It’s not yet the main topic of debate between Liberal and Labor, but some of the arguments in Debtwatch have at least made their way into Hansard courtesy of a speech by Laurie Ferguson. The full extract from the speech is shown below.
“This makes a mockery of the claim by the Prime Minister that we have never been better off. Whilst the Howard government crows about the success in the economy, which was largely inherited from Labor and fuelled by the raw materials demands of India and China, there is an alternative reality of an out-of-control personal debt spiral. Steve Keen from the University of Western Sydney writes:
Australia’s household debt to GDP ratio has risen from 57 per cent of GDP in 2001 to over 86 per cent in 2005 or five fold from the mid 1970s. With the exception of a dip in 1985-87 period, when the Stock Market was the focus of a speculative frenzy in Australia, the housing debt to GDP ratio has been rising exponentially for at least 25 years. The focus of RBA concern today is therefore on borrowing by households.
Australian household debt was five and a half times higher in 2005 than it was in 1990. The American growth rate of eight per cent translates into 3.2 times as much household debt in 2005 as in 1990.
So we see that the situation of Australia has markedly worsened as compared with the United States. Furthermore, whereas in the US debt weighs heavily on households and businesses, in Australia the pressure of debt is being exerted predominantly on households. A potent indicator of the level of financial stress now being felt by Australian households is a ratio to household disposable after-tax income. This ratio has more than tripled since 1981. The explanation that this is due to falling interest rates ceased being viable about two years ago.
The rise in debt has eclipsed the impact of generally lower interest rates since the early 1990s so that payments by households now consume more of household disposable income than they did when standard home loan rates peeked at 17 per cent in 1989, even though the average variable rate is now 7.5 per cent.
Since its election, the Howard government has presided over an almost threefold increase in personal household debt. The total personal debt in Australia has increased from about $46 billion in January 1996 to a staggering $133 billion in November 2006. The Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia reports that the December 2006 quarter saw a blow-out in bankruptcy numbers in all states except Western Australia.
This includes a 30 per cent increase on the corresponding 2005-06 period in New South Wales and almost 28 per cent in Victoria. Steve Keen’s analysis of rising personal household debt is underpinned by AFFCRA’s analysis showing that widespread use of credit cards for household and discretionary spending, driven by aggressive industry selling practices, has led to unhealthy financial thinking where card facilities are considered in the context of available credit rather than actual debt liability. Jan Pentland writes:
In the current consumerist hegemony and the increasing gap between the haves and have nots, where material goods can define self worth, easily available credit has been a trap for many clients of financial counsellors. This budget clearly fails Australian consumers. The government’s priorities are twisted. The government is pouring millions of dollars into financial literacy campaigns when it is clear industry is already doing so. Where money is scarce it should be directed where it is most urgently needed. Financial counsellors are being increasingly called upon to deliver services to gradually more desperate Australian consumers. These and many millions of other Australian consumers need financial counselling around keeping out of debt. They do not need counselling on how to get rich.”






May 31st, 2007 at 11:21 am
Congratulations Steve, I guess a mention in Hansard has as good as immortalised Debtwatch as it will remain until the collapse of civilisation!
More seriously, it is good to see somebody finally making a well-structured attack of the government’s claims of good economic management. I’d be curious to know what Mr. Ferguson proposes should be done about the situation. If Labor win the election, we’re still faced with the same two potential future possibilities: (1) That household debt continues to climb unsustainably (for a time, then slows causing (2)), (2) That house prices collapse in dramatic fashion.
It is too late now to turn back the clock and stop the house price boom from occurring. This boom turned $1 trillion worth of homes into $3 trillion worth of homes over just one decade. That $2 trillion increase is roughly double the entire value of the Australian sharemarket!* Up to this point it seems to have been accepted – that house prices were just ‘doing their thing’, rising as they always have. That those who bought (myself included) earned this extra wealth although we didn’t raise a finger to gain it. That it’s normal for houses to ‘create wealth’.
