12 am
Hi Steve,
I wanted to post this on your ‘about’ page but I seem unable to comment there. I’m not sure if I understand the fundamentals and I wanted to clarify it, I think this article is an appropriate place.
Traditionally inflation referred to the money supply, and meant an increase in the money supply, when now it might mean ‘rising prices’ and not retain its monetarism roots. If an argument was made that a sudden doubling of prices and wages across the entire economy occurred, and that it would change ‘nothing’ – then we haven’t taken into consideration debt (and perhaps also savings).
The problem with debt, is that the arrangement to pay it back was made before the event which doubled prices and wages. So if you are a creditor (like a bank) suddenly you are facing the prospects of having your loans repaid with devalued dollars. Or if you are a first home buyer with a mortgage you might jump for joy if you’re on a fixed interest rate loan!
The level of debt being treated as a stock (constant) and the amount of money in circulation as a flow (not constant). Or interest rates as a flow?
This is the ‘soft landing’ scenario if the government drives up inflation and wages, it just has to be controlled so that it doesn’t end up as hyperinflation.
If however interest rates and inflation are kept low, then to service the debt, because peoples wages are not rising, the money being used to service the loans is not in circulation (or we view it as the additional credit which was circulating dissappears), and suddenly a huge amount of aggregate spending dissappears, and this is the start of a debt deflationary spiral.
In either case, debt is really a ‘ceiling’ in a stable economic environment because debt cannot outstrip wages – so very high debt levels indicate that the economic environment is about to change.
Is that the general idea of why stocks and flows are important and why debt is ‘carbon dioxide’?
June 21st, 2008 at 7:30 am
Hi foundation,
Yes. The ratio rises–as it clearly did in the US case, from 150% of GDP at the end of 1929 to 215% by mid-1932. During that time nominal debt would have fallen slightly, but real GDP and prices fell much more. Hence the ratio blew out. This I term Fisher’s Paradox; to quote him “The more debtors pay, the more they owe”.
Of course, there’s ultimately a turning point–or an extraneous event that rights the system, such as the New Deal. Or the Second World War…