Unfortunately, now it’s finally sinking in that the housing boom hasn’t created wealth at all. It’s merely transferred wealth from future buyers to current owners. The future buyers have to (over time) pony up that $2 trillion dollars, or house prices will collapse. If they are to manage to pay, it will only be through a continuation of the current trend in debt accumulation.
If we look at Australia as a single entity, and as housing as a single asset that has a single price it makes no sense to celebrate a price boom. Where is the gain in adding $2 trillion in to the price of this housing asset if this price can only be met with $2 trillion of extra debt? The net gain from a house price boom that is entirely funded by debt is zero, zip, zilch, while the cost to households and the economy is high, as the increased interest payments reduce (post-mortgage) disposable income and consumption.
If Mr. Ferguson thinks things are bad today, he needs to realise that we’ve only paid for a very small portion of the recent boom. In December 1996, the value of all housing assets in Australia was $1.07 trillion, and housing debt was at $192 billion. Ten years later, the value of all housing assets was $3.14 trillion and housing debt was at $827 billion. Housing debt rose by $103 billion during 2006 alone enabling some 5% of houses to be bought and sold. And therein lies the rub.
The fact that only a small proportion of houses are turned over each year means that after the boom, debt levels will continue to rise each and every year for many years. The boom creates nothing but pain, pain that is drip-fed to households in increasing quantities for ten or fifteen years depending on how quickly their wages manage to counterbalance the rising debt.
Okay so I’m rambling, but the blog has been a bit quiet lately so I guess I can hog it! Here’s my point: House price booms are bad, okay? And if Labor want to do something to help households, the very best thing they can do is to encourage runaway inflation which would reduce the real cost of debt. The second best thing would be to stop looking at ‘solutions’ that add to the demand side of the balance (stamp duty cuts/exemption/FHOG/shared equity loans/etc). To solve the affordability crisis and stop people from continuing to over-accumulate debt you want LESS people who are able to buy at current prices, NOT MORE.
If less people are unable to afford stupidly high prices, prices will fall and affordability will be rebalanced. People will take on less debt and the country will be better off for it! Better still, force banks to stop lending people stupid amounts of money. Limit total debts to 3x household income. Would this stop people buying houses? No, it would simply prevent people buying houses at stupidly high prices using stupidly high mortgages. House prices would fall to a level where people could afford to buy with a mortgage of just 3x household income.
Mr Ferguson, if you or other ALP people are reading this, you need to realise you’ve dropped the ball on this one. The government’s failure to control this debt bubble should be a huge issue for you. It’s not too late to start letting the public know that they’ve been duped over this, that debt is causing harm and will continue to cause further and worse harm in future. It’s in your interests to get this information out before the election, just in case you win. Otherwise when the full force of LIB’s failure is felt (ie when the next recession inevitably occurs), you might end up getting all the blame… again!
* Clearly, houses are the most productive things we have, moreso than businesses, factories, mines or workers. Sure they don’t appear to be productive; they don’t afterall make any products, but they produce money faster and with far less (in fact, without) effort than a business, factory, mine or worker could. /sarcasm off
May 31st, 2007 at 1:07 pm
When you think of it, we have all been fools, we’ve bought some pretty crazy stories:
If we all borrow money from overseas to bid up the price of domestic real estate we’ll all get rich.
It makes perfect sense that sitting inside a pile of bricks and being provided with shelter should EARN you money. As foundation says, more than everyone going out and working! This is reasonable and will continue on forever!
We’re facing challenges like global warming, peak oil, an inverted social pyramid with the babyboomers retiring – and before we’ve even started to face them, we’re starting out with the highest ever debt burden in the countries history. Not only have we made, as a society, a terrible mis allocation of wealth, but we’ve put ourselves behind the 8 ball before we’ve even started.
May 31st, 2007 at 11:15 pm
Well, I’m a lumberjack and I’m OK.
The great thing about Awstralyan households getting up to the the teeth in debt has been catching the money they blow and socking it away.
June 1st, 2007 at 8:36 am
Without meaning to pry, how do we catch it? Surely there’s only so many lumberjacks required to cut down trees for construction?
June 1st, 2007 at 11:16 am
The source of the problem has been the combination of speculative opportunities/incentives and easy money (loose credit). Even if things improved such that housing became affordable again and debt levels reduced to safe levels, the whole cycle would likely repeat again without addressing those two causes.
On the credit side, there is nothing wrong with obtaining credit to purchase now and pay over time if it is “worth it” (and the borrower can afford it), indeed the economy would not function without this facility. So without restricting credit, we need to address speculative incentives.
I have mentioned elsewhere on this blog the strong (technical) argument for high ‘land tax’ to address this (as well at the ethical arguments foundation alludes to regarding the windfall gains currently obtained by landholders from house price appreciation). A major advantage of land tax (in terms of avoiding asset bubbles) would be its systemic effect on dis-incentivising property speculation.
June 1st, 2007 at 11:32 pm
Brief comments because I’m at a conference in Salt Lake City today and active in all 3 sessions (chairing one and presenting papers in two).
Foundation, I think your analysis of the house bubble/debt link is spot on, and some time this year I’ll attempt to include a similar mechanism to that into my Minsky model–the rapid development of which is my main sabbatical leave project (I may make the trip down to Melbourne to brainstorm with you on this one).
Effectively, my current model underestimates debt accumulation because in it, all borrowing for investment leads to an expansion in productive assets. As you put it however (minus the sarcasm!), borrowing for “investment” in housing doesn’t add to productive capacity–it just adds to debt levels.
I’d better go–I have two hours before I’m chairing a session!
June 5th, 2007 at 12:34 pm
Foundation,
Are you serious about solving the debt issue with inflation???
Who would pay for this? Wouldn’t people with debt (myself included) be benefitting from the purchasing power lost by people who do not have debt?
If we do increase inflation, is the rational response to just borrow more?
Be gentle with me I am only new to this…
June 6th, 2007 at 2:21 am
Speaking for Foundation -:)), yes he is, and so am I. The root problem is that, using debt, asset prices have been pushed far higher than can be sustained by the cash flows from real economic activity. Policy-generated inflation would redress the balance, by driving goods prices up while keeping asset prices where they are.
However, this policy is highly unlikely to be followed in practice. We are therefore likely to follow the alternative route–asset prices falling. However, this normally has the knock-on effect of depressing goods prices–deflation. In this world, you are chasing your own tail to the bottom.
That is a lot more painful for everyone than the alternative.
However, because economists are so paranoid about consumer price inflation, while being simultaneously sanguine about asset price inflation, they will fight tooth and nail to stop a policy of deliberate inflation. So if we fall into a debt trap, we are likely to repeat Japan’s experience of a long drawn out depression.
June 7th, 2007 at 11:34 pm
There is little or nothing a democratic government can do to stop determined adult citizens from consigning their future income to mort-gage payments.
What are the citizens to do but play the markets and sell services and imports to each other when manufacturing can not compete with imports and export industries of mining and agriculture are capital intensive and labour non-intensive?
Turning a blind eye and keeping hush to the rapid creation non-cash money by monetizing assets, through creation of debt and credit over those assets, the created money being used to monetize more assets, keeps the citizenry happily employed in record numbers.
June 11th, 2007 at 1:19 am
Generally, we agree with Steve Keen’s view on Australia’s precarious debt deflation position (see our view: Can Australia’s deflating property bubble deflate even further?
But now that our property prices is already inflated, how do we deflate the property bubble? We have an idea, but we don’t know whether it will work:
1. First, remove all negative gearing loophole.
2. Next, for every property transaction that involves a non-first home owner (i.e. investor) as a buyer, impose a purchase tax on the buyer which is a certain percentage of the price of the property being transacted. Also, increase the government stamp duty, and fees for buyers who are investors.
3. For all sellers of property, scrap all government stamp duty, taxes and fees with regards to the property transaction.
But we disagree with Steve Keen on:
How is it possible to engineer an inflation whereby only goods prices rises and asset price remain stagnant? Any policy of deliberate inflation runs the risk of misfiring and thereby further inflating asset prices.
June 11th, 2007 at 3:25 am
Welcome aboard Contrarian.
It would be possible by increasing wages.
Of course, in practice, that is highly unlikely to happen, given the attitude of conventional economists to both inflation, and wages. I’d give the odds of this actually being tried by policy makers as zero.
However, I flag it as a possible remedy because what they are far more likely to propose is something that would make the situation worse: reducing wages. This was of course attempted as a “cure” during the Great Depression–a 10% across the board cut in wages. And Australia was even more mired in Depression afterwards.
From the point of view of neoclassical economics, unemployment–one, but far from the only, symptom of a debt deflation–can be cured by cutting REAL wages. As Keynes argued against this policy, cutting MONEY wages won’t necessarily cause real wages to fall, because the cut in wages will be passed on (in the environment of a Depression) to a fall in prices, leaving real wages at much the same level.
Though I disagree with Keynes about part of the following (causing inflation by “increasing the quantity of money”), I think he puts the dangers in reducing money wages well:
“The method of increasing the quantity of money in terms of wage-units by decreasing the wage-unit increases proportionately the burden of debt;
whereas the method of producing the same result by increasing the quantity of money whilst leaving the wage-unit unchanged has the opposite effect. Having regard to the excessive burden of many types of debt, it can only be an inexperienced person who would prefer the former.†(1936: 268-69)
His comment about “inexperienced person” I read as a jibe at his conventional economic rivals.
So partly, I’m proposing deliberate wage inflation as a potential cure, because I don’t want to see the descendants of Keynes’s rivals in the 1930s–who now dominate economic policy once again–getting away with the same stupidity a second time.
As for your suggestions, they would work to delay getting into a Depression; once in one though, they would have little effect (very few people would be buying assets at the time in any case).
Ultimately, the only way to prevent what seems an inexorable trend towards a debt crisis, is to make structural changes that, as near as possible, eliminate the belief that the road to riches is via speculation in the secondary market on assets. Your proposals are directed at that end,but they’re the sort of reform that market fundamentalists would aim to abolish when the crisis was over.
June 11th, 2007 at 12:47 pm
@ Steve Keen
One question: how would that be done in practice?
Say, we increase wages by decree without a accompanying monetary inflation (i.e. increase in the quantity of money). It will lead to mass unemployment, which in turn will hasten deflation that is led by mass debt defaults (see the 2nd last paragraph of our article: Can Australia’s deflating property bubble deflate even further?).
Say, we increase wages through monetary inflation. We would agree with you that the first round of impact will be on consumer prices. But this is highly risky. Firstly, with this measure, businesses will know in advance that their wage cost will increase. Therefore, they will respond by increasing prices perhaps even beforehand. Politically, once you increase wages once that way, the mob will demand more increase in wages to ‘combat’ the increase in prices. This runs the risk of an upward spiral of general price level. In Murray Rothbard’s (an Austrian economist from the Mises Institute) excellent book: What Has Government Done to Our Money? (page 31-32), it mentioned that
In my humble opinion, I believe your opinion (that is if I understand it correctly as increasing wages by decree with monetary inflation) may run the risk of losing control, resulting in hyper-inflation.
June 11th, 2007 at 1:00 pm
Dear Contrarian,
Here we part company on our analysis of monetary dynamics and the causes of inflation. We could debate from one theoretical perspective (Austrian) to another (Post Keynesian, Circuitist), but my experience of such debates is that they convince neither side. Therefore I suggest you take a look at the following paper, written by two economists with impeccable conservative neoclassical credentials (ie, a Nobel Prize) on the actual dynamics of monetary creation in the USA. They conclude that credit money creation precedes fiat money creation:
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/common/pub_detail.cfm?pb_autonum_id=225
Hyper-inflation is indeed an economic disease in its own right–I’d never deny that–but in the context of deflation, inflation can be desirable. That was Japan’s position for the 15 years it was in a debt deflation recently, and conventional means to cause inflation (“printing money”) failed abjectly–which indicates amongst other things that the conventional theories, like the one you propose above, are not correct.
Please remember that I think a wage-increase-by-decree policy has zero chance of being implemented–whether I think it might work or not. But I simply want to propose it because I expect the opposite policy will be pushed if a debt deflation actually ensues–and that would be an unmitigated disaster.
I’m sorry that this is a rather tangential reply to your post, but I’m busy with other work at the moment, and the difference in our philosophies on this point is rather too extreme to make sensible debate on a blog feasible. However I suggest that if you’d like to know where I’m coming from on some of my analysis on this point, you search out articles on Hyman Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis”–some of which I have linked from this blog, and from my website http://www.debunkingeconomics.com.
June 11th, 2007 at 3:14 pm
Hi Steve!
I agree that the philosophical base of our schools of economic thoughts (mine is Austrian School) are different. So, there is no point in furthering the debate.
Just a clarification on my view regarding the Japan example that you gave. My belief is that (and I’m aware you may not share my belief) Japan’s deflation was caused by credit contraction that was caused by the collapse of asset prices. Therefore, I would not advocate monetary inflation as a cure because all that would do was to inflate the base money supply, which will hardly re-inflate broad money (in which its inflation caused the asset price bubble in the first place). Japan did precisely that and the result was the rise of the yen carry trade in which among other things, Japanese banks extended credit to Asian countries.
Therefore, in Japan’s case, I would not recommend monetary inflation to solve deflation problems.
June 11th, 2007 at 3:34 pm
Clarification/correction on my previous post:
To be more precise, I meant that there was a vicious cycle of credit contraction and asset price collapse. Which of the two was the root cause of this vicious cycle would better be a separate discussion for another day.
June 11th, 2007 at 11:05 pm
Dear Contrarian,
I would also see credit contraction and asset price deflation as part of the process, but I take the causal mechanism back one stage further to the excessive accumulation of debt–on the basis of “euphoric expectations” about asset price inflation–over the preceding decade.
See the November 2006 Debtwatch report, page 12, Figure 14 for a nice empirical statement of this. While I don’t believe that the OECD debt figures can be directly mapped to the RBA and US FRB debt figures I use elsewhere in the report ( I expect the OECD’s classification drastically understates Japan’s actual domestic debt levels), the dynamic between accelerating debt and economic performance is quite clearly shown in the data.
So I see the root cause as debt accumulation during a boom–which is what we are experiencing now. Once that reaches excessive levels–which means once the debt servicing commitments become extreme compared to cash flows from actual productive investments–then the system can tip over into a debt-induced downturn. This is Minsky’s thesis, which I’m attempting to develop further.
June 12th, 2007 at 2:11 pm
Hi Contrarian,
It’s good to see you contributing here – your blog has been a great source of reading material for me lately. I will try to start giving back to your blog in future.
I don’t have much to add here, except to say I can understand that there are arguments both for and against trying to inflate our way out of the mess we’re in. I’m not informed enough to comment on the problems that might eventuate. I just see a continuation along our current path taking us further toward an unpleasant outcome.
“How is it possible to engineer an inflation whereby only goods prices rises and asset price remain stagnant? Any policy of deliberate inflation runs the risk of misfiring and thereby further inflating asset prices.”
I would have thought some combination of credit controls (restrictions or tax on equity withdrawal for starters) would do the trick in keeping asset prices in check. Are you saying that high wage and general inflation and little to no (real) debt growth would lead to mass unemployment?
Rather than simply agreeing to disagree on “monetary dynamics and the causes of inflation” would it be too much to ask for a brief explanation of the differences of opinion? Just the key points as they relate to the argument? And no big words, okay? ;-P
June 13th, 2007 at 1:03 am
Hi foundation!
Firstly, please note that Austrian School’s definition of inflation is different from the mainstream definition. Austrian School define inflation as the growth in money supply (i.e. debasement of the currency). In other words, according to the Austrian School’s definition, inflation is purely a monetary phenomena.
A clear understanding of the different definitions is essential to avoid miscommunication in discussions.
Not exactly. Let me quote the book, What You Should Know About Inflation by Henry Hazlitt (an Austrian School economist):